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Abstract 
  
 In this dissertation, the author argues that constructivist foundations of political 
liberalism require a rarely recognized sort of pluralism—not only the familiar pluralism 
between ideas about how we ought to live that are the stock in trade of standard accounts 
of liberalism, but a pluralism about political foundations as well. The author argues that 
making sense of this requires revision to the way we sometimes understand key concepts 
(such as obligation), and develops an inconsistency-tolerant, pluralism friendly deontic 
logic for this purpose.  
A pluralist friendly obligation is argued to be one that represents moral and 
political principles in contrastive terms (analogous to contrastive explanation from Bas 
Van Fraassen), in virtue of the need to order acting upon prescriptions. The author 
develops a class of mathematical objects choices to model answers to why we should 
choose one policy over alternatives. 
 Constructivist foundations also turn out to be prima facie pluralist foundations, in 
virtue of the nature of the norms guiding abstraction. This leads to a proof that, in a 
weakest base logic, legitimate moral or political codes in a pluralist context must 
reference each other. Upon explicating the distinction between perspectives that could 
consider unrealizable plans and perspectives that are themselves unrealizable, the author 
proves that in our world liberalism is itself an unrealizable plan. These results clearly 
illuminate what is at stake when justifying foundations for a liberal state. 
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Politics, Principles and Pluralism: 
On why liberalism must be inconsistent if correct. 
 
I.  Introduction: Justification and Pluralism 
Justifying a liberal approach to political policy, especially fundamental policy, 
begins with taking the deep divisions and disagreements in a society seriously. In other 
words, liberalism is based upon balancing and prioritizing the moral and life concerns of 
the various members of a pluralist society. In this thesis I shall argue that there is 
important philosophical work that needs to be done before we can get to this fundamental 
balancing act, i.e., deciding upon some basis for justifying political liberalism; there are 
good reasons to think that we need to sort out what some of the concepts we routinely use 
in political and moral discussions can mean in a pluralist context. To be clear, I am 
proposing that many of the concepts we take for granted when theorizing liberalism may 
be unfit in a pluralist context. My hope is that if we can identify exactly how and why this 
mismatch occurs, substantial progress will not be far behind. Let me begin with some 
motivating examples. 
 
I.i  Ought and Can 
Is it possible that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is a platitude? If not, under what 
conditions does ‘ought’ imply ‘can’? If a pluralism regarding correct or acceptable ethical 
theories were plausible, such conditions would make the connection between what we 
ought to do and what we can do far more complicated than may be surmised. The 
problem is, at least at first glance, if one hews to a meta-ethics allowing more than one 
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correct but conflicting moral theory, one ends up committed to the claim that ‘ought’ 
does not imply ‘can’ except in those [rare] occasions where there is only one such correct 
theory that is actually applicable. 
A brief sketch of this argument: suppose we have two equally correct, but 
conflicting theories of what we ought to do. Since they conflict, it must be that they 
prescribe actions that turn out to be incompatible, i.e., acting on one obligation precludes 
being able to do the other. So we have a case where we ought to do two actions, but can 
only do one. Thus, we ought to do something but can’t do it. Obviously, this sketch calls 
for a more detailed discussion, which can be found in chapter two.  
 
I.ii  Consistencies and Equilibrium 
As is well known, reflective equilibrium prescribes mutual adjustment between 
general principles and concrete judgments, with the aim of achieving not only a sort of 
consistency between abstract principles and exemplary cases, but also a best version of 
such a balance. The idea here turns on two subordinate claims. First, that there are better 
and worse ways of reaching this balance. Second, that we identify a best such balance 
with a justification for the constitutive principles and judgments regarding the exemplary 
cases. In other words, it’s insufficient for us to merely obtain consistency between 
principles and intuitions; different approaches to reaching a balance, i.e., a consistent 
package of principles and intuitions, need to be taken into account and compared. If we 
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can’t do better1 than a given balance of principles and intuitions, those principles and 
intuitions are correct (or justified).  
Arguably, pluralism doesn’t play nice with reflective equilibrium either. Here is a 
sketch of why. Pluralism entails irreducible disagreement between equally correct 
theories—see chapter one for details. Thus we are guaranteed at least some inconsistency 
between the principles we expect to take as correct in some cases, concrete or otherwise. 
But the previous explication of reflective equilibrium made (seemingly essential) 
reference to consistency. Thus, if we use reflective equilibrium to justify 
theories/concrete judgments in a subject matter where we think a plurality of theories 
may hold, it seems we are doomed to failure.2 If you can’t get a consistent group of 
principles and intuitions, it seems to follow that instead of a plurality of correct theories, 
we instead have none. 
Here is another way to approach this idea. Let’s suppose that we have a reflective 
equilibrium set up that looks like we have multiple best balances of principles and 
intuitions. If this could make sense, each such principle and intuition could be justified as 
correct according to proponents of reflective equilibrium. On this supposition, there will 
be multiple best but conflicting balances between various principles and intuitions: 
maximals rather than a maximum. Unfortunately for those wanting to treat reflective 
                                                        1 And of course, I will remain silent on what makes one version better than another. Readers may fill in the blank as they see fit, nothing in what follows should hang in the balance. 2 This is how I understand Nelson Goodman’s later argument that there must be a plurality of actual worlds [Goodman 1984]. Since he argues that a version, i.e., a philosophical description, of a world must be consistent, it must mean that there are many such worlds since there are many such correct descriptions. These theoretical descriptions just happen to be mutually inconsistent. Perhaps, this is why he claims to be a relativist. 
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equilibrium as a justificatory method, since these local maximals will conflict with each 
other, the principles they espouse can’t be consistent with each other. And thus, reflective 
equilibrium calls for further adjustment (and perpetually so). In other words, a reflective 
equilibrium approach can’t seemingly allow us to claim that more than one, but 
conflicting, theory is correct regarding the same issue in the first place (i.e., if consistency 
must be a feature of whatever sets of principles and intuitions from which we then look 
for a best such version). Thus, there are no consistent solutions possible between all the 
principles (and intuitions) we think should be correct, given pluralism. 
While obviously not conclusive (there may be some way to relax the requirement 
of consistency in pluralist contexts3), the above sketch of an argument is intended instead 
to be only suggestive. As such, I do not defend this argument in detail in what follows. 
Rather, the point here is that meta-ethical pluralism should not be accepted blithely, i.e., 
just because we think that there is theoretical value to allowing multiple but conflicting 
theories or values/principles. This said, I propose that we should be at least suspicious 
regarding the coherence of pluralism in meta-ethics and thus, there is a pressing need to 
understand just what we are committed to when intuitions incline us to theorize liberalism 
in pluralist terms. 
 
II.  Liberalism is a Pluralism 
Of course, if pluralism seems incompatible with what we think about core ideas, 
one might think so much the worse for pluralism in meta-ethics. And philosophically, if 
                                                        3 Perhaps use some version of pareto optimality instead of best equilibrium or even reject pluralism by compartmentalizing the different theories so they are talking about different subjects, i.e., treat each local maximal as its own type. 
   5 
that is the way you see the conceptual costs and benefits tilt, so be it. After all, if 
pluralism in meta-ethics requires generally jettisoning ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and the use 
of a basic philosophical tool like reflective equilibrium, we better look for something else 
besides a pluralist hypothesis. However, at least for those inclined to liberalism, this is 
not a viable response—pluralism in any meta-ethics compatible with liberalism runs 
deeper than may have first been thought, a claim I now turn to argue. 
In the foundations of political liberalism we find a sort of pluralism that refuses to 
go away. And trying to formulate the foundations of liberalism without taking this 
pluralism seriously has led to some notable, even if fruitful, failures. Before he died, John 
Rawls argued that merely taking pluralism about what is good in life seriously is not 
enough [Rawls 2005]. In order to account for all that a liberal theorist should, one must 
accept a plurality of what he called Public Reasons; in particular his principles of justice 
should be just one type (and perhaps a minor one at that) of Public Reason among many 
(pg. 450). To avoid the use of his particular jargon, we can say that Rawls recognized a 
plurality of general principles of political justice. But why take Rawls’ advice? The 
answer is that formulating the foundations of liberalism requires taking reasonable 
disagreement seriously, at whatever level of analysis one may find it. Here’s how. 
 
II.i  Liberals Disagreeing and Obligation 
The principles of political liberalism are supposed to lay out how we should live 
together while still disagreeing, and even fundamentally so, about what is good in life. 
Such disagreement about what is good in life may be thought of as pluralism about 
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private morality, as opposed to public morality.4 At this level, correct liberal principles 
should then play a dual role, providing both a moral justification for a particular approach 
to the problem of how to resolve tensions arising from differing private moralities, i.e., 
pluralism about the good life, and also a providing a degree of practical guidance about 
how to do so. 
But, as we will see, there are good reasons to think liberalism is itself a pluralism, 
not just a single story about how to deal with private morality pluralism. What does it 
mean that liberalism is a pluralism? Since it is the ambition of political liberalism5 to set 
up how we can still cooperate qua society, given the disagreement found in pluralist 
society, the liberal theorist's job is to provide a correct account about how to 
appropriately enforce such cooperation. Of course, different theorists propose different, 
incompatible answers to both aspects of this question: the terms of cooperation and its 
enforcement or implementation. Liberalism is a pluralism if these different theorists are 
equally correct about how we should cooperate (and enforce it). 
The launching point for this project is then to ask what seems an obvious question, 
framed this way: why can’t people reasonably disagree about how we should cooperate                                                         4 While there may be different ways of spelling out this (often fraught) distinction, for our purposes what we want to be able to distinguish is cases where the principles or values involved regulate the use of resources (time, money, power etc.) provided in trust by others, i.e., a public case, from cases where such issues arise at best, if at all, derivatively, i.e., a private case. The question of what ought I do in public cases must appeal to norms involving the reasonable expectations of those who have entrusted the relevant resources, while in the private case, one is freed from having to account for the expectations of others as they see them. I.e., in the private case one may account for others according to one’s reasonable moral theory or considered judgment. But in the public case, one ought to account for the relevant expectations on their own terms, or more precisely a negotiated version of their terms. 5 Articulating this notion in terms of an ambition is due to a suggestion from Mathieu Doucet in conversation. 
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qua liberal society, and not just about what is good in life? To be more direct, it may have 
seemed safe to assume that it is counter-productive, if not impossible, to theorize the 
liberal state by using a variety of correct, complete, but disagreeing accounts of fairness, 
or justice. (Or whatever else one takes to be the fundamental notions underpinning 
the rules of cooperation qua society for a suitably liberal state.) After all, liberalism is 
supposed to resolve how to get along while disagreeing; and disagreeing about this might 
be tantamount to the failure of the liberal project itself. But this ‘no-disagreement’ 
assumption for the foundation of liberalism I shall argue is untenable. In fact, in chapter 
one I shall argue that this is an instance of a more general philosophical lesson: 
constructive foundations in general (i.e., in any subject matter) are also, prima facie, 
pluralist foundations. 
Put in these terms, it may be thought that this line of argumentation compounds 
the problems of liberalism. That is, granted we take seriously the suggestion that 
pluralism is of dubious coherence (for example on grounds like its seeming 
incompatibility with certain truisms), the last thing we should want is to theorize 
liberalism in terms of pluralism. But it seems to me that we need to take the question of 
‘why can’t we reasonably disagree about how to cooperate’ as, at least prima facie, a 
serious one. Consider, for instance, some debates about the rules of cooperation as they 
actually occur in contemporary liberal societies. Let us briefly discuss the debates 
regarding the best system for electing members of legislatures.   
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II.ii  Unfair/Fair Elections 
Readers are probably somewhat familiar with various options for what we may 
call electoral formulas—first past the post, proportional representation, automatic run-off 
and others, some of which have several variants. What I want to note here is that each 
electoral formula has a plausible case to be made for it on grounds of fairness and justice. 
Moreover, each is also susceptible to criticism on grounds of fairness and justice. For 
ease of presentation, consider just a few of the various negative criteria for a fair and just 
electoral formula or system: 
It is prima facie unfair or unjust: 
a) to ignore/abstract away anyone’s vote in deciding which candidate wins a seat 
b) to ask citizens to vote without suitable political debate (and this requires local 
debates) 
c) to not let citizens vote for a local representative if they so choose 
d) to allow the system to abstract away which party wins the most ‘first choice’ 
votes in deciding which candidate wins the seat 
e) for a system to allow seat distribution to be unrepresentative of voters’ 
preferences, i.e., a suitable sample of seats should be representative of the voting 
population, suitably construed. 
 
For our purposes, what matters is that it is unclear whether the burden for any relevant 
criterion is met for any of one of the electoral systems. And I am sure there are many 
more criteria that may cloud matters further. Here are a couple of examples. With first 
past the post in Canada, for example, generally half of the time you only need little better 
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than a third of the votes in a riding to win the seat.6 So while FPTP allows and 
encourages local debates, with local representatives and ensures at the riding level the 
candidate who wins the most ‘first choice’ votes wins the seat, half of the time two thirds 
of votes are ignored and can allow for parties to win a majority of seats while receiving 
less total votes than another party. On the other hand, Automatic Run-off systems can 
allow (while in practice rarely do so) that a candidate who wins the most first-place votes 
to not win the seat by treating first-place votes as, in some sense, on par with 2nd or even 
lower place votes. And of course, there is nothing in either system that straightforwardly 
encourages or ensures a legislature or executive that is demographically representative of 
the voting population.7 
It seems that taking some types of fairness considerations seriously will show any 
one of these electoral formulas in a favorable light but at the cost of disregarding other 
types of fairness considerations. The question of what makes an electoral system fair 
seems to have multiple cogent answers. Each sort of consideration from the above 
example emphasized different characteristics we take to be relevant when deciding 
whether a voting system is fair. If this characterization of the fairness of electoral 
formulas is cogent, reasonable disagreement about the right way to cooperate, i.e., in 
terms of this sort of basic institution, will be inevitable.   
                                                        6 Accessed June 10 2014 http://www.citizensassembly.gov.on.ca/assets/From%20Votes%20to%20Seats.pdf 7 Again, the electoral formula or system itself doesn’t encourage demographic representation, but if some ridings are dominated by demographic subsections parties have an incentive to use candidates representative of that demographic. But this is happy coincidence, not a virtue of the systems in question. 
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Of course, I don't pretend that one example, or even a range of similar ones, could 
establish that this sort of reasonable disagreement exists—at this stage I aim only to be 
suggestive. What this suggests is that liberalism is caught between needing to take 
disagreement seriously at all levels and on the other hand maintaining theoretical 
coherence. I assume that this problem is not merely ‘eating cake and having it too’; rather, 
if we want to articulate how liberalism can itself be a pluralism8 we need better 
conceptual tools. This project aims to develop a foundation for the concepts we need to 
correctly theorize a truly pluralist liberalism.  
III. Obligations and Pluralism 
To develop a foundation for a thoroughly pluralist liberalism, this thesis is 
roughly divided into two parts. The first section examines the nature of pluralism and 
reasons for thinking when and how it could be true, in general and in moral domains 
specifically. In these sections I also explain how the formal and informal methodologies I 
have chosen are well suited for analyzing the relevant notions. That is, I show that a 
pluralist context makes certain demands on how we theorize.  
The second part pursues the task of providing a pluralism-compatible account of 
the central moral concepts it seems to conflict with. If the dubious coherence of pluralism 
results from a faulty analysis of the concepts, like obligation (especially as it relates to 
                                                        8 One way to motivate research into the various Relevant logics is to take the paradoxes of self‐reference (such as the various Liar sentences) as valid with true premises. Articulating liberalism as a solution to private morality pluralism but as a pluralism itself is likely no accident. You can find in chapter four a proof that in pluralist contexts moral codes must refer to each other. However, the exact nature of the self‐referencing nature of liberalism remains to be worked out in future work. 
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the notion of principles of justice in a liberal democratic context), an account of 
obligation and its cognates that can make sense in a pluralist context is desirable. To 
develop one, I defend a contrastive analysis of obligation under conditions of pluralism, 
which allows us to make sense of disagreement about the right way to socially cooperate.  
I also assume that the principles of liberal justice are decided upon, not 
discovered; in this sense, my approach is part of the constructive traditions in liberal 
foundations and so my approach can be seen as offering an assist to such liberal theorists 
who have either hinted at or advocated pluralism about liberal foundations. Moreover, as 
pointed out already, if my arguments in chapter one, i.e., that constructive foundations are 
prima facie pluralist, are correct, my approach is important for any constructivist in the 
liberal tradition. 
To summarize the general point another way, in this project I answer two 
questions at the heart of this pluralist turn. The first question: How is it possible (or more 
precisely, what would it cost) to have clear and intelligible notions of obligation, moral 
principles and other cognates if moral or political pluralism is assumed? And supposing a 
satisfying answer to that question: is there a suitable notion of pluralism that, in fact, 
could help constructivist liberals develop better a foundation for liberalism? 
IV. Method: Formalizing Obligation 
While there are various moral concepts the obvious readings of which conflict 
with pluralism, much of my discussion focuses on obligation. I do so since it is a linchpin 
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or keystone concept, which once clarified will make the needed adjustments to other 
notions clear. A simple sketch should suffice for now.  
The political rules arising from a particular foundational theory will tell citizens 
what they must do, ought to do or are forbidden from doing (e.g., in order to be fair to 
everyone) and what they are allowed to do. Presumably in a liberal state, the final 
category is large, the first three smaller, as befits a theory with the notion of liberty at its 
core. But if there are in fact various correct such foundational theories, and they are 
genuinely distinct and so disagreeing theories, presumably there will be disagreement 
about which category certain actions fall into.   
It is tempting to take such inconsistency as motivating a disambiguation rule. That 
is, to avoid saying that a particular action is both obligatory and not obligatory, or that 
two incompatible actions are both obligatory, one might defend the view that we mean 
different things by the notion of prescription found in each endorsed moral code. Rather 
than a plurality of equally correct but conflicting moral codes, we have only different 
theories with different conceptions of prescription and so no disagreement or pluralism 
after all. I will pursue a different road: if you get the right logic, inconsistency does not 
indicate the need to disambiguate.  
For a few decades now, logicians have pursued formal means of reflecting the 
intuition that all inconsistencies aren’t the same. Some sorts of inconsistency are not 
disastrous, logically speaking. The best-known sorts of logics that can distinguish 
between disastrous and deductively interesting inconsistencies are the various Relevant 
(or Relevance) logics. Of course, Classical and Intuitionistic logics treat all 
   13 
inconsistencies as explosive, implying everything and nothing. Representing deductions 
in a pluralist context however requires us to distinguish between when someone uses a 
particular theory in an inconsistent manner, which should be explosive, logically 
speaking, and when someone uses inconsistent claims from two different but equally 
correct theories. The latter sort of inconsistency must be allowed for, i.e., to put 
constraints on what follows from such inconsistent group of premises. 
The use of ready-made tools from formal logic is one reason that there is more 
symbolism in this thesis than one often finds in works of political philosophy—others 
have already considered how to revise what follows from inconsistencies. But there are 
further reasons to take a formal approach. Formalization is well known as the appropriate 
and go-to tool for investigating conceptual options and constraints for the sorts of 
concepts that can in some sense be treated as logical words, and words like ‘ought’ have 
long been regarded this way. A proper formal treatment of these concepts will help us 
sort out what these concepts can coherently mean in a pluralist setting.  
As may be guessed, standard deontic logics are not the right tool for the present 
job since inconsistency is disastrous in such logics; nonetheless I shall briefly argue this 
point in chapter two. The positive part of the project, so to speak, and the one the vast 
majority of this thesis deals with, is that we shall need to develop new tools for thinking 
about obligations (and cognates) in a pluralist setting. 
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V. The Difference between the Political and the Moral 
I am arguing that justifying liberal, fundamental policy requires understanding 
what justification would look like under conditions of pluralism. To accomplish this, 
there are two tracks I take in this project. First, as mentioned, the methodological track 
uses (or aims to use) a suitable notion of deontic consequence, i.e., a logic that treats 
‘obligation’ as a logical word. The philosophical track is to suppose that, as we are 
searching for norms that we can use to justify political liberalism, we can use the sort of 
norms we already use in the moral domain and make suitable adjustments for use in the 
political sphere. In both cases, the adjustments I will argue for will be due sometimes to 
considerations regarding the nature of value pluralism and other times in regards to 
special features found in political claims (or at least allow for such a possibility.)  
The worry here is how can I allow for the possibility that political claims about 
liberalism are not the same as substantive moral claims, i.e., liberalism as a political 
theory needn’t assume any particular meta-ethical view. There’s a potential tension 
between using a formalism that focuses on an ostensibly moral notion, as well as often 
using moral examples to illustrate the norms I argue we should adapt for use in the 
foundations of liberalism, and respecting the distinction between substantive moral 
claims and political claims.  
The response to this concern in the methodological arena starts with the idea that 
while it is also a live debate whether pluralism is true in the ethical realm, it is not an 
implausible suggestion. My account of issues, like one norm trumping another, spell out 
the need for representing these types and patterns of conceptual reasoning by positing 
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moral pluralism, and account for the mechanisms of, say, trumping, in that light. If I am 
right, the liberal political domain is also one in which we find a plurality of normative 
codes, so it is plausible that analogous formal tools will work in both domains. The idea 
here is that on a substantive or material level of analysis it’s possible to draw carefully 
circumscribed but fruitful analogies between moral and political claims; on a formal level, 
such analogies are easier to come by, since structural similarity comes much cheaper than 
does the material. This is generally one of the great virtues of formal analysis, i.e., that 
the same structure may be instantiated in different (and sometimes radically different) 
realms, which allows us to use claims in one domain to articulate a similar claim in a 
different domain. 
On this account, we may see moral and political codes as both species of a more 
general notion of a normative code, and that to a significant degree the structure found in 
moral codes under conditions of pluralism generalizes and thus can be applied in the 
analysis of political codes (under conditions of pluralism.) Part of the justification for this 
attitude (towards the generalizability of the structure of moral codes) is in fact how apt 
such structure turns out to be, i.e., for representing political codes under pluralist 
conditions. In other words, I am asking that the context of discovery serve also, at least 
somewhat, as a context of justification. And of course, if I am right about this 
species/genus differentiation, we could do no more to philosophically respect the 
distinction between political claims and substantial moral claims. And all this while 
nonetheless treating such claims as structurally similar in the way presupposed by this 
methodology. 
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Regarding the other aspect of this concern, when I explain what is philosophically 
or materially at stake regarding certain distinctions, I will generally use moral examples 
to articulate a first approximation. And given the methodological track I take, I ought not 
do otherwise, i.e., I need to first formulate a moral version before I can explain why I 
need to make the required adjustments to render it properly political in nature. Moreover, 
there is nothing claimed here a priori about the nature of political claims, i.e., that they 
just are notions adapted from moral contexts. Rather, the claim is that I can use the 
analysis of notions found in the moral context to develop an analysis for the relevant 
political claim. Here I am instructed by Feigl [1968]: philosophical analysis is the search 
for the basis of justification for the relevant class of claims. On this account, justification 
is giving reasons why you choose, believe, etc. A instead of B: A falls under the relevant 
norm, say W, while B does not. And if someone demands justification for the norm W, 
none can be given, or, as I would add, not without specifying alternative norms, say Y or 
X and arguing that W does a better job than Y or X in regulating what matters in that 
discourse.  
As Dummett [1980] points out, reporting correct usage, i.e., as falling under the 
relevant norm, is not philosophy, but mere description (pg. 2.) There is a reason for these 
norms, the ‘why we follow said norm’ and this reason is what is properly philosophical. 
In other words, what we do by following the norm is what is at stake, philosophically. As 
it turns out, at least in my approach, the philosophical stakes are far more easily drawn 
when dealing with the toy models and thought experiments common to the moral domain. 
Again, the claim I am defending is not that there is no distinction between the political 
and the substantive moral; rather that they aren’t so different that we can’t make suitable 
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adjustments to norms in one domain to justify claims in the other. And this is possible 
because, as I will argue in particular cases, why we follow these philosophically 
significant norms are relevantly similar in both domains. 
While this argument may not be conclusive in some a priori sense, the point is 
instead to motivate at least taking this sort of methodology seriously enough to test out its 
results. 
VI. Outline 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter One, I introduce some of the 
basic notions underlying this project. First, I introduce the philosophical issues that I take 
to motivate the move to pluralism in meta-ethics: Bernard Williams’ anti-systematic 
claims regarding ethics and Amartya Sen’s infeasibility and redundancy objections to 
constructing ideally just states in liberal theory. I then sketch a brief and informal version 
of my response to these objections, i.e., to using ideal versions of a state to theorize 
liberalism. I then look at the concepts of deontic logic and the value of using a logical 
approach to meta-ethics. Next I examine the connection between action-guiding 
principles, moral constructivism and pluralism. Here I argue that a constructivist 
foundation is also prima facie a pluralist foundation. 
In Chapter Two, I examine the nature of pluralism, both in general and in meta-
ethics in particular. I first survey some common and pertinent responses to moral 
disagreement or dilemmas and argue that dilemmas ought to be taken seriously, not 
explained away. One way to take dilemmas seriously is to posit that there are multiple 
correct moral theories that conflict in such cases. The next section is a detailed 
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examination of the nature of theoretical pluralism and how it could apply to regimenting 
meta-ethics. The next three sections examine a family of what I suggest are logical and 
philosophical consequences of taking moral pluralism seriously: inconsistency of 
principles, paraconsistency, and (perhaps) true contradictions. From this discussion, a 
clear picture of what taking pluralism seriously involves emerges. We can now begin the 
analysis of obligation and its cognates under conditions of pluralism. 
Chapter Three is concerned with the problem of action-guidance in a pluralist 
context. The idea is that, when faced with the sort of disagreement seen as problematic 
for action-guidance, the relevant codes may prescribe trumping the original but 
conflicting obligation with a coordination mechanism. These mechanisms could allow us 
to settle disagreement in some, if not most, cases in a liberal society. There are two 
subordinate issues involved in this strategy. First, what is a trumping relation? Second, 
what is a fair coordination mechanism?  
Given these issues, Chapter Three is largely focused on the philosophical details 
of how we should analyze obligation such that we can make sense of contrary to duty 
(CTD hereafter) structures and what I call ‘trumping’ relations. A trumping relation holds 
between two obligations when one obligation overrides the other. A CTD structure is 
closely related, and the idea here is if one were to do wrong, not all bets are off so to 
speak. After one has done wrong, there are still moral reasons to refrain from other evils.9 
                                                        9 The Gentle Murder Paradox is likely the most famous CTD structure in the literature [Forrester 1984]: Suppose you are going to murder someone (clearly contrary to duty). But surely, one ought to mitigate harm when one can. Thus if you murder someone, you ought to murder them gently. The problem is that if one murders someone gently, one murders him or her. And if you ought to do action A, you ought to do what A entails. Thus you ought to murder him or her. Since we take 
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The first section details the problems that result from using propositions as basic 
parameters, i.e., atoms, in any deontic logic that has trumping relations or CTD structures.  
The next section argues that moral principles should be understood as more fine-
grained than is the usual practice. To capture this more nuanced conception, I defend a 
view that moral principles need to be understood contrastively. While I claim no 
commitment to the view as originally developed for scientific explanation by Van 
Fraassen [1980], I do make use of certain elements as found in his proposal. I argue that 
what matters for representing moral principles is being able to identify what sort of 
choices one ought or ought not to so choose. To this end, I propose that choices should be 
represented by a list of options and that principles should be understood as a claim that 
such and such option should be chosen, morally speaking, instead of the other options. In 
following the literature surrounding Van Fraassen’s project, I call my proposal 
“Contrastive Principles”. I show how we need a structure that allows us to specify the 
contrast class of the action we are morally evaluating in order to represent choices and 
thus moral principles.  
In Chapter Four, the previously informal concepts of choices and obligations, 
specifically the resulting ideality ordering and related moral orderings are treated 
formally. I then introduce a proof-theory to reason about and with the concepts defined 
by this order theory. I show how we can use the weakest formal language to deduce a 
criterion for any moral code under conditions of pluralism: that any such code must 
guarantee that acting upon its prescriptions is compatible with the obligations of rival 
codes. As may be guessed, this criterion bears a strong resemblance to parts of Rawls’                                                                                                                                                                      conditionals to be transitive, we have the paradox: If you murder someone, you ought to murder him or her. 
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inference from what he calls the fact of Reasonable pluralism. But of significant 
theoretical value, I show that this conclusion holds without using any of his theoretical 
apparatus or assumptions; the bare meaning of logical terms under conditions of 
pluralism entails the criterion. 
With these tools in place, the formal semantics for the language RD-choice is 
introduced. RD-choice is shown to be paraconsistent, relevant, and constructive.  
Next I introduce a semantics for a pluralist version of obligation: neighborhood 
semantics. If a sense of permissibility is treated as interdefinable with obligation, I 
demonstrate the need for a different sense of permissibility for sub-ideal worlds such as 
ours. This result can represent the distinction between weak and strong permissibility as 
found in the deontic logic literature. It is also shown that in the neighborhood semantics 
Williams’ [1981] maxim is right; the relationship between ought and must is the same 
relationship as that between best and only.  
I conclude with comments regarding directions for research in solving problems 
in deontic logic, such as CTD structures and other order problems. I also point to the 
possibility of deriving radically different types of foundations for liberalism. It seems safe 
to assume that some notion of impartiality must underwrite the foundation for justifying 
liberal policy. I propose that another sort of foundation is possible, given the arguments 
regarding the nature of constructive abstraction and pluralism: the fiduciary perspective. 
Finally I propose that my account of a plurality of moral and political codes, i.e., the type 
and nature of interaction between such codes, can provide a useful scaffold for theorizing 
the legitimacy of the state. In brief, when the political codes of a state are used in moral 
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criticism to adjust private moral codes and when private moral codes are used in moral 
criticism to adjust the political codes of a state, that state is taken to be legitimate. 
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Chapter One  Foundations 
1.0 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will be looking at starting points. The first issue: Bernard 
Williams and Amartya Sen may be seen as arguing that taking pluralism seriously is 
tantamount to rejecting systematic constructivism in ethics. If they are correct, this 
project (i.e., of using systematic constructivism in a pluralist context) is misguided. I will 
argue that their criticism leaves open at least one avenue of escape, and that this is the 
option I will take: allowing for a constructive system to be inconsistent. The first problem 
I look at is the anti-systematic program of Bernard Williams [1981], perhaps best 
captured by his slogan “‘ought’ is related to ‘must’ as ‘best’ is related to ‘only’” (pg. 
125.) The other issue is Amartya Sen’s [2009] objections to social contract foundations of 
liberalism. I show how we can use Sen’s complaints to make a more general point 
regarding the problems faced by any constructivist approach. In this chapter I will briefly 
and informally sketch out how the sort of pluralist approach I propose will be able to 
respond to these objections. A more detailed response, in some respects, must wait 
because the details depend on some of the formal work to be done in later chapters. 
The second issue follows up on this discussion of pluralism and Sen’s and 
Williams’ criticisms: why use a logical approach to meta-ethics? The idea is that while 
we may want to use a pluralist perspective to defend a foundation for political liberalism, 
we first need to justify a method for investigating the details of a suitable pluralism. It 
would be cold comfort to have a doctrine that solves problems at a general level, but turns 
out to be too problematic in the details. To this end, I argue that the relevant moral terms 
and concepts can be treated as particular sorts of mathematical objects. Given an 
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appropriate formal language to reason with and about such objects, we will be well on 
our way to understanding the ramifications and consequences of a pluralist approach for 
liberal foundations. 
The next issue will concern doubts regarding the epistemic status of pluralism in 
meta-ethics. It may be hoped that the multiplicity of moral approaches to liberalism is 
merely an artifact of the state of current scholarship, contra Williams or Sen. The hope is 
that once we have better understood our notions, we could develop one uniquely correct 
theory that captures everything we thought mattered. However, I argue that the very 
nature of constructivist foundations, when properly understood, generates a prima facie 
case for a plurality of such foundations. So whether or not one agrees with Williams’ and 
Sen’s arguments for taking pluralism seriously, as constructivists we have at least a prima 
facie case for so doing. It would appear that a constructivist approach leads one to allow 
for inconsistent systems in general and in meta-ethics in particular. 
 
1.1 The Organizing Issues: The distinction between ‘Must’ and ‘Ought’  
To understand why a pluralist turn looks to hold promise for solving issues in the 
foundations of political liberalism, I will first look at why some have argued that 
pluralism is instead deeply problematic for systematic constructivist foundations. I begin 
with Bernard Williams and his criticism of systematic approaches in general.  
As in other fields, foundational theories tend to include answers to questions 
regarding the nature of characteristic concepts (for example, what is the nature of 
obligation). Also, it is common that foundational theories should vindicate practices as 
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found in its target area.10 And when we think of foundations, thoughts of a systematic 
theory are often not far behind. However, in his book Moral Luck, and throughout much 
of his oeuvre, Bernard Williams used features found in concrete moral practices to 
support his contention that no systematic foundation was possible for moral theory. I 
propose that such concrete moral practices instead suggest that no self-consistent 
systematic foundation is possible. If I am correct about the nature of these starting points, 
my conjecture is that Williams’ reasoning should lead us not to reject a systematic 
approach simpliciter, rather only to reject self-consistent systems. However, while I will 
gladly borrow the concrete starting points he describes, the details of Williams’ 
arguments are beyond the scope of this project. All I need from this discussion is the 
conclusion that at least some systems, for example a suitable pluralist foundation, are 
permitted, given the relevant concrete starting points. 
A major starting point for Williams’ [2012] argument was the fact that the meta-
ethical perspectives of his day failed to take seriously the fact that we find irreducibly 
conflicting responsibilities throughout lived moral experiences [2012]. His anti-
systematic perspective relied, in part, on a distinction between ought and must observed 
in such concrete instances of conflict. He formulated this distinction as follows: that 
“obligation is related to must as best is related to only.” (Hereafter I may refer to this as 
the obligation as best options claim.)  
The problem the obligations as best options claim raises for a systematic 
foundations is that it seems if the system involves a unique moral theory, then what it 
                                                        10 Which, in sotto voce, often really means “gloss over any revisions.” 
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finds to be the best action, decision, choice etc. for some moral situation is also the only 
such best option. Thus, there could be no distinction between ought and must.11 
What I take from this distinction: if a systematic approach to action-guiding 
principles is self-consistent, in that for any one particular moral issue there is at most 
one12 applicable principle to guide action, the distinction between ought and must is 
obscured or even conflated. In other words, when what we ought to do is the only thing 
we should do (and vice versa), there is no real difference between what we must and what 
we ought to do. Perhaps this suggests that, on this account, the distinction between ought 
and must is merely grammatical or a matter of emphasis at best.  
Given that we want this distinction to be more meaningful, it seems that correctly 
abstracting principles from the concrete level of lived moral experiences often requires 
positing a multiplicity of ways to best live up to our responsibilities. If we want to take 
into account all relevant moral concerns i.e., found in more concrete terms, then correctly 
balancing of the responsibilities of different moral roles may take many different guises. 
Looking at this issue in this way suggests a theoretic possibility with important 
implications. There is some plausibility in the notion that a theory could have a principle 
that in some cases finds two states of affairs to have the same amount of good and bad for 
different reasons. For example, if one is to maximize the amount of happiness within 
some group, there may be many different ways to calibrate this hedonic calculus. In other 
                                                        11 True, there is another possible sense of ‘must’ in ethics: the must of a minimum requirement. However, a similar sort of issue arises once we countenance the possibility of minimals instead of a unique minimum.  12 Technically, the set of evaluations, given the standard notion of a systematic foundation, is a linear chain, i.e., it has a non‐branching structure: any option it evaluates is better or worse than any other element it evaluates. 
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words there may be no unique distribution for the maximum amount of happiness 
throughout this group.13  
However, it is not clear whether the lack of distributive principles constitutes a 
principled distinction between ought and must. Failing to guide distribution may merely 
amount to a lacuna in the action guiding power of the theory after all. Nonetheless, we 
can see from this case that it might be possible to distinguish a choice with multiple best 
options from there being only one such best option. But the question now is: what would 
it take for there to be a principled connection between many/one best option(s) and the 
distinction between ought/must? 
Perhaps we should look to a more fine-grained decision procedure for a basis for 
the distinction between ought and must. A decision procedure is a principled basis after 
all. If, as is commonly thought, a constructivist approach is supposed to specify a 
procedure for identifying the relevant principle for deciding a case, that same procedure 
should always identify the same principle in all morally similar cases. This consistency 
over similar cases is a standard, and some might think bedrock, criterion for a cogent 
decision procedure. Put this way, it seems that there shouldn’t be ‘tied for best’ in 
constructive procedures.14 That is, it seems impossible that a consistent procedure could 
give us different results from the same starting points. The natural option is to then to 
allow for multiple procedures for deciding what is best.                                                         13 To be clear, while the different distributions may conflict, there is no conflict between moral principles on this account.  14 Notwithstanding Rawls’ contention that the nature of different groups does not matter in distributive justice as long as the proper pattern of distribution holds (i.e., that the worst off are the best off they could be) [Rawls 2005]; however, as will be argued in the next chapter, this notion actually obscures a requirement in his early theory, that is a theory of distributive justice is on the hook for identifying what should count as a fair coordination mechanism among the fair or just distributions.  
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The lesson, then, from the lack-of-distributive-principles case is that we’re 
looking for a constructive system that, in some cases, finds no moral distinction between 
multiple options, each relevant to the one and same decision. That is, given at least two 
such options there should be a relevant and correct decision procedure, which says each is 
the best thing for us to do. Thus, we need a constructive system with multiple, equally 
correct but conflicting decision procedures such that there could be no moral reason to 
prefer one decision procedure over another, at least in some non-trivial cases. Such a 
possibility would allow us to differentiate between cases where there is only one best 
option and cases where there are multiple best options; thus we could have a principled 
ought/must distinction.  
Of course, if I am correct and theories must be able to be thought of as consistent 
sets, there must be a way to conceive of a systematic foundation as not a theory. To do so, 
I will distinguish between a systematic approach and a theory, but this must wait until I 
explain why and how I will use formal methodology. Before that discussion, let me first 
introduce Sen’s objections to constructing ideally just states as a basis for justifying 
liberalism. After all, Sen asks a similar question to the one I raised in the introduction: 
why can’t people reasonably disagree about what is unjust? 
 
1.2 The Organizing Issues: the Infeasibility and Redundancy Problems 
Liberal theory qua political doctrine, i.e. over and above the meta-ethical issues 
regarding pluralism raised in the last section, faces at least two foundational problems, to 
which I contend, theoretical pluralism instead provides a viable solution. 
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Let me introduce some background to the issues. It is useful to categorize, broadly 
speaking, two main strands in the kinds of answers political philosophers give to the 
question of what policy should guide us in the selection of public policy [Sen 2009: pgs. 
5-12]. The received view may be thought of as Regulatory Ideal Theory (RIT) 
methodologies. The basic idea behind RITs is that from among the realistic alternatives 
for the basic constitution of a state, we ought to choose the one that most closely 
approximates the ideal. In this project I am focusing on a subset of RITs, that is, those 
that use a constructivist framework. To be clear, constructivist RITs specify criteria for 
acceptability of principles under ideal conditions. 
The main challengers to RIT may be called Comparative Approaches (CA).  Such 
approaches argue that working from a neutral perspective, which will vary from theory to 
theory, the various options could be cardinally ranked according to different standards for 
‘better than’ (or left argued for in informal terms). As described, these are very broad 
categories. Plato, Kant and Rousseau are some of the earliest defenders of the regulatory 
ideal. John Rawls’ early work is a good example of contemporary RIT, as is Robert 
Nozick’s libertarianism. Different as all their views are, each is concerned with 
specifying the ideal form of a just state and by so doing providing a framework for 
justifying policy in concrete situations.  
Adam Smith, Karl Marx15 and John Stuart Mill are some good examples of the 
CA tradition. Important contemporary comparative theorists include Amartya Sen and 
Kenneth Arrow. Each is concerned with specifying an impartial perspective and a                                                         15 That is, I think given two caveats; when his methodology was economic/historical in nature and when he argued that the proletariat perspective deserves to be seen in some sense as impartial, i.e., what is good for the proletariat would be good for all people. 
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methodology, as well as specifying what sort of concrete social and economic situations 
are preferable from their perspectives16.  
To see what philosophical benefit theoretical pluralism provides, it will help to 
focus on Amartya Sen’s attack on RITs. In The Idea of Justice, Sen focuses his attack on 
social contract-style reasoning, which is only one type of constructivist reasoning in 
ethics. Social contract reasoning specifies criteria for the acceptability of an agreement or 
contract under ideal circumstances (and what counts as ideal circumstances should be 
constructively abstracted from a concrete level—more on this later). This ideal contract is 
then used to generate principles to organize the moral or political world under 
consideration. However, I will show how his argument can be refined to target the 
assumptions shared by constructivist meta-ethics in general. Before I do this, let me 
introduce the main target of his criticism: John Rawls and the contemporary social 
contract reasoning developed around A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism.  
 
1.2.1 Rawls and Social Contract Foundations 
Rawls’ original motivation in A Theory of Justice [1999] was to establish for 
political theory a basis that can do for it what set theory did for mathematics. The idea 
underlying his approach is that if we were to decide upon using principles X to organize 
society and we can show that we couldn’t do better than X then a society based on X is 
justified. To this end, he develops the metaphor of a social contract in terms of what he 
                                                        16 Not only is the CA tradition often tolerant of a plurality of correct but disagreeing principles, but in some case this conflict is theoretically front and center: Marx’s approach for instance, may be characterized as explicating the nature of the conflicting principles of social organization in capitalist societies.   
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calls the ‘original position.’ The idea here is that we could use a decision to agree to a 
contract, suitably construed, as a basis for justifying the terms of forming and maintaining 
a society. If we could show how people in such an original position would agree to a 
best-case scenario of such social contract, the terms and conditions of their agreement 
could justify the resulting society.  
However, the nature of how we set up the decision-procedure for our social 
contract must still capture what would count as a moral perspective, that is, if it is to have 
any claim to be a contract upon which we could not improve. Thus Rawls invents a ‘veil 
of ignorance’ that strips away any information from our contract negotiators that could 
give any undue advantage in the bargaining process. For example, knowing whether one 
is male or not would incline one to favor contracts that likewise suggest favorable 
outcomes for males or not as the case may be. Any sort of favoritism for outcomes based 
on social privileges or any other sort of lottery of birth would be cut out with such a 
condition. The notion of a moral perspective operative here is as a view taking persons as 
equal in fundamental ways deserving of equal consideration; here I focus on just one 
aspect of this equality of consideration, in terms of the fact that any knowledge of how 
anyone in particular would fare in a proposed contract is left in the dark.  
As may be well known, Rawls came to the conclusion that we could not do better 
under these conditions than to agree to a society that maximizes liberties for each person 
compatible with the same liberties for any other and that an inequality of any socially, 
economically or politically significant good may only be allowed if it is to the benefit of 
those who end up among the worst off in that society. His reasoning for this conclusion 
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can be summed up in terms of a rational necessity for negotiators in the original position 
to take themselves to be in a worst-off position in whatever society they decide upon.  
While his reasons for this averse attitude to the risks of ending up as a ‘worst-off’ 
are detailed, independently interesting and wide-ranging, I prefer to articulate them in a 
more general sense than he explicitly does but in a fashion that I propose is more in the 
spirit of both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. Justifying society in terms of a 
sort of cooperation only makes sense first and foremost in terms of a risk-pooling 
arrangement in which we try to minimize the variability of economic activity and our 
exposure to violence. If we don’t take this basis to be the purpose of distinguishing unjust 
societies from just societies, Rawls would suggest we are talking about different topics 
altogether. In other words, there are two things we must take to be primitive evils: 
catastrophic scarcity and violence. Since it follows that, rationally, we must seek to avoid 
these evils without thereby sacrificing anything of greater value, our negotiators in the 
original positions must assume the perspective of the worst-off, i.e., those most likely to 
suffer from the variability of economic activity or violence, and bargain accordingly. Of 
course once we are negotiating, other sorts of goods could become subject to similar 
reasoning: it is rational to pool the risk associated with catastrophic lack or loss of other 
sorts of goods if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. 
 
1.2.2 Sen: Agreement isn’t Acceptability 
Sen, in his The Idea of Justice [2009], argues that contract-style RITs (what he 
calls ‘transcendentalist institutionalism’) all suffer from at least one of two problems: 
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they are either infeasible or redundant.17 When he speaks of feasibility, Sen has in mind a 
requirement for a certain sort of completeness. The incompleteness he accuses RITs of 
should not be confused with the logical notion of theoretical incompleteness, i.e., that for 
some sentence p the theory doesn’t decide whether p or not p is true. Rather, the salient 
sort of incompleteness refers to a theory failing to account for all the phenomena it should, 
i.e., a "feasible" theory is one that accounts for all the relevant phenomena. Sen argues 
that it implausible that any agreement (set of principles) specifying a perfectly just state, 
or its institutions, could account for all the many, diverse impartial reasons that actually 
exist for thinking of justice in one way or another.18 This is what he means by the claim 
that any unique ideal will be infeasible. More precisely, he claims that it’s infeasible that 
any one particular social contract could achieve unanimous assent from every reasonable 
would-be citizen. 
When Sen charges RITs with being redundant, his line of thinking is what one 
would expect, given his terminology: if we need CA anyway to justify concrete policy 
decisions, and if we can also use CA to justify the basic constitution of a state, then the 
RIT framework is not doing any work. There are clearly two subsidiary claims involved 
here. First, that RITs are of no help for solving particular policy problems, so a CA such 
as the social choice theory Sen advocates is unavoidable. Secondly, that there is no                                                         17 According to Sen “with transcendentalism, I see two problems…the issue of the 
feasibility of finding an agreed transcendental solution…an exercise of practical reason that involves an actual choice demands a framework for comparison of justice for choosing among feasible alternatives and not an identification of a possibly unavailable perfect situation…this is the issue of the redundancy of [RIT]”[2009, pg.9]  18 Moreover, the social contract tradition developed under Rawls posited an ideal contract, which everyone would accept and if it is implausible that such a contract could be constructed then such a RIT perspective is in trouble; or so goes the infeasibility complaint. 
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principled difference between justifying the choice of concrete policy and the choice of 
what general policy should guide particular policy options (that is, the choice of the basic 
constitution of a state).  
While Sen’s argument is careful and detailed, we need not cover his particular 
attack on Rawlsian and other social contract theories. We can already abstract the more 
general lesson from Sen’s argument. To do so, keep in mind the constructivist 
assumption: we assume that the notion of acceptability under ideal conditions is suitable 
to play the role of ‘truth’ in ethics. Sen’s infeasibility complaint points out that the set of 
acceptable principles of justice is far larger than any one contract we could agree to.19 
That is, the notion of agreement (to a contract) does not exhaust the notion of 
acceptability (of a set of principles).  As I want to refurbish his argument, there is an 
analogous complaint against any particular specification of what counts as acceptable. In 
other words, the class of principles we have reasons to accept is larger than any set picked 
out by any RIT.20 To be fair, I don’t think I am claiming anything that is not already 
implicit in Sen’s criticism of a monist foundation. 
There are two ways that I will take to ground the claim that there is no unique 
self-consistent way to formulate what it takes for a moral or political principle to be 
                                                        19 Many of Sen’s chapters are devoted to this claim; however the simplest and most helpful for our current purposes can be found on pg 57: “Indeed, plurality of unbiased principles can, I would argue, reflect the fact that impartiality can take many different forms and have quite distinct manifestations… [people’s different] reasonings about the nature of a just society [can] reflect different basic ideas that can each be defended impartially (rather than being parasitic on vested interests).” 20 Sen’s infeasibility complaint is not unlike G.E. Moore’s open question argument. More precisely, there is a more sophisticated notion indicated by the open‐question argument that seems analogous to the infeasibility complaint. The idea is that any specification or discrimination of moral properties or principles cannot exhaust every possible reason we could take as action‐guiding, morally speaking. 
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acceptable. First, the notion of acceptability under ideal circumstances can be made 
more precise and detailed in many distinct but equally justifiable ways. For instance, 
what should count as ideal circumstances can vary: in terms of what knowledge we 
would have; the time span of the contract; the operative; and whether some basic moral 
assumptions or sentiments (e.g. violence is bad) are presupposed such that we must allow 
some claims to have default justification. 
The second way to try to ground the distinction between the generic and specific 
notions of acceptability is to mimic, mutatis mutandi, Sen’s infeasibility complaint or 
some version of G.E. Moore’s open-question argument. For instance, suppose we have 
some specification of the sort of reasons that should be taken to render some policy 
acceptable. We would have some formula like: reasons to choose A have X if and only if 
the choice to A is acceptable. Despite the general rejection of Moore’s intuitionistic 
Platonism,21 many people may still respect the intuition behind the open-question 
argument: that we can never be certain that there are no relevant properties outside of X 
that we should take as good reasons to guide our assessments of choosing A. In other 
words: But is it [really] acceptable for reasons to choose A to have X? For example, let X 
be some formulation of impartiality. On this supposition, the reasons to choose A are 
impartial if and only if the choice to A is acceptable. But, it still seems intelligible to ask: 
is it morally acceptable for reasons to choose A to have that particular formulation of 
impartiality. Is it not possible that we could do better, morally speaking, with some other 
formulation? 
                                                        21 The most straightforward reason for rejecting Moore’s proposal I take to be is Bernard Williams’ [2012] demonstration that Moore equivocates on the attributive and predicative properties of an adjective (pg 38‐42.) 
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A related problem is that any correct characterization of what counts as a good 
reason must on some level be attentive to contextual factors. If this is the case, the 
implausibility of enumerating every possible correct characterization is due to how 
contextual factors are generally understood as having an open-texture. As is well known, 
it is impossible to enumerate every characterization of a phenomenon if under conditions 
of open-texture.22 
The redundancy problem needs no substantive changes for it to apply directly to 
any specification of what counts in general, as a constructively acceptable 
characterization of an ideally just state. 
 
1.3 The Solutions: Moral and Political Pluralism 
The Ought/Must Distinction and Moral Pluralism 
At first glance it is easy to see why those who feel inclined to agree with Williams’ 
assessment of the plurality of best moral practices might also buy into anti-
foundationalism (or more precisely, a non-systematic foundations) of some sort. In fact, 
particularists (and possibly moral sentiments theorists) of the more careful and subtle 
variety could try to use a version of the obligations as best options idea to substantiate the 
claim that understanding which moral principles are relevant to a choice is unrelated to 
making an appropriate judgment regarding what moral properties obtain in that situation.  
                                                        22 The structure that I argue captures a related notion of this sort of open‐texture of moral reasoning is the choice parameter. In chapter three, I argue that the moral properties of an action obtain only relative to a contrast class of unselected options. Since we can always specify different or additional members, i.e. options, of the contrast class, the moral properties of an action demonstrate an open‐texture. A similar structure should be able to be used to capture the open‐texture of good reasons. 
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But this inference is sound only if foundations need to be systematic and if a systematic 
approach needs to be self-consistent given the right logic. While a non-systematic 
foundation might be a plausible and interesting project, it is not the current one.  
Nonetheless, we have a clear criterion for what we are looking for in a suitable 
systematic foundation: a clear and principled distinction between ought and must. If we 
are to have a systematic foundation that takes the distinction between ought and must 
seriously, we need a system of many equally correct moral theories. With this notion, it is 
possible to have cases with many best options as distinct from when there is only one best 
option all theories posit. And from the discussion regarding Sen’s attack on RIT 
approaches to justice we find something similar: we can’t use only one RIT to account for 
all we should when deciding what is unjust. The natural idea I explore from here on out is 
to allow for a plurality of RITs in what I call a PRIT meta-ethics.23 
 
1.3.1 Infeasibility, Redundancy and Political Pluralism 
The infeasibility and redundancy problems are powerful reasons to reconsider the 
regulatory ideal approach when such approaches underlying reasoning rely on the notion 
of agreement. Moreover, as I have revised Sen’s argument, there are good reasons to 
reconsider the RIT approach at large, given that the underlying reasoning of such 
approaches may likewise rely on any one particular notion of acceptability. However, 
while I grant the force of these arguments, I think we need to be careful to draw the right 
conclusion. Instead of rejecting the regulatory approach tout court in favor of the 
comparative, as Sen urges, I suspect that the infeasibility complaint uncovers an 
                                                        23 I pronounce this acronym: pree‐tee. … as in a pretty nice meta‐ethics. 
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unwarranted assumption made by defenders of the regulatory ideal framework. As I shall 
argue, this assumption is unnecessary and a view more plausible than either the standard 
RIT or the CA results if we delete it.24 The assumption to be rejected is that liberalism 
must be consistent to be correct. In other words, our fundamental principles of justice 
may disagree. And by happy coincidence, this idea fits nicely with what we uncovered 
from the discussion of William’s ought/must distinction. 
I am not unsympathetic to social choice theory, nor would I reject Sen's demand 
that there be a suitable mechanism for deciding when concrete choices must be made. 
Rather, I will argue that his infeasibility argument fails to take into account a promising 
option. The key idea is that the infeasibility problem misses the target if pluralism about 
ideally just institutions, procedures or policy is taken seriously.25 In fact, RIT pluralism 
(i.e., PRIT) takes the diversity of impartial reasons that are the key to Sen's objection as 
its starting point for thinking about justice. By the ‘diversity of impartial reasons’ I mean 
that no one theory of acceptability can account for every member in the class of 
principles we have good reasons to accept. 
Proponents of an RIT generally assume we need one uniquely correct account of 
perfectly just institutions to serve as the regulatory ideal. Sen shares this assumption, at 
least implicitly (i.e., the infeasibility argument has force only if there is at most one 
regulatory ideal.) But one might suspect that PRIT has traded frying pan for fire. For if                                                         24 However, to argue this point regarding the CA project is beyond the scope of the current project. At the very least, the current project should set the stage for such a comparison down the road. 25 This pluralistic approach looks like it could generalize to other domains where some sort of open‐question argument seems legitimate. For example: norms of assertion, logics (i.e., are there logical truths not included in this logic?), norms of theory selection, and scientific methodologies in general. However, while interesting, pursuing the question of whether this is so is outside the scope of this project. 
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there are two regulatory ideals relevant to a policy choice, but each ideal selects a 
different option, then we have an action-guiding problem. Perhaps worse, each option is 
recommended as ideal in the circumstances. There is a far more problematic possibility 
waiting the pluralist. Since in the larger picture we are assuming that anything prescribed 
by an ideal is prescribed, there is at least one logical rule that entails disaster. The logical 
rule of "explosion" (i.e., that everything follows from a contradiction26) would seem to 
entail that anything and nothing is just if we accept inconsistent principles. It seems that 
we have traded an arguably difficult problem of incompleteness for a much worse 
problem of over-completeness or the failure of action-guiding. 
 
1.3.2 Deontic Logics: Moral Concepts as Logical Words 
In order to discuss how I think we should deal with these issues, it seems 
appropriate to explain some of the reasons for the formal methodology of this project. 
However, let first me outline where I deal with the specific issues raised already. To 
address the concern that pluralism implies an inability to be action-guiding, I examine in 
Chapter 2 a few ways philosophers have looked at the phenomenon of conflicting 
principles. In Chapter 3, I develop the underlying structure for a relevant deontic logic 
that allows us to represent trumping, conflicting principles and justifiable choices in an 
illuminating way. It is my contention that by structuring these concepts in this way we 
will be able to better account for our actual practice. In Chapter 4 I shall present some 
technical tools that show that a set of inconsistent regulatory ideals does not imply that 
everything is permitted. That is, I will develop a paraconsistent deontic logical system 
                                                        26 This rule is valid, for example, in both Classical and Intuitionistic logic. 
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(i.e., one that does not validate explosion) that also avoids pitfalls that undermine some 
other deontic systems. These pitfalls include committing the naturalistic fallacy and 
ignoring trumping relations.  
I will also try to show that action-guiding under-determination isn’t the problem it 
is commonly thought to be (and that Sen assumes it to be). I shall argue in Chapter 3 that 
any regulatory ideal must specify the terms of fair cooperation, and this will include a 
specification of the equilibrium selection mechanisms appropriate for coordination, i.e., 
how we decide on who does what to cooperate must be identified. If I am correct, the 
appropriateness of these mechanisms should not be independent of the theory in question, 
i.e., how we decide who does what must be fair as well. It follows that the fairness of 
coordination is theory-dependent whether there is only a single ideally just state or if 
there is, instead, a plurality of ideally just states. However, this is a useful fact for the 
pluralist. It opens up the possibility that when two distinct policy options are selected by 
different regulatory ideals, we can in some cases resolve the action-guiding problem. In 
some cases, we will be able to decide on which policy to implement by using an 
equilibrium selection mechanism that both theories accept. I will illustrate how this works 
when I have the right representation of trumps reasoning, thus showing how PRIT could 
answer Sen’s redundancy objection.  
Now, let me turn to explaining the methodology and defending how I will deal 
with these issues. The plausibility of a pluralist foundation for liberalism depends on 
whether we can find (i.e., construct) an intelligible notion of prescription or its cognates 
for such an approach. In the most basic analysis, pluralism, arguably, solves major 
problems with political liberalism; the problem that arises is that with a plurality of 
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liberalism, it’s difficult to make sense of how several theories can together guide the 
choice of policy. The method I propose we use to address this issue is a type of deontic 
logic.  
Deontic logic may be characterized by the idea that we can treat the concepts of 
moral obligation and permission as logical words [Scotch & Jennings 1981; Hare 1964]. 
For example, let’s say we have a description— “a red apple is on the table”; we can 
transform this statement into a prescription by prefixing it with “there should be” 
resulting in “there should be a red apple on the table.” Thus, insofar as the concept of 
obligation can be articulated in terms of a moral ‘should’ or ‘ought to’, it is apt to be 
described as a sort of modality and perhaps formulated as such in logical terms. 
Like other logical words, such as “and”, “or” and “not”, the idea is that we 
should represent obligation and permission as operations on well-formed formulas. The 
starting point in deontic logic is that we represent the concept of obligation as a sort of 
necessity operator. Obligation, so understood, is what is morally necessary. However, in 
what follows I do not use the standard method in modal logics, where we use some sort 
of universal quantification over suitably related worlds to represent necessity. (In the 
deontic case, these worlds could represent what would be true27 in morally satisfying or, 
perhaps, ideal situations.) Instead, I defend an analysis of obligation independent of 
possible worlds talk and thus turn to what is called neighborhood semantics for the truth 
conditions for obligation; but more on this in Chapter Four. In this chapter, I begin the 
overall task of showing how structuring obligation in terms of moral necessity is quite a 
                                                        27 Talk of truth at morally accessible worlds is a heuristic for now, which will be developed into the more refined notion of designated value in chapter 3. 
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complicated formal exercise if it is to do justice to features found in actual lived moral 
experience. 
 
1.3.3 Choices 
There are some considerations that call for a refinement of this basic intuition, i.e., 
that prescriptions are suitably modified descriptions. The basic idea is that not just any 
sort of description is appropriate for such transformation, but only those that express a 
choice. To make the notion of a choice amenable to formal treatment, it will be useful to 
be able to treat choices as mathematical objects of some sort. I will therefore treat a 
choice, on this account, as a (always finite in the examples we deal with) countable list of 
options. We will informally understand the options to be such that an agent confronted 
with a choice must select an option, and to be constrained by the rule that once an option 
is selected no other listed option can be, at least in that case. As a heuristic, morally 
obligatory choices can be thought of as choices where no other listed option is morally 
better than the selected option.28  
To illustrate the sorts of descriptions I have in mind here, instead of merely ‘a red 
apple on the table’ we would need to also describe the other relevant options, such as ‘a 
green apple on the table’ and perhaps also ‘a red apple on the floor’. A choice then would 
be to make it true that a red apple is on the table instead of a green one, or rather to place 
the red apple on the floor.  
                                                        28 This heuristic seems to indicate that a (moral) preference ordering could generate such a ranking. Though I will not pursue this, one promising way to construct such moral perspectives is to posit ideally moral agents, saints or vampire slayers, and order choices in terms of such saints’ preferences.  
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 Why choices? I think there are many good reasons for this proposal, some 
technical, others more informal. For now, let me introduce some of the less technical 
concerns. Suppose it is morally objectionable to choose to lie to a reporter instead of 
telling the truth when the truth will likely result in you losing a two million dollar 
investment. However, if we pay close attention to the fine-grained structure of choices, 
we can represent a change in the moral characteristics of lying. To do so, we change the 
available options. Here’s how: it seems morally obligatory to choose to lie to a potential 
heart attack victim instead of telling the truth or remaining silent. Given a basic training 
in CPR etc., one should know how telling the truth, i.e., that ‘yes, I think you are having a 
heart attack’ or even just staying silent on this fact, will likely result in a worsening of 
symptoms or death. While it is true that, linguistically, we can transform any description 
into a prescription, my claim is that such linguistic phenomena is, in this case, 
conceptually misleading. In Chapter Three I go into more detail on the nature of what I 
call Contrastive Principles: that principles, obligations etc. bind choices, not the 
constitutive actions nor propositions, classically understood. 
 One further example before we move one.29 There is a flawed way of 
understanding human rights that, if we were to use contrastive principles or choices 
instead, we could say what we actually mean far more simply and accurately. I think the 
idea that a person could do something that thereby revokes or forfeits some (or all) of her 
human rights is incoherent. Of course, there is a seeming consensus disputing my claim, 
i.e., regarding how people could in fact lose or forfeit human rights [Lippke 2002; Ward 
                                                        29 An earlier version of this argument shows up in Holukoff [2006]. 
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and Birgden 2007],30 and the brief argument that follows could hardly be the last word. 
On the other hand, I propose that we can say what we really mean with choices and to do 
so without any of the conceptual gymnastics that seem to be needed to make sense of 
how it is possible for someone to lose her human rights. 
The usual way to understand human rights is with caveats—one can lose or forfeit 
her human rights by doing something bad. This is natural only if the reasons for having 
human rights also pick out a category of agents and membership in this category isn’t 
permanent, i.e., it can end before biological death and perhaps even be resumed. There 
are three problems I want to highlight with this idea, i.e., that membership isn’t 
permanent (in the above sense) in an ‘eligible for human rights’ category. All three 
problems are due to the fact that any right, including human rights, should be an instance 
of a general rights formula. By the General Rights Formula, I mean that: x has a claim R 
against y in virtue of Z, where x is the right holder for the right R and y is the respondent 
(the agents or institution that must see to it that R for x) and Z is the basis or reasons for 
why x has R against y. And of course, it’s implausible that human rights don’t take this 
general form. 
It turns out that if human rights are an instance of this more general rights formula, 
it seems that membership in an ‘eligible for human rights’ category can’t fail to be 
permanent in the way required by the caveat approach. The first two reasons I will not 
argue for (but rather give the benefit of the doubt to the caveat approach): how we specify 
Z for caveat-style human rights is likely either too broad, i.e., it implies we includes 
things in an ‘eligible for human rights’ category we shouldn’t, or too narrow, i.e., it                                                         30 To be clear, the authors cited dispute this consensus as do I, but in different respects. 
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excludes persons it shouldn’t. But as I suggested, I want to suppose that somehow we do 
get Z right; if so, there is a more interesting problem that awaits us. If Z is neither too 
narrow nor too broad, but is compatible with the caveat approach, it implies that people 
who lose human rights aren’t human or that the various relevant biological markers that 
should be coincident with reasons for human rights fail to be so. 
I will assume without further argument that claiming that ‘people who lose human 
rights stop being human’ is unacceptable. On the other hand, it would seem that the 
various stories for how the relevant biological markers aren’t coincident with reasons for 
human rights are all a mess—for an easy target, reciprocity is a terrible basis for a 
comprehensive moral category as it ignores the most vulnerable and hence those most in 
need of the protection afforded by human rights.31 Of course, I promised to give the 
benefit of the doubt regarding how we specify Z, i.e., in a way that is neither too broad 
nor too narrow, so I will put these concerns off to the side so we can focus on the real 
issue. There are various biological markers that should be coincident with reasons for 
human rights and any story that claims to justify them failing to be so is inappropriate. 
With the stage set, let me explain in more detail what I mean by ‘relevant biological 
markers.’  
Consider Mary. Mary is a human, and, however one feels compelled to articulate 
them, she has all the features relevant to her claiming human rights. In fact, any correct 
formulation for the grounds of human rights, i.e. Z, must determine a set that is implied 
by being human. This is not to say that ‘human being’ is a moral category; that is, we can 
                                                        31 And the expected response fares no better. If it’s the potential for reciprocity that matters, we run into problems in the other direction: ‘potential x’ is a very broad category indeed. 
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say, of some human right—say R—that all humans have R because every human has Z 
(or belongs to Z etc.). To paraphrase Brian Orend [2002], human rights are founded upon 
reasons to treat every human in the relevant fashion (pgs. 19, 34.) And of course, Mary 
being human is not such a reason; rather it is that Z picks out Mary, just like any other 
human, which matters, morally speaking. In other words, it is a coincidence, but by 
design, that being human biologically (together almost certainly with other biological 
features, such as having a brain, being sentient perhaps, and so on) implies belonging to a 
moral category that thereby confers upon its members certain rights. But it is tempting to 
think that Z has loopholes, by which a person may satisfy some condition whereby the 
reasons to treat all humans in the relevant sense no longer hold, at least for this person. 
Here’s why. 
Suppose we have the relevant sort of very good reasons to not place Mary into a 
dangerous situation against her will. And such good reasons turn out to apply equally to 
any human being: that is, we should not place any human in situations of unreasonable 
risk, i.e. we have no right to do so. But alas, Mary shoots Jack with a shotgun for telling 
her where to put her apple. In societies such as ours, prisons tend to be very dangerous 
places. If Mary has a right to not be placed in a dangerous situation against her will, it 
appears that she has, like all humans, a right to not be sent to prison against her will.  
This seems all too fast: prisons are a fundamental affront to human rights? Now, 
as suggested, there are all sorts of stories trying to show how the relevant human rights 
stop applying when certain crimes are committed, but all such stories are unnecessary and, 
if I am right, incoherent. Such stories seem to implicate that when we refrain from 
applying human rights to any particular human this is equivalent to denying that she or he 
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is human or that the relevant biological markers that should be coincident with the 
reasons for human rights fail to be so. To see this, we can formalize the set membership 
talk from above by considering a set-theoretic deduction.  
We use H to represent the set of all human being, while Z and R are as above. We 
can read xRy as ‘x has a claim R against y’. And as promised, taking this approach will 
imply a General Rights Formula: x has a claim R against y in virtue of Z. If this general 
rights formula is applicable we have the following inference that shows that denying a 
human right to a human is incoherent. 
 ∀𝑤, 𝑥,𝑦  𝑤 ∈ 𝐻 → 𝑤 ∈ 𝑍  & (𝑥 ∈ 𝑍) → 𝑥𝑅!𝑦 ⊢  ¬𝑥𝑅!𝑦 → 𝑥 ∉ 𝐻 
 
This inference obviously requires a more detailed interpretation and defense than can be 
given here. But the idea is that anytime a human right is denied, the humanity of that 
person is denied since membership in Z must fail and by modus tollens so to does 
membership in H, i.e., being human. Of course, there is the possibility that what is going 
on here is that we are slipping between a generic claim about humans, generally, having 
said rights and confusing this with a universal claim, i.e., that all humans have said rights. 
But taking this route suggests, implausibly, that the general rights formula isn’t 
applicable to human rights. But even if this is so, it then becomes strained to see just what 
work using biological markers, i.e., being human, as a shorthand for assigning moral 
membership into this class of rights is doing.  
Practically speaking, this suggests that caveats to Z, such as ‘as long as you don’t 
commit certain offences’ would mean that H doesn’t imply Z after all, and the fear is, 
there be dragons. The practical value of human rights on this account is that appeal to 
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them shuts down further discussion, so to speak. No government official or tyrant can 
spend enough time to dream up some scheme by which someone no longer deserves to be 
treated with basic human dignity, for example, and this because we can simply point to 
the relevant biological markers.  
Again, I don’t pretend that this brief line of argument is conclusive. The hope is 
that readers might now share some of my suspicion towards the caveat approach and 
perhaps find a simpler and, I propose, a far more accurate way of understanding human 
rights more attractive. Simply put, it’s just a fact that people don’t have a general right, 
human or otherwise, to not go to prison when they are rightly convicted of the relevant 
crimes. It is a virtue of my system that, by using contrastive principles and choices, we 
can see how we missed such an obvious response and how to fix the problem. 
In my system, it is the content of the right itself that is at fault for such a bizarre 
result (i.e., that there is a human right against incarceration). The clue perhaps is the word 
‘unreasonable’ in ‘we should not place any human in situations of unreasonable risk.’ 
The appropriate response seems to be that the dangers of prison are not unreasonable, that 
is, given that Mary’s shooting Jack constitutes murder. It is by glossing over the 
conditionality of the content of rights that give us such bizarre results as seen above. On 
my account, we represent rights as an obligation for someone to make a particular choice. 
The choice in this case: Should we leave someone alone instead of incarcerating her for 
murder? When the issue is clarified by thinking in terms of choices, it turns out there is 
no human right for governments to leave you alone when you murder someone. That is, 
any legitimate take on Z won’t justify making the choice to leave someone alone instead 
of incarcerating her when rightly convicted of murder, all else being equal. Analytically, 
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choices explain what’s going on when we correctly (I assume) limit rights in such cases; 
there may be other analysans, but the simplicity and technical power of choices turns out 
to be remarkably well-suited for our current purposes. 
 
1.3.4 On Using Formal Methods in Moral Foundations 
However, the further question remains: why use formal methods to investigate the 
notion of moral necessity? All I have done so far is to show that we could do so and 
illustrate some of the utility in so doing. On the other hand, I am not unaware of 
Aristotle’s injunction against precision in moral theory.32 He argues that we should never 
aim for more precision than we should expect from different fields of inquiry. When 
articulating doctrines in different fields, precision can be counter-productive when 
accuracy is better served by remaining more vague. He found this to be especially the 
case with moral inquiry where he held a large place for reasonable differences in moral 
judgment. In fact he contrasted the work of a mathematician with that of an ethicist as an 
example of when we should expect or reject a high level of precision.  
Nonetheless, the trade-off between accuracy and precision in ethics can be 
moderated by the development of better tools of precision. I propose that, even if 
Aristotle’s injunction was at one time wise advice, its appropriateness needs to be 
reassessed; given the [massive] progress we have made in designing artificial languages 
and their formal techniques, it’s not unreasonable that some updating is called for. His 
point was that precision is limited by the nature of the subject matter and I don’t deny that 
this is true, but only to some degree. I propose that better tools can extract more detail 
                                                        32 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics. Book 1 Chapter 3, first paragraph. 
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and illuminate finer distinctions than more coarse-grained techniques, for nearly any 
subject matter. And on the flip side, better tools may allow us to safely ignore some 
details and distinctions when called for (more on this later). I think we can do better than 
what Aristotle proposed, i.e., leaving the nature of conflicting principles up to legitimate 
differences in mature, trained, and considered judgment or sensibilities. I hope my results 
will help make this case but I also think there are good reasons to expect this outcome.  
On this note, it is worth a short tangent to see how in particular using logical 
machinery can advance our understanding, even in a domain like moral theory.  When we 
set up a formal calculus and it’s associated formal semantics, in order for it to be "the 
logic of " some domain, we hope to build the machinery in such a way that it captures the 
concepts we are interested in investigating. And as I’m sure even Aristotle would agree, 
this is more art than science. Once done, though, it is a familiar fact that formal tools can 
enable us to reveal things that are simply not obvious, and in some cases is seems safe to 
say, would never have been discovered, had the formalization never happened. For 
example, the informal understanding of notions such as provability or truth has changed 
dramatically thanks to the investigation of the formalized versions of these important 
notions. The hope is that we can do the same for "obligatory," "permissible," and the rest. 
Of course, there remain philosophical questions about the relationship between 
the concepts of truth or provability and their formalized versions. For any particular 
formal result, it is always open to ask whether the result teaches us something about the 
concept under investigation, or if it only teaches us that the formal analogue is different 
from the concept we care about—consider, for instance, Tarski's [1956] well-known 
result about "no language containing its own truth predicate."  However, this process is 
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fruitfully viewed as one of pursuing a sort of reflective equilibrium, and both adjustments 
to the formal machinery to better reflect the actual concept and revision to our thinking 
about the nature of the original concept are both on the table.33 
With this said, what I will be trying to do in this project is provide a formalized 
version of key moral concepts, with the hope of learning some useful lessons about those 
concepts, ones that would not be easily learned if the formalization were not undertaken. 
But, as should be clear from the discussion above, attention must first be paid to the 
question of what to build into the formal system I will investigate. As I have already 
suggested, I think standard deontic logics won't do the job. To get a sense of what we 
need to do differently, it is necessary to do some preliminary philosophical investigation. 
And to get a sense of the subtle and nuanced deviations a pluralist and constructivist 
notion of obligation undergoes, let me briefly survey some of these philosophical issues. 
While it has many virtues, the meta-ethics I will look at must reject many 
common theoretical assumptions regarding the concepts of principle or obligation and 
their cognates. As mentioned in the Introduction, I show that neutrality towards the 
existence of moral dilemmas (i.e., taking the possibility of moral disagreement seriously) 
renders the inference “ought implies can” invalid.34 Moreover, in the formal language I 
                                                        33 Moreover, even if a formal version diverges significantly from its informal analogue, such a contrast could prove illuminating in surprising ways. For example, such divergence may call for explanation, which in turn may point to some novel significance of a feature of the informal concept. I am thinking here of the divergence between the material conditional and the ordinary language locution of “if…then…” and say, Grice’s [1975] notion of conversational implicature to account for it. 34 I also give a non‐technical argument against “ought” implies “can” in chapter three. It is based on intuitions that we should not be able to jury‐rig the order of actions so as to immunize ourselves from living up to our obligations. It is closely connected to technical issues however in CTD structures. 
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develop for PRIT, RD-choice, I prove that it is only in ideal situations that ought to 
choose X implies it is permissible to choose X.  
Specifically, in 4.68 and 4.69 I argue that any conception of obligation that 
implies can or permissibility is inapplicable, all things being equal, to any world like ours. 
With the system I have developed, it will be possible to distinguish between principles 
and obligations that can guide action at an ideal level of abstraction from the mess of 
moral properties we tend to see in concrete situations that end up insufficiently guiding 
action for people like us. I also prove that, given neutrality towards the existence of moral 
dilemmas, obligation and permission are inter-definable only under ideal conditions.35 To 
be more precise, I show that it is must rather than ought that implies may (technically, 
must implies what deontic logicians call “weak permission” but more on this later). 
At first glance, this may seem a radical modification of obligation and so may be 
thought implausible; I shall argue that closer attention paid to our best practices reveals 
that my proposed theory accords better with such concrete touchstones. The question then 
becomes: Is it reasonable to cling to a conception of obligation, when a more nuanced 
conception fits our practices better, even given how obviously correct it feels? In what 
follows I hope to demonstrate that a correct account requires a far more subtle and careful 
relationship between obligation and action-guidance than is commonly supposed. This 
holds even more so in political discourse. 
                                                        35 Following standard practice in deontic logic, technically such notions of 
permission are called ‘weak permission’ in contrast to the notion of strong 
permission, which is an exception to an obligation under specific conditions. CTD structures will be used to regiment the notion of strong permission, i.e. as a sort of sub‐ideal best practice. 
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As promised I can now explain how we can have a non-theory (since theories can 
be thought of as consistent sets of propositions) but systematic approach to meta-ethics. If 
we can use a deontic logic, i.e., a formal system, to represent the claim “obligation is 
related to must as best is related to only” then I have proved that it is at least possible to 
have a systematic moral foundation that can account for Williams’ starting points in 
concrete moral experience. Thus while logics are theories and thus consistent themselves, 
we can apply logics to domains that aren’t consistent. But, since we can represent what is 
going on in terms of a single logical system, we have what I hope deserves to called a 
systematic foundation. It just turns out that all the principles etc. that we represent with 
the logic are themselves not consistent, and thus, not a theory. In fact, one of the main 
results of the formal presentation is that we can justify the claim that liberalism itself is 
an unrealizable plan, not that it just can allow for reasoning regarding unrealizable 
plans—see in particular 4.64.  
 
1.4 Constructivism, Pluralism and Prescription 
As I have laid out the project, the style of meta-ethics I’m looking at deals in the 
construction of an ideally just society (in our case, ideally liberal).  The issue that 
pluralism raises, in large part, is how must our understanding of the doctrine “whatever is 
prescribed by an ideal, all things being equal, is obligatory, a principle of justice etc.” 
change? 
 To see why it is reasonable to suppose that changes must be made, let us assume 
that this characteristic inference is correct: what a correct moral theory or ideal 
prescribes is prescribed. This seems pretty reasonable, or it's hard to see what the 
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correctness of the theory consists in. However, if pluralism means that we will be 
confronted with more than one correct moral theory, the prospect of being obliged to 
more than one, incompatible thing looms. Conflicting obligations raise a whole host of 
problems, so at least two questions arise at this point. First, is the cure (pluralism) worse 
than the disease? And secondly: why isn’t pluralism just a code word for “we haven’t got 
liberalism right yet”? I will answer the second question next. The project at large is 
intended to answer the first. 
 
1.4.1 Constructive Foundations and the Burden of Pluralism 
 
All this talk about methods for understanding moral concepts in a pluralist-
friendly manner may seem to be putting the cart before the horse. Here’s what I mean: 
just because some important philosophers are talking about or have taken a pluralist turn 
in the face of persistent problems doesn’t mean that pluralism is the right way to go in the 
foundations of liberalism. After all, we might just have gotten things wrong or be 
working with incomplete theories so far. Instead, perhaps we ought to hope that in the 
foreseeable future we will discover one uniquely correct theory that captures everything 
we thought mattered in previous attempts. In this section I will argue that this hope is 
misguided, at least if we are proposing constructivist foundations for liberalism.  
Once we pay close attention to what makes a theoretical principle suitably 
constructivist in nature, we will see that justifying a constructivist approach in any 
foundational domain generates a prima facie case for pluralism in that domain. I contend 
that it is implicit in the nature of constructivist foundations (for any domain) that there are 
good reasons to be suspicious of any claim to some uniquely correct approach. If this 
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argument is cogent, the burden of proof is on any constructivist to show why she is not 
also a pluralist.  
I will also briefly look at a plausible premise that, if added to the argument, 
suggests that in order to justify constructivist foundations, one must also justify a pluralist 
foundation. However I am less sure about this second, extended version of the argument; 
while the additional premise seems plausible, giving a fuller defense of it is part of a 
much larger project. A quick note: I don’t mean that to justify constructive methods, one 
must justify pluralist foundations; some classical mathematicians are nevertheless fans of 
constructive methods, but merely because they give better details or more informative 
proofs (for example) rather than because they think they are fundamentally correct. 
Instead, in the argument that follows, I propose that any type of foundations that can 
deserve the title of constructive is also, all things being equal, very likely a pluralist 
foundation. 
It will be useful to approach this argument by answering two questions. First: 
what makes a principle, method, or foundation constructivist? Secondly: assuming that a 
genuine plurality in foundations requires interesting, non-trivial disagreement between 
foundational theories, what is the connection between constructive foundations and 
interesting, non-trivial disagreement?36 As a first pass, the answers I have in mind are as 
follows. For something to count as constructive in the relevant sense means being able, at 
least in principle, to trace the grounds for any true claim back to the basic sources of 
                                                        36In putting the matter in terms of such disagreement, I follow [DeVidi 2012.] I discuss  DeVidi’s  criteria for a philosophically important pluralism in more detail in Chapter Two. At this point, I will only argue that the pluralism I have in mind have these properties. Later, I will show how and why these properties matter in the relevant meta‐ethical issues. 
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evidence underlying it—there are no epistemically inaccessible truths. But as I shall try to 
show, this means that a correct constructive claim is relative to a starting point. As I will 
suggest, this is naturally thought of as relativity to a choice of starting point. Not just any 
starting point will do, i.e. our choice is not unconstrained. But there is little reason 
(notwithstanding a commitment to some "mind independent reality," which alone makes 
true statements true) to suppose that there's only one correct starting point. And of course, 
believing that there is some such reality undermines the commitment to constructivism in 
the first place. As we will see, more than one correct starting point will make for 
interesting, non-trivial disagreement and thus a pluralism worth having. 
 This lesson is especially easy to see in the mathematical case, where 
constructivism is better worked out than in any other domain in philosophy. To answer 
these questions in more detail, I will develop insights drawn from the Italian school of 
intuitionistic mathematics, most notably Giovanni Sambin’s minimalist foundations.  
 Sambin’s minimalist foundations takes type theory (which I will explain in more 
detail below) to be conceptually prior to set theory. In brief, in Sambin’s minimalist 
foundations the definition of a set is not given by set-theoretic axioms but is worked up 
from elements of type theory. In particular, in Sambin’s theory subsets are not, in general, 
sets (contrary to the standard ZFC axiomatization of set theory).37 But not any sort of 
type theory, but only a constructive version will do. Following Per Martin-Lof, Sambin 
and Silvio Valentini [1998] explain what is at stake for an intuitionistic (i.e., constructive) 
type theory (and thus for the possibility of a constructive foundation): 
                                                        37 A simple constructive rationale for this denial of set‐hood for subsets: defining a subset on a set is impredicative, and thus non‐constructive. 
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The form of type theory is that of a logical calculus where inference rules to 
derive judgments are at the same time [type] theoretic constructions, because 
of the [“formulas-as-types"]38 interpretation. The spirit of type theory – 
expressing our interpretation in a single sentence- is to adopt those notions 
and rules which keep total control of the amount of information contained in 
the different forms of judgment (pg 3). 
 
In general, from an intuitionistic perspective the truth of a proposition (say P) 
depends upon “the existence of a verification of” P (pg. 2).  In type theory, talk of truth 
and propositions is replaced with (in mathematical terminology) a judgment that 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃, 
that is, a judgment that some term, p, is of type P. An intuitionistic version requires that 
such a judgment “explicitly exhibits a verification” that p is of type P. Paraphrasing Greg 
Restall [2008], type theory allows us to ‘name’ proofs by keeping track of the terms used 
throughout the "consecution" (or proof) (pg 127).  Thus the judgments in type theory 
record each step (i.e. rule and assumption) used to verify some conclusion. Not only does 
a type-theoretic presentation of a proof tell you what was inferred from what; the 
conclusion also explicitly contains all the assumptions, premises and rules used to derive 
it. 
On this account, the judgment that “A is a set” explicitly encodes the specific 
procedure for delineating the elements of A (and, since the procedure is constructive, this 
                                                        38 The original primarily referenced the “propositions‐as‐sets” interpretation, but in keeping with [Sambin & Maietti 2010] proofs‐as‐programs interpretation, I used the other terminology. 
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procedure is often required to satisfy a further condition, such as recursiveness); Sambin 
and Valenti write:  
In fact, the rules for primitive types and for type constructors are so devised 
that whenever a judgment A set is proved, it means that one has also complete 
information on the rules which describe how canonical elements of A are 
formed…Summing up, we see not only that [intuitionistic] type theory is 
inspired by the principle of control of information, but also that the same 
principle should be at the base of any coherent treatment of sets and 
propositions, if it has to be both intuitionistic and free of wastes (pg 2).  
As it turns out, in their theory of subsets, a judgment that “B is a subset of A” doesn’t 
necessarily encode a specific recursive procedure for delineating the elements of B; 
instead, the judgment encodes a specific propositional function on the relevant set (pg 7). 
And without delineating the elements of the input domain, the function can’t be used to 
recursively populate the subset, i.e., it’s impredicative. 
However, there is such a thing as too much detail. In Sambin and Valenti’s terms, 
orthodox type theory is “a burden when dealing with the synthetic methods of 
mathematics, which ‘forget’ or take for granted most of the details” (pg. 2). Consequently, 
the goal is to develop “definitions and rules which ‘forget’ some information, and thus 
allow a higher level of abstraction, which can make type theory more handy and suitable 
to work out (intuitionistic) mathematics…” (pg. 3) However, for it to be constructivist, 
properly speaking, we must be able to later recover what was “forgotten”. 
It can be helpful to focus on how we can take the notion of forgetting details as a 
metaphor for abstraction. Similarly to how David DeVidi makes the point, abstracting 
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away properties of objects is a matter of forgetting those properties when formulating 
“principles that, as we might say, govern the phenomena in question.” [DeVidi 2012] The 
stricter the principles, the finer grain of distinctions we can make. On the other hand, we 
must be careful that we are not merely changing the subject matter by changing how 
much or what we abstract away. An (overly?) simple way of looking at this is that age-
old maxim: make sure you compare apples with apples. There is nothing amiss, all else 
being equal, if we compare apples with oranges when what matters is being fruit. 
Alternatively, if what matters is being baking apples the criteria we use to compare 
apples should reflect what goes into making an apple suitable for baking. Clearly, 
comparing fruit is a different subject matter from comparing baking apples; thus 
abstracting away too many properties surely results in a change of subject matter. But 
comparing sweetness and comparing ripeness may be seen as two different bases of 
abstraction in the subject matter of ‘when apples are ready to eat’. In other words, 
different principles governing ‘when apples are ready to eat’ can be obtained by 
alternatively forgetting one property or the other (i.e., sweetness or ripeness). At this 
point, we have different ready-to-eat principles; but where is the interesting and non-
trivial disagreement?  
Given just these principles (i.e., the ripeness-principle and sweetness-principle), 
there may already be disagreement about which apples are ready to eat. But this 
possibility (i.e., one principle identifies an apple as ready-to-eat but the other doesn’t) 
would seem to suggest something went wrong with the choice of one principle over the 
other. After all, a principle formulated with both properties in mind (i.e., those apples 
belonging in a union of ripeness and sweetness) would be preferable, all else being equal. 
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But it is sometimes hard to tell when all things are equal; this fix is sometimes more 
trouble than may first appear. In the case of intuitionistic mathematics, it is impossible to 
combine a principle that the collection of all subsets of a set is a set (the Powerset Axiom) 
with the principle that every total relation has a non-empty section that contains a 
function (the Axiom of Choice) without proving the law of excluded middle (and thereby 
become incompatible with intuitionism) [Bell 1988; Maieti & Valentini 1999; Maietti 
1999]. Given different starting points, these principles both encode something that is 
desirable in, for instance, the notion of "well behaved concept of set", and so are 
analogous to our imaginary case of disagreement about which apples are ready to eat. 
However, trying to come up with a stricter notion of well-behaved concept of set that 
incorporates both requirements doesn't work, because a classical notion of set is one that 
is, for the constructivists in question, beyond the pale—rather as though apples that were 
both sweet and ripe were also, ipso facto, toxic. On the other hand, let’s say that the 
single-property constructive principles agree with each other every time about which 
apples were ready to eat…what sort of disagreement can still arise? One sort of 
disagreement is fairly trivial. The disagreement I have in mind here is when the 
verificational content of the judgment, i.e., the terms in which the conclusion is 
proved/confirmed, differs. In this case, there is no disagreement about which apples are 
ready-to-eat, only in the tests recorded as used in the different judgments: in one 
judgment ripeness tests are explicitly recorded and in the other judgment we would have 
sweetness tests. This disagreement is trivial: of course different tests would be recorded 
corresponding to the different properties characteristic of the principles. Taking different 
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paths to the same destination, even if one is more scenic (or informative) than the other, 
doesn’t really amount to much disagreement about where you are now.39 
The second sort of disagreement is far more interesting. This sort of disagreement 
again assumes that the principles abstracted from the same ‘reality’, phenomena, or basic 
notion nevertheless disagree. In other words, in a given domain or subject matter multiple 
principles may equally apply but still disagree in some other manner. The question, 
though, is how that could be: if they begin from the same "reality" and merely forget 
different parts of it, how could the different remainders disagree? This possibility 
suggests that the disagreement we are looking for occurs down the road, so to speak. 
DeVidi writes that this possibility requires “that abstraction yield principles that, when 
stated in properly abstract, i.e. formal terms, are correct when we reinterpret them in the 
original domain. But once abstracted and formalized, mathematical practice involves 
extending principles as far as they will go, or at least as far as we can push them. This is a 
process that fairly often yields surprising results…principles that agree in the realm from 
which we originally abstract them can, when pushed beyond that realm, produce 
incompatible surprises [original italics].”[DeVidi 2012.] 40 
Sambin points out that this possibility (i.e., of having different principles 
governing the same subject matter or phenomena) is actually inherent in pinning 
                                                        39 This notion is closely tied to the complaint that intuitionistic mathematics is merely more informative than classical math, but not a true rival. I point out how Sambin responds to this worry in the next section. 40 In fact, Sambin demonstrates that taking his approach results in developing genuinely new mathematical structures, unavailable with other starting points [pg 86‐9 Sambin 2010] (thus, intuitionistic mathematics is not merely offering a more informative method). 
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constructivism to a process of abstraction and formalization of the resulting principles. 
He writes [Sambin 2010]:  
Only by “forgetting” some information can one obtain some abstract concepts 
[sic], treat them “mathematically,” that is with no mention of the reality they 
come from, and ﬁnally apply them back to reality successfully. This is 
probably taken for granted by most. However, one tends to overlook the fact 
that there is no single and necessary method of doing it. Actually, different 
foundations can be seen, under this perspective, as different choices as to 
what should or should not be considered as relevant, that is, as different 
principles to be used to abstract from reality and idealize it (Pg. 67). 
At this point, we need to look in more detail regarding the question of how choice 
of a starting point should be constrained if it is to be correct on constructive41 grounds 
and otherwise. What we need, I argue, is a distinction among the different bases of 
abstraction, i.e., how much and what we “forget” when formulating principles. The 
distinction I have in mind is between when ‘features’ are included or excluded merely in 
order to get some desired outcome and when such inclusion or exclusion is taken (or 
seen) as relevant for (and as still) being faithful to the source notion, reality, or 
phenomena. The first sort bears some resemblance to what can be called a merely 
                                                        41 There is some irony in how Sambin [2010] argues for the possibility of different principles and thus different foundations. He writes in the paragraphs following the passage quoted in the previous footnote that “[i]n intuitionistic logic the notion of truth is linked with proof, and necessity, rather than with consistency, or possibility [i.e. the absence of contradiction, as is the case with classical logic]” In some sense, it seems that his argument for pluralist foundations is not constructive. This turns out to be a problem (i.e., what grounds different foundations) in other parts of his argument, such as a lamentable, misguided analogy with religious beliefs at the end of his paper. 
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instrumental theory, while the second has a much better claim to the title of a 
constructive theory.  
Sambin and Valenti [1988] argue for something quite similar: “our principle is 
that an abstraction is constructive, that is, a reliable tool in getting knowledge that is 
faithful to reality, not when information is kept as much as possible, but when it is 
‘forgotten’ in such a way that it can be restored at will in any moment. This after all is the 
test to show that an abstraction does not lead astray from reality, that is, that it preserves 
truth” (pg. 4). 
On the other hand, if we do not care to be faithful to our target phenomenon, data 
or ‘reality’ we can readily admit ‘features’ into our process in order to generate principles 
that get some sort of desired results (including matching data). In the constructive case, 
since we must be able to guarantee that anything “forgotten” by principles of a more 
abstract level can be restored, we can prove that the more abstract principle is faithful to 
the more concrete level. But how can we know when the inclusion or exclusion of some 
feature is constructively relevant? The answer, I will now argue, is due to a 
generalization from this discussion: what I call abstraction norms. 
First off, an abstraction norm presupposes that some but not all bases of 
abstraction may be justified in some context: some choices as to what is relevant may be 
justified, while others rejected (or merely unjustified). What is at stake when we so 
justify these choices (of a basis of abstraction) is explained by appeal to abstraction 
norms. In other words, abstraction is justified like any other philosophical activity: as 
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subsumed under relevant norms.42 And we have already looked at one sort of abstraction 
norm, namely a constructive abstraction norm. So what we are looking for is not merely 
that we are using the abstraction for some purpose that is relevant, but whether we can 
justify such an abstraction as being faithful to a more concrete level and relevant for said 
purpose, all else being equal.  
Thus, an abstraction norm governs not only what details will get in the way of (or 
just be superfluous for) some theoretical purpose but also at what degree in the 
abstraction process alterations become distortions. For example, and as already argued, 
at some levels of abstraction we might have a change in the subject matter and thus could 
be comparing apples with oranges. Consequently, criteria for what counts as the subject 
matter, ‘reality’, or the phenomena at hand must figure in with such abstraction norms. 
At this point, I am in good shape to show what we have gained so far in my 
pursuit of a prima facie case for a plurality of foundations (that is, if you start from a 
constructivist foundation). Specifically, I can answer the two questions I pointed out 
above.  
First: what makes a principle, method, or foundation constructive? A constructive 
principle, method, or foundation is the Hansel and Gretel of theoretical perspectives: it 
will always leave a trail of breadcrumbs so we can back track to the source.  Of course, 
this needs for most interesting subject matters to be hedged with ‘in principle,’ just as the 
defenders of verification theories of meaning for empirical claims needed to insert ‘in 
                                                        42 I have in mind here Herbert Feigl’s [1968] argument. However, I would be remiss (in a project that explores the use of a preference logic) to not point out that there is no such thing as “pure syntax, pure semantics and pure pragmatics” even at the level of pragmatic justification, i.e., justifying a preference for the adoption of some mode of justification or primitive norms.  
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principle’ clauses to avoid being committed to the claim that very distant stars never had 
planets if nobody would ever observe them, and various other qualifications will no doubt 
be required for domains that differ from the mathematical ones. But the principle of ‘no 
in principle unknowable truths’ is basic.  
Secondly, what is the connection between constructive foundations and 
interesting, non-trivial disagreement? The connection can be found in how we can justify 
different bases of abstraction, that each nonetheless satisfies our constructive norms. For 
example, the two notions of a set, i.e., a subset is a set or not, we looked at are both 
constructive, as long as we don't try to have them both at once ... but they each 
correspond to a further goal for the abstracting mathematicians. The ‘as rules’ folk are 
motivated as describe above. The ‘input output behavior’ mathematicians are motivated 
by the idea that wherever possible mathematics should be extensional: that the point of 
mathematics is to investigate structures that can be instantiated in different ways, and that 
to consider two things that share the same structure as different simply because they are 
differently described is to betray a non-mathematical motivation. So one can qualify as a 
constructivist, but one can have different motivations and goals within the constructivist 
framework and so abstract in different ways with different resulting foundations. And 
assuming that neither of these is an incorrect motivation, we get alternative constructivist 
foundations. And, supposing DeVidi is on to something, we see how they can come to 
disagree when we extend their use beyond the ‘reality’ from which they were first 
abstracted.   
Thus, to suppose that merely requiring a constructive framework in any domain 
will pin us down to a single correct way to abstract is unmotivated. Constructivist 
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motivations will seldom be the only motives involved in abstracting. Supposing that more 
than one collection of other legitimate motives is compatible with constructivism for a 
given domain, alternative foundations are possible.   
What Sambin seems to have asserted as fact, i.e., that there isn’t a single and 
necessary way of ‘forgetting’ what doesn’t matter in some context, we can now see that 
there are in fact good reasons why such a monist posit is unjustified. This implies that it 
is prima facie possible that there is always more than one correct, constructive basis for 
abstracting what matters when formulating relevant principles. And we know that the 
results of formalizing or situating such principles in larger theories often end up being 
incompatible in an interesting and non-trivial manner.  
We now have, at least what I hope, looks like a typical or exemplary case (i.e., in 
the mathematical case of the notion of function or subset) of a notion for which distinct, 
perfectly acceptable (and all constructive) accounts can arise because different acts, i.e., 
bases, of abstraction underlie them. And this typical case may also point us to a stronger 
argument for pluralism (given constructivist starting points). As mentioned above, what I 
propose is an argument with the stronger conclusion that accepting constructivist 
foundations requires accepting pluralism about foundations, is available if an additional 
premise is acceptable. The premise in question is that given any notion apt for abstraction, 
there are always be at least two distinct bases for abstractions that give rise to distinct 
foundations within the same general abstraction norm. That is, when we set about 
abstracting, and our abstraction is governed by some norm (“it must be constructive,” or 
“it must be a liberal theory,”) that norm by itself will not be so constraining that what else 
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is abstracted away or included cannot vary depending on the other interests the 
abstracters bring to the exercise.  
Specifically I propose that there are always, or at least generally, supplementary 
interests that can be brought to bear that can be described in terms of two general types of 
norms: that the principles one should use, i.e., abstract out, may be characterized as either 
intentional or extensional (but not both if constructive). The idea here is that any 
constructive approach must allow for both levels of analysis, i.e. abstract, extensional 
reasoning and computational, intensional algorithms, but not both at the same time. I 
must profess ignorance on how to defend such a premise, rather I am inclined to only fear 
it is true (since the burden of proof returns to the pluralist constructivist, rather than the 
monist constructivist). 
 
1.5 Two Rival Norms in Constructive Liberalism 
Ignoring for now the stronger premise, if what I have said above is true, there 
should be a parallel story for constructivist liberal theories to the one just told about 
constructive mathematics. And in the same way, this will amount to a prima facie case 
for pluralism in liberal foundations. 
In the mathematical case, constructive motivations alone can’t determine an 
approach to answering foundational questions. Instead, for at least some foundational 
questions, there is a multiplicity of mathematical norms that are each consistent with 
constructivism—indeed, that are plausible parts of a constructive answer to a 
foundational question—but which are jointly incompatible when constructivism is 
assumed. I have considered two such norms above, namely the norms of extensionality 
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and of computability. I will briefly present an example of political/moral norms that 
might play a similar role for constructivist liberalism. 
An important foundational principle in any political theory where fairness or 
justice is central, and so for all liberal theories, will be: equal concerns should be treated 
the same. As is probably well known, there are many difficulties spelling out exactly 
what this principle means; it’s far more complicated than merely being a claim that 
decisions be principled or consistent and so constructivism alone is insufficient to 
determine what it means. To start, let’s break down this principle into two subsidiary 
issues. First, what does it mean for two considerations to be equal in moral or political 
stature? Secondly, what does it mean to then treat such equal considerations as the same? 
(E.g., the world being the way it is may allow for us to act on one but not the other in 
identical fashion). 
The obvious way to understand the second issue is that political/moral decisions 
must be impartial: whatever you do for one concern, do for any equal concern, ceterius 
paribus. This isn’t to say that there isn’t a lot of disagreement regarding how to theorize 
this impartiality. For example, Harsanyi’s [1975] utilitarian notion of impartiality means 
treating everyone’s preferences as if one super-person had them all. The best known 
variant of Rawls [1971] notion of impartiality is spelled out in terms of the mechanism of 
the veil of ignorance; with reasons being suitably impartial when accepted there. 
Scanlon’s[1998] notion of impartiality means using reasons that no reasonable person 
would reject. Sen’s notion of impartiality [2009] is quite similar to Scanlon in many 
ways; he argues for what he calls an open impartiality where reasoned scrutiny can come 
from any source, so as to help undermine parochialism. 
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Likely, there is an interesting story to be told here regarding different theoretical 
or abstraction norms at work in these various accounts of impartiality. However, I want to 
focus on the first subsidiary issue, due to what turns out to be an interesting parallel with 
the previous discussion. Sorting what it means for two concerns to be equal in moral or 
political stature leads to interesting questions regarding the nature of categorization or 
class membership, and logically minded folk find such questions illuminating. I will 
focus on two ways of answering this question. These two answers will, individually, be 
compatible with political liberalism; but under the assumption of constructive liberalism 
are instead jointly incompatible. Furthermore, I argue that each answer is predicated upon 
a different norm for what matters in making political/moral decisions. 
The first answer is that when two groups (individuals can be groups) have the 
same to gain or lose in the outcome of some decision, the concerns of each group are 
equal. The norm I propose as the basis for this answer is that political/moral decisions 
should be focused on people’s wellbeing, as befitting a focus on what one has to gain or 
lose.43 As such, I will call this the wellbeing norm; its important feature is that it only 
sorts interests in terms of the outcomes of a decision. The second answer is that when two 
groups invest or entrust the same sort of resource in a decision, i.e., to the decision-
makers, the concerns of each group are equal. The norm here is that political/moral 
decisions should be responsible.  
                                                        43 Normally, I would take such a straightforward privileging of people’s well‐being over other sentient animals as morally unmotivated and possibly immoral. In this case, since we are looking at political decisions, and I am assuming that it is humankind alone that is the relevant kind of political animals. This assumption might be mistaken. 
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To illustrate the wellbeing norm, Peter Singer’s preference utilitarianism is 
helpful (even if one thinks his view isn’t constructivist, the norm is more general than just 
as a part of constructivism). He is explicit in answering the foundational question we are 
looking at in Singer [2011]. He writes: “In accepting that ethical judgments must be made 
from a universal point of view, I am accepting that my own needs, wants and desires 
cannot, simply because they are my preferences, count more than the wants, needs and 
desires of anyone else. Thus, my very natural concern that my own [preferences] be 
looked after must, when I think ethically, be extended to the preferences of others.” (pgs 
11-12). 
With this wellbeing approach, political decision-makers must count groups with 
the same preference regarding an outcome as having equal weight when making a 
decision. Obviously, not all wellbeing minded moral theorists are preference utilitarians, 
but Singer’s explicit focus on the outcomes of a decision is exemplary of this approach. 
And if one needs an example of a constructivist utilitarian, Harsanyi can be seen as 
footing this bill with his version of the veil of ignorance. 
On the other hand, the responsibility norm prescribes focusing on the roles people 
may have in the process of a decision or in the life of the decision-maker. Thus, equality 
of such roles in a decision implies equality of concerns, all else being equal. On this 
account, sorting concerns as equal requires taking into account differing concern for the 
resources or trusts invested in the first place. A key virtue for responsibility-based 
accounts is that they can straightforwardly handle cases where social roles seem to play 
an essential role. For example, two drowning children have an equal concern in the 
outcome of surviving. But if one child is your child while the other is a stranger to you, 
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there is something very wrong in treating their concerns [in being saved by you] as equal. 
Your child trusts you in a way the stranger does not. This is not to say that wellbeing 
accounts can’t deal with this issue somehow, but rather responsibility accounts can be 
applied in a relatively simple and straightforward way to do so.44 In the political sphere, 
responsibility accounts straightforwardly handle questions regarding why a preference for 
one’s own citizens over the needs of others, all things considered, seems morally justified. 
The question now at hand is whether each norm, i.e., the wellbeing and the 
responsibility norms, are individually compatible with political liberalism and 
specifically constructive liberalism. To show compatibility, I will give an example of 
each norm at work in liberal theories that eschew appeal to some mind-independent 
reality for what makes moral/political claims true. 
The wellbeing norm can be seen as the basis for Rawls’s approach in A Theory of 
Justice, as his principles for a just society clearly privileges liberty and then focuses on 
the benefits the worst-off will receive when implementing some fundamental policy. And 
of course, the social contract reasoning at the heart of A Theory of Justice is constructivist.  
An explicit and simple example of a liberal theory based on the responsibility 
norm is a bit harder to come by. To avoid having to justify interpreting a pre-existing 
liberal theory as responsibility-based, I will cook one up, so to speak, to do the job. In 
Richard Freeman’s [1984] stakeholder analysis for ethical business decisions, the moral 
principle at its heart is that one should maximize value for all stakeholders. And whether 
or not this principle is wellbeing or responsibility based depends then on how carefully                                                         44 On the other hand, an easy way to theorize responsible decisions is in terms of preferring the concerns of those who start with more to invest. And if this easy way is taken, it’s not hard to see how responsibility norms could allow for principles that privilege the wealthy in a society. 
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we define ‘stakeholder’. To make explicit how the responsibility norm can work in this 
approach, I will deviate from Freeman’s [2002] most widely known definition.45 Let’s 
define Stakeholder as: 
Given a decision-maker O, a stakeholder S for O is a group whose concerns are or 
have been placed under O’s care, given O’s function(s), purpose(s) or social 
role(s).  
This definition allows for children to be stakeholders to their parents, where there is no 
explicit choice on the part of children to place themselves under their parents’ care. It 
also allows for bondholders to be a stakeholder for the organization in which they have 
their creditor’s stake, where here there is an explicit choice to place their coupon under 
the organization’s care. Of course, a range of examples can’t directly justify a definition, 
but they can illustrate how the definition can be put to work.  
To ensure that a political version of this stakeholder theory can be both liberal and 
constructivist, we need an example where individual citizens’ liberty is a privileged 
concern placed under the government’s care, but justified in virtue of a constructive 
method. I propose that we could construct conditions under which individuals would risk 
their liberty under the care of political representatives using a framework that resembles 
Philip Pettit’s [2005] civicism. With such a framework we could avoid any ontological 
essentialism when it comes to delineating when a group of individuals constitute a 
political people. Unfortunately, such interesting details are beyond the scope of this 
                                                        45 Which reads [Freeman 2002], “The narrow definition includes those groups who are vital to the survival and success of the corporation. The wide definition includes any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a [organization’s] purposes.” (pg. 47). 
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project. However, plausibility and compatibility should travel hand in hand well enough 
for now.46 
 Nonetheless, we still need to answer why it’s possible to construct a situation 
where individuals will reasonably place their liberty under their governments’ care.47 
Since it’s possible to use the veil of ignorance to characterize an ideal contract, such that, 
at the minimum, we agree to a society where each has the most liberty compatible with 
like liberty for all; this much can be said regarding the political stakeholder approach as 
well. Of course, this assumes that other conditions of such an ideal contract are 
independent of this privileging of liberty; but this assumption must be made anyways 
since, as I will argue in Chapter Two, we will need a plurality of such ideal states in order 
to theorize liberalism—more on this in due course. 
The next issue is to sort wellbeing and responsibility norms as incompatible, that 
is, once we assume constructivism. It is not hard to see wellbeing accounts as often and 
directly conflicting with responsibility accounts. To illustrate, I see the 
wellbeing/responsibility divide roughly tracking Nozicks’s  [1974] patterned/historical 
accounts of justice. What someone has invested (whether it’s trust or capital) in some 
project is a matter of historical record; outcomes of some project can be articulated solely 
in terms of an abstract pattern. If Nozick’s arguments regarding the incompatibility of 
patterned and historical accounts of justice are cogent, we should also expect that the 
wellbeing and responsibility norms are, in fact, incompatible once we assume 
constructivism. Here is a brief argument to this effect: reference to some historical 
                                                        46 That is, as long as being good constructivists, we distinguish between plausibility and truth. 47 The simple answer: if something is actual, it’s possible.   
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investment etc. in some project regarding what its outcome should be is clearly 
intensional, while wellbeing is straightforwardly reducible to questions of membership in 
the same group,48 i.e., could be read as extensional, and thus logically, constructivism is 
undermined if we combine both of these further norms (as is in the case with constructive 
mathematics and combining extensional with computable norms).  
But suppose we don’t want to rely on the cogency of Nozick’s arguments. If we 
can show that these different norms justify conflicting answers to basic policy questions, 
we would have a good grasp of what the right sort of incompatibility would look like. To 
do so, let me explain how I see these norms as operating at a basic level. I propose that 
the norms regarding wellbeing and responsibility, as I have called them, arise from the 
context of moral criticism in actual moral practice.49  
When one is on the hot seat, so to speak, the charge one is accountable for, i.e. 
what we are responding to, is: whose concerns did you take into account in your 
decision? More concretely, if someone did wrong, the charge may be glossed as: why did 
you not think of so and so’s concerns, wellbeing, rights, and/or trust etc. when you did 
such and such? (How could you?) On this account, principles governing the notion of 
wellbeing and responsibility are formulated from and with details abstracted from real-
life calls for considering all the people (or even sentient beings) and their legitimate 
                                                        48 Of course, part of the open questions brought up here include the issue of whether there is a way to develop the notion of wellbeing in intensional terms. If this can be worked out, the incompatibility conjectured here is wrong (at least as presented for now). 49 As you will see, I will often appeal to this context (i.e., of being called on to justify one’s choices) to help specify the notions required for a suitable meta‐ethics. 
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concerns one should in making appropriate choices.50 The question here is: why couldn’t 
we formulate constructive principles that treat concerns with trust, investments etc. and 
with wellbeing as on par? As in the case of ready-to-eat principles for apples, where we 
seeming could combine ripeness-based and sweetness-based principles, can we always 
combine wellbeing with responsibility norms in a constructive principle? To see why not, 
consider the following case of moral criticism. 
Suppose we are on the hot seat. We, as state officials, used taxes to help a 
company outsource jobs from a local plant to a factory in a developing nation.51 One can 
readily imagine that the loudest criticism will sound something like: how could you use 
our money to take away our jobs and give them to people in ….? Here, there is a claim 
that we must defend a decision to use resources from one group to benefit a different 
group. Now, instead of answering the criticism, and in the fine political tradition of 
criticizing one’s critics, we could query: how could you critics think families here are 
more important than families there, especially since helping families in a developing 
nation can result in far more benefit from the same tax dollar? This isn’t to say that 
responsibility based theorists won’t prescribe, say, foreign aid. They may do so, but likely 
in a way that by providing such aid, there will be spin-off benefits for the donor country’s 
taxpayers (and probably international business stakeholders). In contrast, wellbeing based 
theorists would likely instead prescribe aid where the benefit to recipients is the greatest                                                         50 This foundation is largely motivated by Bernard Williams’ [2012] focus on taking moral phenomena, especially personal and social responsibilities (not to be confused with my technical notion of a norm of responsibility), as the starting point of analysis (as opposed to a systematic or theoretic approach) regarding what changes to the world one should bring about. 51 ‘Why?’ one might ask. Perhaps we were moved by the plight of those suffering from a catastrophic variability of economic activity, and thus privileged those under conditions of absolute poverty relative to our own relatively affluent citizens. 
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overall. And of course, it’s a contingent fact which country would benefit the most from 
aid and which country, provided with aid, would provide the most spin-off benefits for 
the donor’s taxpayers. Thus we would have interesting, non-trivial, constructive but 
conflicting answers to fundamental policy questions about obligations regarding foreign 
aid. 
If I am right regarding the nature of pluralism in constructive mathematics, there 
should be a parallel story for constructivist liberal theories. I argued that, as in the case 
with math, constructivism alone couldn’t determine how to answer some fundamental 
policy questions in liberal theory; we need to apply further abstraction norms to provide 
the relevant answers. This will also result in a prima facie case for pluralism in liberal 
foundations. I argued that sorting which concerns are equal when making political 
decisions can be based on two constructive abstraction norms: wellbeing and 
responsibility. For the former, political decisions should be focused, i.e., given a 
privileging of liberty, on the wellbeing of those involved. For the latter norm, political 
decisions should be responsible to those who have entrusted their care to the decision-
makers. I gave an example of two constructive liberal theories, each based on each norm, 
to show that the norms are individually compatible with constructive liberalism. Then, I 
argued that there are two ways in which these norms are instead jointly incompatible 
once we assume constructivism. First, the wellbeing norm is extensional in nature and the 
responsibility norm is intensional in nature. As with the case for mathematics, 
constructivism can’t be combined with both extensional and intensional accounts of 
group membership. The second argument showed that each norm gives rise to conflicting 
principles for directing foreign aid, and thus disagree at a fundamental level. 
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1.5.2 A Plurality of Prescriptions 
On this account of the nature or foundations of constructive reasoning, it is prima 
facie the case that there are multiple correct, but disagreeing, ideals from which we can 
abstract out prescriptions, obligations, principles of justice etc. As mentioned, these 
prescriptions etc. are not merely claims made by the relevant ideal; rather if the ideal is 
cogent, what it prescribes is in fact prescribed. Thus we will have some inconsistent 
prescriptions in such cases; to make pluralism intelligible, we need to know how to make 
sense of such a possibility. And this is part of the contribution this project is aimed at 
providing. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
Summarizing so far, I have looked at why, if we want a systematic and 
constructivist meta-ethics for liberal foundations, we will need to allow for such a system 
to be self-inconsistent. And to investigate such possibilities, it would be appropriate to 
use formal tools. Specifically, I have argued that Bernard Williams’ and Amartya Sen’s 
claims, i.e., that taking pluralism seriously is tantamount to rejecting systematic 
constructivism in ethics, leaves open at least one avenue of escape. And this is the option 
I propose: that we should allow for a constructive system to be inconsistent. I briefly and 
informally sketched out how the sort of pluralist approach I propose, i.e., that allowing 
for the system to be inconsistent, we are able to respond to their objections.  
But this talk of theoretical inconsistency is likely hard to handle. The idea is that 
while we may want to use a pluralist perspective to defend a foundation for political 
liberalism, we first need to justify a method for investigating the details of a suitable 
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pluralism. I argued that the relevant moral terms and concepts can be treated as particular 
sorts of mathematical objects. In particular, I introduced and informally sketched out the 
technical notion of a choice. Given an appropriate formal language to reason with and 
about such choices, we will be well on our way to understanding the ramifications and 
consequences of a pluralist approach for liberal foundations. 
Finally, I responded to doubts regarding the epistemic status of pluralism in meta-
ethics. It may have been hoped that the multiplicity of moral approaches to liberalism is 
merely an artifact of the state of current scholarship, contra Williams or Sen. However, I 
argued that the very nature of constructivist foundations, when properly understood, 
generates a prima facie case for a plurality of such foundations. It would appear that a 
constructivist approach leads one to allow for inconsistent systems, in general and in 
meta-ethics in particular. 
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Chapter Two  A Feasible Plurality 
2.0 Introduction  
In Chapter One I suggested that a proper foundation for liberalism ought to be a 
pluralist one. In this chapter, I begin the defense of this claim.  
 I will begin by considering how best to understand the phenomena of moral 
conflict and disagreement in order to clarify what a correct pluralist account should look 
like. I then turn to the important task of defending pluralism against some obvious 
objections. This part of the chapter is not merely defensive, though, since the shape a 
defensible pluralism must take has important implications for meta-ethics. As it turns out, 
taking conflicting principles seriously requires a nuanced and complex conception of 
disagreement and incompatibility between rival theories.  
 
2.1 CA and Value Conflicts 
CA methodologies seem (but only seem) to have a better grasp on how to handle 
conflicting principles than RITs. As Sen [2009] pointed out, RITs seemingly suffer from 
what he calls the infeasibility problem when faced with conflicting principles. Since CAs 
specify which principles are socially preferable (i.e., which principle is selected from 
some specified impartial perspective) they promise to resolve disputes in any particular 
context. Consider two principles, say A and B. And suppose that in some context, c, A 
prescribes some choice that B prohibits. Perhaps, B always prohibits lying but A says you 
should not put someone’s life at risk without good reason (all other things being equal). 
The context is a person having a heart-attack and she asks you if she is having a heart-
attack. Since you have basic CPR training you know that staying silent or telling the truth 
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will likely worsen the symptoms or cause death. Given a social choice methodology, we 
could input principles A and B together with assumptions about how each option will 
ramify in distributing ‘goods’ across society. Presumably, in this example, a reasonable 
CA will opt for the principle that allows us to tell ‘white lies’ in life-and-death 
circumstances. More generally, though, one option will be better or at least no worse than 
the other option in how well it distributes goods according to the preferences of our social 
perspective.  
However, using CAs does seem to imply that the principle of we should always 
maximize the preferences of the impartial perspective will never be over-ridden by any 
other principle, on pain of circularity or nonsense. In other words, upon closer 
examination CA methods do in fact presuppose a uniquely correct principle. Since for 
such CA methodologies, justice just is a species of choices preferred by impartial 
perspectives,52 we must give up the possibility of conflicting principles at a fundamental 
level. What may have looked promising, i.e., in terms of taking conflicting principles 
seriously, in ordinary moral contexts turns out to be unsuitable for handling the more 
foundational issues at hand.  
I am assuming that there is not just one way of appropriately thinking about 
justice, and Sen claims to make a similar assumption.53 I agree with Sen that our store of 
                                                        52 Non‐cognitivist responses to the open‐question argument in some sense relegate all questions of action‐guidance to individual motivations to act. In this one aspect, Sen’s [2009] appeal to actual preferences could be seen as immune to the open‐question argument. However, Sen’s belief that we can then appropriately aggregate such motivations (preferences) in a theoretical structure (i.e., the impartial perspective) revives the argument. 53 Pgs 203‐207 Sen [2009] argues for other foundations of political reasonableness than the notions of reciprocity and mutual benefit as found in the social contract tradition. 
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such impartial reasons and notions regarding justice do seem to outstrip our ability to 
capture every relevant consideration in one unique and consistent set of principles. 
However, for any relevant CA all these conflicting principles of justice can be attributed 
to different accounts of what claims can be defended as appropriately impartial.54 The 
problem is that even if all reasonable considerations are given due weight and concern 
within any and every suitably impartial perspective, this does not imply that there are still 
no other reasonable ways to think about justice. In fact, this seems to suggest another 
open-question: But is it reasonable to only defend claims from impartial perspectives?55 
It looks like taking justice to be a species of choices preferred by an impartial 
perspective doesn’t allow for us to represent all the conflict we do find in actual moral 
practice. If this is the case, CA methodologies flounder at a fundamental level, given a 
pluralist starting point. On the other hand, it is clear that CA methodologies can take 
conflicting principles in more ordinary contexts quite seriously. And as you will see, I 
will borrow ruthlessly from what makes CA methods work at an ordinary level to help 
RIT approaches handle more fundamental disagreement. 
 
2.2 “Ought” Implies “Can” and Monism 
There is another common view regarding the nature of intractable conflict 
between principles: there are none. I will briefly and informally introduce this view by 
using an argument proposed by Terrance McConnell [1976;1978]. McConnell shows that 
the conjunction of the following three sentences express an inconsistent set of 
                                                        54 See footnote 53 55 And as suggested in Chapter 1, there are some reasons to think that a 
responsibility‐based perspective is possible. 
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propositions: (1) there are genuine moral dilemmas; (2) ought implies can; (3) if one is 
obligated to do each of two courses of action, then one is obligated to do both courses of 
action. McConnell does not offer a formal specification of to his deontic language, but it 
is not hard to identify the reasoning behind his argument. In keeping with normal practice 
in deontic logics, OA stands for “it is obligatory that A” and ◊ stands for classical alethic 
possibility. Premises introduced to represent the above propositions will be noted by [1], 
[2], or [3] to keep distinct from rules referring to steps in the argument. 
1) OA     premise 
2) OB    premise 
3) ~ ◊ (A & B)   premise; 1-3 represent [1] 
4) O(A & B) → ◊ (A & B) premise; by way of [2] 
5) (OA & OB) → O(A& B) premise; by way of [3] 
6) OA & OB   1,2 &I 
7) O(A&B)   5, 6 →E 
8) ~ O (A&B)   3,4 m.t.  
Since 7 and 8 are a contradiction, some step leading to them must go. McConnell’s 
choice is line 3, and so he puts the fault on the assumption that there are genuine moral 
dilemmas. He makes this because the formulas of #4 and #5 are axioms in his version of 
standard deontic logic (SDL). But this is too fast; why shouldn’t we instead revise the 
axioms or logic being used to represent deontic deductions? There are technical reasons 
for rejecting a polymodal logic combining KD and S5 (the closest well-understood logic 
to approximate McConnell’s take on SDL). For example, it seems like the naturalistic 
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fallacy (that is, a formula reasonably interpreted as such) is satisfied by all models for 
such a polymodal logic (details can be found in appendix 1).   
 Less technically, it seems problematic to use a formal representation to rule out 
one side in a live debate, unless that formal representation is taken to be indisputable by 
all relevant sides. McConnell seems instead to have the tail wagging the dog in this 
argument. As I will show, the inference from ought to can is not in general valid if we 
take the distinction between ought and must seriously, let alone the possibility of moral 
conflicts. Moreover, the formalization of obligation that McConnell seems to have in 
mind is not constructive, however the details of such an argument is part of a much larger 
project.  
 In Chapter Four I developed a logic for characterizing the deontic consequence 
relation that rejects both [2] and [3]. At worst, then, even if we assume McConnell’s line 
of reasoning is correct, we have a stalemate since the axioms of my deontic logic permits 
us to posit the existence of moral dilemmas if we so desire. However, as I will show, 
there are independent reasons for preferring my system. 
 Given the sort of considerations raised by Sen, it is safe to assume that there are 
many, diverse impartial reasons that actually exists for thinking of justice in one way or 
another. Our store of such impartial reasons and notions regarding justice do seem to 
outstrip our ability to capture every relevant consideration in one unique and consistent 
set of principles. If at least some obligations follow from our notions of justice then a 
logic that is at least neutral with respect to the existence of moral dilemmas is far more 
appropriate than the ‘standard’ logic assumed by McConnell and those who share this 
view on this issue. 
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2.3 On a Family of Liberalisms 
Indeed, it is the recognition of this failure of any single, consistent theory of 
justice to capture every relevant consideration that has motivated other philosophers to 
consider some form of pluralism. For example, the many counter-examples offered in the 
literature to Rawls’ principles of justice from A Theory of Justice tend to show how there 
are legitimate instances of injustice that Rawls’s principles fail to pick out [Copp 1974; 
Keyt 1974; G.A. Cohen 1991; Harsanyi 1975]. As noted in the introductory chapter, near 
the end of his life Rawls explicitly argues that his principles of justice should have 
perhaps only a minor role in justifying public policy. Instead, he argues there should be a 
family of liberal theories that make up the Public Reason that may be used to justify 
policy. Rawls’ move to a plurality of RITs was motivated by this recognition of the many, 
diverse and seemingly correct reasons for thinking about equality and liberty that actually 
exist in our sort of democratic culture.  
Let us pause here to distinguish the case for pluralism from the mere recognition 
that people sometimes disagree. So far I have relied on an intuitive sense of what sort of 
disagreement matters in a philosophically worthwhile pluralism. To develop a more 
nuanced notion of pluralist disagreement, I think a useful place to start is David DeVidi’s 
[2012] argument for mathematical pluralism. His claim is that for pluralism to be a 
philosophical view worthy of philosophical attention, it must be, when spelled out, 
interesting (e.g. it can’t turn out that we’ve all been pluralists all along) and nontrivial 
(the differing theorists cannot be mere variants, sub-theories of the same overarching 
theory, etc. – they need to disagree!)  
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While DeVidi had mathematical and logical theories in mind, this seems a 
plausible requirement for moral or political pluralism as well. And it is a condition I think 
Rawls’ Public Reason meets. There are, of course, subsidiary conditions pluralism must 
meet—the different theories of the same thing—so that the disagreements are not merely 
argument, involving a subtle changing the subject from one theory to another and so on.  
We can develop this pluralist notion of disagreement further: the sort of 
disagreement that we are looking for should have rival theories or ways of seeing the 
same subject matter. But not just any rival theories will do; for the disagreement to be 
philosophically worthwhile, the rivalry must be intractable. In this case, intractable 
rivalry must mean two things: 1) at a fundamental level there is some sense in which the 
rivals agree, e.g. on what metaphorical race they are running; 2) that the criteria for 
success is non-excludable,56 i.e., that it doesn’t follow from a theory satisfying the criteria 
that no other theory can. 
It should be clearer now why the recognition of rival theories or abstract 
principles could motivate notions similar to PRIT. In fact, when we look at the theoretic 
resources PRIT has to handle the infeasibility objection, these resources are due in large 
part to the structural features PRIT shares with other interesting and non-trivial 
pluralisms found in other domains. 
In the math case, a non-trivial and interesting pluralism implies that there may be 
more than one correct solution to a well-posed mathematical problem. To be clear, 
                                                        56 It is plausible that this might mean that inquiry in mind‐independent or realist domains cannot then be pluralists in this sense. A plausible criterion for a successful theory in such domains is: which theory gets the world as it really is? And unless the 
world has parts that can be represented by true contradictions, it seems that there are no rival but equally successful theories.  
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pluralism on this account needs multiple correct answers to a well-posed question.57 As 
argued in Chapter One, given a constructivist starting point for liberalism, there is a 
prima facie case for pluralism. Given these considerations, such pluralism implies that 
the bases for such rival theories or formal principles are used to abstract said principles 
etc. from the same concrete level. On this account, rivals must be faithful to the same 
more concrete notion. If this is the case, there can be no aspect of the concrete notion that 
can decisively rule out all but one of the rivals. Since the infeasibility objection is what it 
is because of the plurality of impartial reasons, if we were to posit rival theories, rival 
ideals, it is possible to then account for such a plurality. 
Recall that PRIT is the view that there is at least two equally (and maximally) 
correct but distinct accounts, i.e. rivals, of what a perfectly just institution consists in. 
(While, like later Rawls seems to suggest, I argue there are more than just two such rivals, 
and all we need for pluralism to hold is that there are at least two.) PRIT is therefore 
similar to other interesting and non-trivial pluralisms from other domains: to be an 
interesting and non-trivial sort of pluralism the view must be that a particular 
phenomenon, domain, or subject matter can be correctly specified or explained in more 
than one genuinely distinct manner. The shorthand version for these criteria in the case of 
PRIT is that the cogency of PRIT rests on the claim that there is more than one correct 
answer to a well-posed question regarding the nature of ideally just societies. 
In the political context, I will use Rawls’ organizing question (but choose your 
own if you want): How should we balance the values of liberty and equality in the basic 
                                                        57 To be clear, it is a theoretical pluralism, not just methodological pluralism. Methodological pluralism is more often defended on the grounds of the incompleteness of a method leading us to use other methods to fill this gap. 
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framework of social cooperation? Suppose we can justify different starting points in how 
we specify these values or what counts as impartial or what counts as a good balance. The 
result will most likely be a non-trivial and interesting pluralism. In the liberal RIT 
tradition, I explicate a particular balance of these values by trying to describe a perfectly 
just society based on those starting points.  
For PRIT, the many, diverse impartial reasons that actually exist for thinking 
different things unjust are understood as parts of rival accounts of a perfectly just society. 
To be explicit, PRIT is an interesting and non-trivial pluralism since we have but one 
subject matter, namely what is the nature of a perfectly just society? And I propose that, 
for the purposes of the present inquiry, we can assume we have at least two genuinely 
distinct but correct answers. Each correct account of a perfectly just society can be seen 
as formulated upon a distinct group of the many, diverse impartial reasons for thinking 
different situations unjust. There can be some overlap in these groupings of reasons; 
however, we assume that there must be at least one difference when we assume the 
pluralism to be non-trivial. 
As pointed out above, I agree with Sen that our desire to capture every relevant 
consideration in one unique and consistent set of principles of justice is a false hope. But 
I contend that there is good reason to suppose that for any one of the many, diverse, 
impartial reasons that could be a relevant consideration in theorizing justice, we have 
good reason to think it to be included in one of the plurality of accounts of a perfectly just 
society. Here’s why: if you consider what an impartial reason would have to be like in 
order for it to be independent of every regulatory ideal, such theory-independence will 
not look plausible. Such a reason could not: 
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1. Play any role in modeling the decisions of a just society  
2. Be entailed by any correct version of an ideally just society.  
3. Be a premise in the construction of any theory of ideal justice.  
4. Be added to an ideal theory to construct an improved theory (that is, 
extending a theory if it is consistent to do so).  
5. Approximate the sorts of reasons used in policy decisions in any correct 
version of a just society.  
The idea here is it seems implausible that such impartial reasons could not count as 
touchstones for a theory of an ideally just society. Conditions 1-5 survey the different 
ways rivals can be formulated upon these relevant impartial reasons or imply such 
reasons are acceptable. 1 and 3 are clear examples of how rivals may take aspects 
abstracted from the more concrete level and then formulate principles based on these 
considerations. Conditions 2 and 5 point out the ‘discovery’ of a new sort of reason we 
should think of as relevant or impartial, either in formal terms or in approximate form as 
the case may be. And condition 4 indicates how we might be able to accommodate 
principles in the context of pre-existing theory. Each condition captures how such reasons 
can count as touchstones for our various rivals, either as criteria in their formation or as 
tests of their results.  
It seems unlikely that any significant consideration could not be accounted for as 
a touchstone for at least one rival version of an ideally just society. Obviously, this 
argument is not conclusive; it is not intended to be so but rather it is conductive in nature.  
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2.4 Pluralism and Paraconsistency 
An obvious objection looms, so let me pause to address it. The cost of a PRIT 
framework is that deductive reasoning from a PRIT perspective must be paraconsistent. 
Assuming that we have an interesting and non-trivial pluralism there must be some p 
such that one theory permits p while the other does not permit p. As I have developed the 
notion, our family of liberal principles of justice must be jointly inconsistent in order to 
be an interesting and non-trivial sort of pluralism. They must disagree and that 
disagreement cannot be explained away by each theory dealing with a different subject 
matter or some other form of equivocation. To be clear, the individual theories 
themselves need not be inconsistent; inconsistency only arises when we combine them 
into a family of rival theories. But if we assume that the pronouncements of each correct 
theory about what is obligatory and what is not, then if deductive reasoning is to be 
fruitful under these conditions, we need a logic that does not verify the rule of explosion.  
Could we avoid this conclusion? Why not change the properties of the theories in 
our family of RITs so that such inconsistency does not arise automatically? Perhaps we 
should give up the claims that each acceptable theory be complete. That is, should we 
allow individual RITs to have truth gaps (i.e. claim lacking both truth and falsity) instead 
of truth gluts (i.e., claims being both true and false)? In this way, we could have 
disagreement between the members of our family of RITs that amounts to one theory 
permitting p and a different theory failing to say one way or the other whether p is 
permissible; thus, there would be no need for paraconsistency, at least at face value. 
Two problems arise. The first problem is that such disagreement is not vigorous 
enough to be non-trivial. In this domain it seems always justifiable to appeal to the 
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stronger theory in such cases, even when the theories are rivals in other cases. In other 
words, if one theory is silent on some issue but a rival rules it just or unjust, the silent 
theory does not guide action in the way its rival does. This seems to suggest that being 
silent is a theoretical vice in such a case; i.e., the action-guiding theory has a prima facie 
claim to being a better theory. This would render such disagreement trivial.  
Moreover, there is an additional aspect to this problem. Supervalutation 
techniques allow us to fill in truth gaps of incomplete theories. Supervaluation treats the 
incompleteness of a theory in terms of its underdevelopment. Thus, given assumptions 
about how things will turn out theoretically, truth gaps are only relative to a stage of 
theoretical achievement, progress or available evidence, information etc. With such 
formal representations available, there would have to be independent justification for not 
using filled-in-theories instead of the gap-py theories. That is, we could always in theory 
generate a stronger theory than an incomplete one. 
 The second problem questions the conceptual plausibility of a theory of an ideally 
just society failing to be maximally complete. It is true that our actual theories in use in 
contemporary public debate are not maximally complete, let alone generally correct. 
However, RITs are not merely cleaned up versions of actual beliefs held by citizens; they 
are theories that specify an ideally just society. It is not plausible that an ideally just 
society would be less than maximally complete for the following reasons. First, there is a 
conceptual connection, albeit an inchoate one, between an ideal society and complete set 
of action-guiding principles at the heart of the RIT approach. The idea here is that there is 
something sub-ideal with a society that doesn’t know which policies to implement. There 
is a distinctly comparative or attributive element to this notion of an ideal society: My 
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society answers more policy questions than yours so mine is better, i.e., the more 
comprehensive theory, consistent with the same question is better than a less 
comprehensive theory. In an important sense, the current project can be seen as an 
attempt to make explicit this inchoate connection between an ideal society and action-
guiding principles.  
Secondly, in this sort of normative research we are aiming at providing action-
guiding principles for collective choosing, everything else being equal; this goal seems to 
incline us to construct maximal theories instead of less maximal theories. It is only when 
we find discrepancies between equally correct maximal theories that we bemoan such 
completeness. We have a conflict here between the theoretical values of consistency and 
action-guiding/maximal completeness. I have noted already the difficulties with living up 
to our action-guiding duties in a pluralistic theoretical framework. We should not choose 
options to make this harder than it must be. One quick clarification: by maximal or 
complete theories in this case I do not mean a theory that is formulated upon every 
impartial reason. Recall the distinction between infeasible incompleteness and theoretical 
incompleteness from the discussion of Sen’s infeasibility argument. In this case, the 
completeness is in terms of ruling for any P whether P is true or false. The above 
argument for an ideally just society providing a complete theory is by no means 
conclusive. But until such justification is provided, the balance of considerations 
decisively tilts to using the truth-glut approach instead of the truth-gap approach. 
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2.4.1 PRIT and True Contradictions 
There is a meta-ethical and metaphysical worry I want to head off. If prescriptions 
are truth-apt, and mixed inferences58 suggest at least some are [Tappolet 1997; 2000], and 
PRIT is true then it seems plausible at first blush that some dialethias (true 
contradictions) exist. For instance, suppose we have some policy, P and two rival 
liberalisms X and Y that disagree about the justness of P. If both X and Y liberalisms are 
equally applicable for evaluating P then it seems that P is both just and not just. It seems 
we are contradicting ourselves, if we are not equivocating on the meaning of justice.59 
We could bite the bullet and accept one of the options, i.e., that we are truly contradicting 
ourselves or equivocating on ‘justness’ (but in an interesting and non-trivial way). 
However, neither option seems all that appealing at first pass. True contradictions are 
unappealing for obvious reasons. Equivocal use of justice would seem to undermine the 
notion of being rival accounts, i.e. in terms of the interesting disagreement criterion, of an 
ideally just society. Nonetheless, I shall adopt versions of both these options. The plan is 
that careful and nuanced formulations of both these options together will provide a 
sensible account of what is going on when rivals disagree (as required by a 
philosophically worthwhile pluralism). 
On the first option, dialetheism in PRIT may not be as strange or troubling as 
perhaps first thought. In the next chapter I will develop tools for dealing with trumping 
                                                        58 The mixed inferences I have in mind are arguments with both descriptive and prescriptive premises. For example: Killing John is wrong (prescriptive). Mark is killing John (descriptive). Therefore, Mark is doing wrong by killing John. The pattern of inference is valid according to the standard account, so truth‐preserving. The premises must be truth‐apt, or so this account implies. 59 This is a modification of Graham Priest’s [2006; 2008] argument against logical pluralism. 
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reasoning in ethics. In doing so, I will show that the best way to construct formulas 
representing prescriptions will be in terms of a prescribed choice.60 Thus it is not that we 
have a proposition and its negand both being true, as is in the case of the standard 
presentation of dialetheism. Rather I posit that we have two jointly incompatible choices 
both being acceptable or “true”—more on this in the next chapter.61  
 
2.4.2 Equivocating on Justness at different levels of analysis 
But there is a further problem regarding incompatible properties, such as justness, 
I want to highlight. Dealing with this problem will lead us to see how there can be a sort 
of equivocation on justice on one level of analysis that still allows for the relevant 
theories to be rivals on a different level of analysis. The idea is that by representing 
different sorts of incompatibility we can allow for an interesting and nuanced 
equivocation rather than merely changing the subject matter. Moreover, by having 
different incompatibilities we can provide a useful perspective for regimenting the 
relation between moral properties, prescribing choices and moral theories. The problem I 
have in mind is a sort of over-determination issue, in that actions may have properties 
independent of any theory’s assertion (contrary to a constructivist account of the 
attribution of properties). 
                                                        60 More formally, a prescription will be a relation over tuples of actions and sets of such tuples modified by a deontic box or diamond (with negation when required). 61 If something like this view is correct, together with the notion of mixed inference, it implies that acceptable and truth are just species of a more general notion of what is preserved in valid inferences. Given my predisposition towards type‐theoretic foundations seen in earlier chapters, this should not be all that surprising. But what this more general notion is exactly is beyond the scope of this project. 
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As I will argue in Chapter Three and Four, it is choices that are, in the first 
instance, subject to moral evaluation; actions have properties only due to their role as 
options from which a choice must be made. But for this to get off the ground, two actions 
compared in this way must not only be rankable as better or worse, but also must have a 
measure of how much better one is that the other.62 If such comparisons can measure how 
much better an option is than another, i.e. a cardinal ranking, then the following problem 
for pluralism can seemingly occur.  
Suppose we interpret the acceptability of a choice, according to a theory, as 
implying that the selected option is more just than the rejected options. Given that a 
theory is comparing actions to other actions (and assuming that a theory may be in some 
cases indifferent between trading off a certain number of actions against another type of 
action) the justness of actions can be cardinally ranked by a theory. Assume we have two 
theories A, B and three actions x, y, z but that x and y are incomparable according to A and 
B. Suppose that A states that we should choose x over z but not y over z and B states that 
we should choose y over z but not x over z. The problem is that if theory A states that x is 
much more just than z but B states that y is barely more just than z then (if we are not 
equivocating on ‘justice’) x is more just than y is relative to z, even though we have no 
theory stating that x is more just than y.63  
                                                        62 A comparison of actions is cardinal when it also compares lotteries composed of subsets of those actions, i.e., when an indifference curve can be constructed. Thus a cardinal ranking will tell us how much better one option is than another. 63 Of course, as stated this is a problem for my project only in principle. After all, I have already argued that the relevant moral or political codes or theories should be complete. But the problem could be modified to deal with decision‐procedures for handling conflict between such codes—more on this in Chapter Three. 
   94 
It seems that what started out as an interesting and non-trivial pluralism regarding 
ideally just societies threatens to turn into monism. Here’s why. If moral theories 
cardinally rank options and we can unequivocally attribute justness accordingly then we 
seem to have a sort of inter-theoretical comparison64 that can over-rule any given theory 
regarding what properties obtain. 
I want to approach this over-determination problem by finding a way to 
equivocate on justness as applied to specific choices while treating the justness of an 
ideal state unequivocally. In other words, we want a principled reason to move between a 
sort of theoretical relativism when dealing with claims regarding the justness of specific 
choices and a theoretical pluralism when dealing with claims regarding what we ought to 
do, in ideally just states or otherwise. By theoretical relativism, I mean that predicates are 
indexed to the theory used: given a predicate A and theories 𝑌!, if X according to theory 𝑌! is 𝐴!, we have relativism. Framed this way, theoretical pluralism is: given a predicate 
A and theories 𝑌!, if X according to theory 𝑌! is A, we have pluralism. On this view, 
theoretical pluralism abstracts away or ignores the source, i.e. the relevant theory, of the 
predication. So the question now is, what abstraction norm can underwrite this base of 
abstraction? 
We could first find out when we shouldn’t abstract away the source of predication. 
For example, we already have a rule that specifies that the justness of choices (or any 
other property) is a matter of theoretical relativism (and because such a rule wouldn’t 
allow the ranking of x, y and z in the manner described above). But it’s not a very 
philosophically interesting rule: given the fact that we are committed to constructive                                                         64 Compare with how interpersonal comparisons of utility is used in social welfare economics to aggregate individual’s preferences, given a suitable ordinal ranking. 
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norms, theoretical relativism lets us exclude the faulty sort of ranking. Obviously, this 
seems more than slightly ad hoc; I think we can reverse-engineer a more principled rule. 
If a multiplicity of theories in one case calls for pluralism, and we know the bases for this 
requirement, we might have a better view for understanding when a multiplicity of 
theories calls instead for relativism. 
The idea I have in mind is that obligation can be, and should be, treated as a 
logical word (as argued in Chapter One), but not so with moral properties. We may use 
moral property-claims, which obtain relative to some theory, to justify an obligation; but 
justifying an obligation by using a moral theory doesn’t imply that the resulting 
obligation inherits any theoretical connection to that theory, given that it is a logical word 
(understood in terms of a suitable deontic logic). Once we have an acceptable obligation, 
we kick away the theoretical ladder, so to speak, that let us defend it in the first place. 
Logical words don’t care about content, i.e., the particular theory used, that is, once they 
are recognized as (deontic) logical in nature. Therefore, when representing obligation in a 
formal system we must ignore what theory was used in deriving said obligation since 
obligation is a logical word.65 
Thus, the rule I have in mind is that when dealing with a multiplicity of theories: 
if the subject matter, i.e., the concepts, predicates etc., can be and should be treated as a 
logical word, pluralism is needed; otherwise, relativism is called for. That is, given a 
                                                        65 While I maintain no commitment to Rawls’ notion of overlapping consensus, I think there is some happy coincidence here. On his account, where the reasons used in reaching some consensus come from don’t matter. As long as everyone involved can use their own views to defend the target claims, it shouldn’t matter what the reasons are, all things considered. Fortunate for my account, I am making use of a far weaker set of theoretical assumptions than does Rawls, especially as my arguments generally rest on a logical analysis of what the relevant terms can mean.  
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multiplicity of correct theories, pluralism abstracts away which theory was used, as called 
for when the subject matter is a logical word; but not so with relativism: each claim is 
indexed to the theory used. Obviously, there are important details to be worked out here; 
however, defending such a pluralist basis of abstraction is a far larger project (especially, 
how it relates to the arguments in chapter one regarding constructivism implying a prima 
facie case for pluralism). Nonetheless, something similar to this basis of abstraction is at 
work throughout Chapter Four and some details can be found there.  
 
2.5 Different Pluralisms 
A final question still remains regarding pluralism. Why not instead deny that 
equality of correctness implies equality of applicability? I will call this option, 
“Jurisdictional Pluralism”. On this alternative, there is a distinction between the sorts of 
answers equally correct theories may cogently disagree upon. The idea is that evaluative 
questions are kept distinct from theoretical questions. For a more widely understood 
example (but one where I want to bracket off the issue of whether it is merely a 
methodological pluralism or a fundamental one), say we have two models for 
representing fundamental physics. The first understands a basic element as a wave and 
the second represents the same thing as a particle. Clearly the obvious ways to interpret 
these models disagree on questions on the nature of this element of physics. However, 
given different experimental setups, the context will indicate that one of these theories is 
inappropriate or appropriate for predicting experimental outcomes.  
My notion of jurisdictional pluralism claims that non-trivial and interesting 
disagreement may take place only at a descriptive or theoretical level; no disagreement 
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occurs at the evaluative or predictive level. The idea is that the nature of evaluative or 
predictive questions relies in large part on the purposes we are aiming for in making this 
assessment. On the other hand, non-evaluative questions are asking for a description or 
abstract representation of some phenomenon. A PRIT version of jurisdictional pluralism 
would then claim that only one liberalism can ever be applicable in evaluating whether a 
particular policy is just or not, even though other liberalisms are no less correct in how 
they describe the nature of ideally just institutions. 
In this project, I assume that the less problematic option is to let incompatible 
choices be jointly acceptable. I think we can make sense of the notion that policies can be 
both just and unjust: acceptable in one ideally just society but objectionable in a different 
ideally just society. On the other hand, there is no clear rule for when one of our rival 
liberalism would be exclusively applicable for evaluating a particular policy, as required 
by the jurisdictional account. Of course, an argument from ignorance is no argument at 
all. Rather, I propose that both sorts of projects should be of some value, but only the one 
is in play in the current work. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
I started off with looking at two monist ways of looking at conflicting principles 
or obligations. In particular, I showed that ‘ought’ can’t imply ‘can’ if we allow for 
conflicting obligations, i.e., genuine moral dilemmas. And if we use an impartial 
perspective to decide all questions of conflicting principles, we rule out reasonably 
disagreeing about using an impartial perspective. Finding fault with both these monist 
frameworks, I showed that a philosophically useful pluralism needs multiple correct 
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answers to the same well-posed question. I argued that we should understand such an 
interesting and non-trivial pluralism as needing rival theories. Rivals disagree in a 
particular fashion: Rivals must be complete regarding the question at hand.  
I then looked at some plausible objections to theoretical pluralism, including 
whether pluralism is a sort of dialetheism and questions of when we are mistakenly 
equivocating on the relevant terms. I argued that the semantic values underlying the 
notion of obligation and its cognates should be understood in terms of acceptable or not. 
If I am correct, a true contradiction of obligations isn’t as bizarre or worrying as if 
obligations were truth-apt like, say propositions about apples on tables. Next, I argued 
that we could formulate the distinction between relativism and pluralism in terms of 
pluralism ignoring the theory used in predication, whereas relativism indexes such claims. 
With this formulation in hand, we could then look to whether the relevant terms should 
be treated as logical in nature. This technique should then answer whether a term should 
have an unequivocal sense or whether terms should be indexed to the relevant theories.  
Finally, I briefly looked at an alternative way of understanding pluralism, what I 
called ‘Jurisdictional’. But without a clear sense of the norms we could use for uniquely 
applying different liberal theories to particular evaluative questions, I suggested we stick 
with the account already at hand. And as it stands, we have a good enough view of 
theoretical pluralism that we can now turn to looking at how the notion of obligation 
must adapt to such a context.  
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Chapter Three  Ordering Obligations 
3.0 Introduction 
In this chapter I begin the work on how we should adapt the notion of obligation 
(and cognates), if we are to fruitfully use it in a pluralist context. First, I will be 
concerned with the problem of action-guidance in a pluralist context. The idea is that, 
when faced with the sort of disagreement seen as problematic for action-guidance, the 
relevant codes may prescribe trumping the original but conflicting obligation with a 
coordination mechanism. These mechanisms could allow us to settle disagreement in 
some, if not most, cases in a liberal society. Clearly, there are two subordinate issues 
involved in this strategy. First, what is a trumping relation? Second, what is a fair 
coordination mechanism?  
First up, I look at the philosophical problems with formalizing trumping-relations 
in deontic logic. This part of the project allows me to resolve two problems. First, using 
such a formal perspective offers a powerful method to respond to a large part of Sen’s 
redundancy objection to RIT foundations. Second, and more helpful at a general level, 
this perspective shows how the action-guiding problem raised by disagreeing principles 
can be made far more reasonable, and manageable from a practical point of view. But the 
reasons for looking at these issues go beyond the immediate demands of this project. 
Trumping-relations are ubiquitous in moral, political, and legal reasoning and so deserve 
to be taken seriously in any deontic logic. But trumping-relations are largely ignored in 
most deontic logics. This isn’t surprising since trumping poses many inconvenient 
problems for those constructing formal systems.  
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3.1 The Persistent problem with trumping 
The different consequence relations formalized in logical systems are for the most 
part what we call monotonic relations. This means that the premise set from which a 
specified conclusion set is deduced can be freely extended with additional premises.66 For 
example, if A entails B then A and C entail B for any C whatsoever. Monotonic logics 
include classical and intuitionistic logics, as well as normal modal logics. However, 
trumps-reasoning is not monotonic: the purpose of trumps reasoning is to change what is 
permitted or obligatory, as the case may be, by introducing a new premise. Relevant logic 
is not monotonic in the sense defined above.  
However, trumps-reasoning is also not symmetrical. For example, not letting 
someone die may trump not telling a lie but not telling a lie rarely trumps not letting 
someone die. In relevant logics the order of premises does not matter to what may be 
deduced. However, with the non-symmetrical nature of trumps-reasoning, the order in 
which premises are introduced is significant. The usual method for handling the 
difficulties posed by this sort of consideration is to eliminate rules that let us ignore the 
order of premises, which results in a more complicated semantics for negation. 
Essentially, a non-symmetrical negation of incompatibility would need to be added to or 
replace the standard negation of being false. I will not follow the usual method. Instead, I 
will introduce a technique that instead simplifies trumps-reasoning. In fact, I will not 
introduce any extra semantics for negation to deal with trumping relations. But to be fair, 
this choice is purely pragmatic; the change from the familiar logic we learned in 
                                                        66 Characterized by the structural rule of weakening: 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐶  ⇐ 𝐴;𝐵 ⊢ 𝐶—see chapter four for details. 
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undergrad to relevant and constructive versions is extreme enough. Further deviations 
from the familiar are likely just unhelpful at this point. 
I will first show how the tools available in current non-standard deontic logics fail 
to accurately represent trumps reasoning. This will allow me to explain how my approach 
differs in a way that productively addresses these problems. I then take this technique and 
solve two problems. I will show how members of a RIT plurality can use coordination 
devices they prescribe to solve some, but only some, disagreement between members in 
our family of liberal theories. This result will mitigate some of the action-guiding worry 
mentioned in the introduction. But perhaps most importantly for current purposes, these 
coordination devices are used to solve concrete policy problems. In the light of these 
results, the redundancy complaint loses much of its bite. 
The difficulties existing approaches have with trumps reasoning are due to the 
persistence of truth. By the persistence of truth I mean that if a proposition is true in our 
semantics, that proposition will remain true regardless of further developments. The 
persistence of truth is normally, and I assume correctly, regarded as a conceptual truth. 
Recall that my starting point is that moral necessity=obligation, and with standard 
approaches this means that moral necessity is represented by the truth of a proposition at 
all morally accessible worlds. If we assume that trumps-reasoning with such a 
propositional moral necessity requires a non-symmetrical negation, (so that the order of 
premises matters to which premise trumps which premise), the persistence of truth is 
impaired.  
The problem with this framework is that if an obligation can be trumped by a 
different obligation, truth at a moral world is no longer persistent (or as we shall 
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sometimes also say, hereditary). Persistence would fail if a proposition, say A, true at all 
morally accessible worlds could be rendered no longer true at all morally accessible 
worlds because of trumping. To see this possibility, assume that OA is true in the actual 
world, i.e., A is true at all morally accessible worlds, but that OA is trumped by a 
different obligation, say OB. The truth of the trumping obligation, OB, requires that there 
be a proposition true at all accessible worlds that is incompatible with A. But B and A 
cannot both be true at all morally accessible worlds, if there are any. In other words, if 
OB trumps OA, it can no longer be permissible or obligatory to make A true. Thus, the 
semantics would have to somehow record that A would be true at all morally accessible 
worlds, if it were not for the fact that OB trumps OA. We started off thinking that we 
could represent obligation in terms of truth at all morally accessible worlds! However we 
now have to represent the notion, at least in part, in terms of a conditional logic or 
counterfactual model of some sort. In other words, given this approach, we must treat the 
trumping relation along the lines of: if it weren’t (or isn’t) the case that OB, it would be 
the case that OA.  
While I grant that there might be a case to be made for using conditional logics to 
represent trumping, I think such an approach would miss out on an important fact about 
trumping-reasoning. The fact I have in mind is that a trumping relation is also its own (or 
introduces a new) obligation: an obligation regarding the order in which you may do 
certain actions. In an important sense, if OB trumps OA, you are obligated to make B true 
instead of A. Here’s what I mean: suppose we assume OA is true at the actual world and 
that OB trumps OA. If we then also assume OB we are not just obligated to make B true 
but also to not make A true after all. This fact suggests that in order to represent 
   103 
trumping-relations, we should do so in terms of an obligation to order actions in some 
particular fashion. If this is true, representing obligation as propositions true at all 
morally accessible is wrong-headed. In a nutshell, this is why you will see me use order-
theoretic tools and what is called neighborhood semantics for representing moral 
necessity in Chapter Four, instead of the more familiar universal quantification over 
accessible ‘worlds’. 
 
3.2 Why not ‘Obligation’ as suitably modified actions? 
As a first step towards representing trumping relations as an obligation ordering 
actions, I begin with the hypothesis that, instead of modifying propositions with deontic 
boxes and diamonds, they should modify a logic of actions. Let me explain: suppose we 
have a sentence expressing an action and modify it with a deontic box or diamond. In 
other words, it is actions (not propositions simpliciter) that are prescribed, proscribed, or 
permitted as the case may be. Important for current purposes, the order of actions matters 
in a properly constrained logic of action (as we will shortly see in more detail). Thus, this 
approach seems a promising start for constructing sentences that express moral 
obligations and permissions, in particular, obligations to do actions in a particular order.  
Using a deontic logic of actions rather that propositions may require other 
adjustments that may be problematic for use in deontic logic. The rules for combining 
actions should not include commutative rules, but standard logics involving propositions 
do include such commutative rules.  (An example of a commutative rule is that the order 
of premises doesn’t matter.) In other words, I can combine some actions in one order but 
not in the reverse order. Consider an example, due to Greg Restall, where I can go buy a 
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car and then give all my money away but I can’t first give away all my money and then 
buy a car (all other things being equal). One can fine-tune one’s logic using commutative 
rules of differing strength, i.e., with different types of reordering being acceptable. It 
might look, given the issues raised about trumping and how order matters in what 
obligations trump which others, that removing commutative rules is a good fit. But as I 
have already mentioned, there are significant costs when we turn to representing negation, 
and thus necessity, and possibility.  
The first issue is that losing commutativity seems to introduce very fine 
distinctions between different senses of obligation and its cognates into our semantics 
that don’t generally arise in actual practice. Here’s how: when the order of premises 
matters, we must have two implication arrows instead of one in our logic. The reason for 
this, while technical, is not hard to see. When we combine two premises to prove some 
conclusion, the deduction theorem states that we can also infer that one of the premises 
can prove a conditional with the other premise as antecedent and the original conclusion 
as the consequent. That is from 𝐴;𝐵 ⊢ 𝐶 both 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐵 → 𝐶 and 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴 → 𝐶 follow. 
However, the deduction theorem must be refined when the order of the premises matters, 
as two different kinds of conditionals follow from 𝐴;𝐵 ⊢ 𝐶. The first uses the standard 
left to right arrow that we learned in intro logic: 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐵 → 𝐶. The second sort of arrow 
records that the order of the premises in the original proof matters; it is a right to left (or 
backwards) arrow: 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐶 ← 𝐴. It is not easy to gloss this distinction in ordinary language, 
but perhaps we could say for the first sort: from A we can deduce that if we add B then C. 
The second can be read as: from B we can deduce that provided that we had A in the first 
place then C. The distinction between ‘if we add’ and ‘provided that’ disappears when 
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order doesn’t matter; but in the current case ‘if’ represents adding information and 
‘provided that’ represents a prior assumption. As we will see in the next chapter, in this 
system negation of a formula is defined intensionally (i.e., by reference to ‘worlds’ other 
than the one it is ‘true’ at). We can use arrows to represent this definition of negation, 
which implies that there would be two sorts of negation (i.e., right to left and left to right), 
and so two ways of representing being obligated not to do something (or not obligated as 
the case may be) depending on which sort of negation is in play. This is probably an 
example of how a subtle distinction in an artificial language sometimes doesn’t matter for 
understanding or representing the corresponding ordinary concept. So, this distinction is 
of value for deontic logicians, and probably very few others. In other words, positing 
different senses of prohibition etc. in order to interpret non-commutative rules in a formal 
system may be seen as too cumbersome to be worth the trek. If we could do without 
adding these extra versions of obligation, all the better.  
 
3.3 Order puzzles and actions 
A connected, but more philosophical, problem is that the nature of actions in of 
itself should not dictate moral theory. But this could happen in improperly constrained 
deontic action logic. A good example of this can be found in the various order puzzles 
common to the literature. While the details on how my proposal resolves this class of 
problems is part of a larger project, the basic issue with such puzzles resolves around 
specifying a rule for the order in which obligations are to be discharged. (For example, 
representing trumping-relations is a type of order puzzle.) The nature of action 
combination is in many ways at the heart of order puzzles. Since actions are 
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asymmetrically incompatible, we have a puzzle with how to specify the moral 
accessibility relation so that we couldn’t represent the permissibility of arranging our 
actions in such a way to avoid doing something we think we, pre-theoretically, must do, 
and so solely in virtue of the nature of action combination. The problem with so 
specifying the moral accessibility relation is that we seem to need to refer to the particular 
content of the relevant worlds, which can’t be done formally, i.e., a priori or in axiomatic 
terms.  
For example, to be responsible for some harm, a person should be mentally 
competent. But getting drunk renders one temporarily mentally incompetent. At first 
glance, it looks like getting drunk and thus temporarily mentally incompetent absolves 
you of responsibility for harms you inflict after you become drunk. Indeed, it is a (I think 
sad) fact of legal and moral history (from 1949-1982 in U.S.A.) that showing that the 
accused was drunk was successfully used as a defense in sexual assault cases in just this 
way [Hasse 1972]. Improperly constrained, the logic can justify past judges’ decisions to 
find accused rapists not guilty because being drunk rendered them mentally incompetent. 
As mentioned above, being able to appropriately specify such a constraint on the logic is 
deeply problematic. This isn’t to say that there might not be many promising attempts to 
do so. My proposal is that most of the problem can be dealt with in a far simpler way—
but more on this in the next section. 
 One final example before we move on. The issue I have in mind comes from the 
idea that ‘ought implies can’. This claim seems to imply that morality is silent when there 
are no options. Suppose now that a person performed actions at an earlier time that have 
the effect that at a later time she has no other options but to, for example, maximize profit 
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within the bounds of the law. Then, on this account, moral obligations are no longer 
operative. Why should the order in which actions can be combined have such 
ramification for moral theory? We need more than an appeal to an ambiguous platitude as 
is ‘ought implies can’. I think we can do so. 
 
3.4 Obligation in terms of Contrastive Principles 
While the technical details are part of a different project, my philosophical response 
to order puzzles such as representing trumping relations is to use what I call the choice 
structure. The basic idea is that representing the relative moral ordering of actions should 
use a complex structure of the relevant actions, rather than what actions are true in 
accessible worlds.  
To motivate this technique philosophically, I will introduce and develop what I call 
the concept of contrastive principles. In a nutshell, we are quantifying over ideal answers 
to a contrastive “May/Ought I” question when we are looking for action-guidance. A 
contrastive “May I?” question is regimented by the choices of actions over alternatives. 
In other words, the question queries the moral nature of choosing one option from a 
specified group of alternative options. Understanding principles in terms of answers to 
contrastive “May I?” questions (that is choices instead of actions simpliciter) will permit 
me, or so I will argue, to avoid deontic problems with the order in which actions are 
performed.  
First, a quick tangent regarding what is at stake when representing actions. Of 
course, whether or not the actions in the system are clustered into choices in some way, it 
remains true that actions are being represented. So it may well seem that I owe an 
   108 
account of what I take actions to be. It seems to me, though, that the only theoretic 
assumption I need to make about actions is that there can be multiple tokens of the same 
type of action. I do not deny that different tokens of a single action will have different 
empirical descriptions. However, if we can treat such actions as equivalent for the 
purposes of developing intentional explanations then a type-token structure is appropriate. 
On this account, actions are individuated in terms of the role they play in intentional 
explanations. However, PRIT is neutral regarding the nature of intentional explanations.  
  
3.4.1 Contrastive Principles 
Before I can explain and justify contrastive principles, it is important to try to 
clarify how principles figure into this system. I take it as a starting point that principles 
guide our actions, either implicitly or explicitly. Moreover principles are what give 
content to moral theories that specify the Right. Since RITs specialize in specifying what 
an ideally just society consists in and thus a version of the Right, we are looking for a 
plurality of principles, given RIT pluralism. I will call ‘choice-principles’ those abstract 
principles we are willing to commit ourselves to employing when deliberating about 
deciding future concrete cases. I propose that a choice-principle is, to a first 
approximation, the answer to a question, “May I do X?”.  However, decisions, as even 
elementary decision theory correctly teaches us are about trade-offs. If decisions are 
about selecting one option from among alternatives, there is something conceptually 
amiss if we take the answer to “May I do X?” as fully capturing what matters in a choice-
principle. 
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Considering actual choices, it is clear that any choice is drawn from among a class 
of alternatives. If the class of possible alternatives picks out the important aspects of the 
decision at hand, we will want in our theory a way to represent the distinction between 
“May I do X instead of Y?” and “May I do X instead of Z? The contrast class is the set of 
alternatives (Y in the first case and Z in the second) to be considered as available options 
we could choose instead of the one actually taken, i.e., X. Adapting from Van Fraassen 
[1980], I will call the question’s targeted option the topic, in this case X. For example 
consider the topic of lying. “May I lie instead of telling the truth and people die as a 
result?” questions the permissibility of lying, the topic, differently than does “May I lie 
instead of telling the truth and lose 2 million dollars as a result?” Since I am modeling 
principles as answers to May I questions, I will also refer to a principle’s topic as well; 
the answer is supposed to tell us whether we can choose the topic instead of a member of 
the contrast class. 
Analogously to the literature on explanation, I call this refinement of 
permissibility norms ‘contrastive principle’. To a first approximation, I define a moral 
principle as a universal (morally speaking) answer to a choice question, i.e. “May I do X 
instead of Y?” And as expected, permissibility is a negated universal negation but in my 
system, this does not imply that permissibility can be represented as an existential 
quantifier. Briefly, here’s why: having one yes answer to a choice question is not 
equivalent to it not being the case you ought not to choose so, since we are taking moral 
dilemmas seriously. But more on dealing with having both yes and no answers to a May 
I? question later. 
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Employing contrastive principles gives this theory important flexibility. For 
instance, it makes it possible to model various subtly different sorts of May I? questions. 
As we shall see below, being able to model the change in questions allows us to solve a 
lot of different problems, including order puzzles.  
The first and most obvious way of changing a May I? question is by changing the 
composition of the contrast class. To repeat the example that I raised earlier, we could 
change the consequences of telling the truth from losing two million dollars to someone 
dying. While both May I? questions regarding the topic of ‘lying’ seem to have a token of 
the type ‘telling the truth’ in the contrast class, the consequences of acting in such a way 
are quite different. And we can structure the components of a contrast class to reflect this 
complexity. The truth is, that the contrast class differs for each May I? question in terms 
of a different type of action. In the first case, it will have a token of the type ‘if you tell 
the truth then you will lose two million dollars’; in the second case, the token is of the 
type ‘if you tell the truth then the patient will die’. 
A second way of changing a choice question is by changing the contextual factors 
relevant to giving a satisfactory answer. The idea here is that the question may be framed 
by conversational clues, contextual constraints, or outright specification for a particular 
type of answer. For example, say you are an astute listener [and presumably are talking to 
a philosopher] and you pick up on a conversational implicature that the person wants a 
Kantian answer. You gather from this implicit demand that the question requires more 
than a simple yes or no, but requires a specific sort of explanation as to why Kant would 
have said yes or no, under ideal circumstances. In other words we need to model how we 
can preserve the satisfaction with an answer. 
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To tie this in with the previous account of constructive abstraction, if I want to 
safely use the notion of moral principle in what follows, it is best if I show how we can 
recover what is ‘forgotten’ in the abstraction process. As in the mathematical case, it 
looks like we can formulate theoretical principles governing May I? contextual factors 
either extensionally or intensionally. For instance, we can formulate a theory of 
contextual factors intensionally, by listing or forming a set67 of variables representing 
contextual concerns that can be ‘checked off’ when we evaluate an answer to a May I? 
question. On the other hand, we could formulate a theory of contextual factors 
extensionally by directly treating elements in the model as denoting the type of contexts 
salient to May I? questions.  
I argue the right approach is to choose an intensional method. Most of my 
confidence in this approach comes from a deeply ingrained prejudice for computable 
types of constructivism. However, if you don’t share this motivational framework, more 
can be said. Here’s what I mean: if we treat “because” as part of the statement form of 
answers to May I? questions, the resulting structure cannot guarantee preservation of 
satisfaction over substitution of co-extensive expressions. The statement form (of a 
positive answer) I have in mind is the following.  
Yes, you can choose (topic) instead of (contrast) because (topic) is (blank) but 
(contrast) is (blank). 
For example, consider the possibility that the topic of some choice is both the greatest 
good for the greatest number and can be willed as a universal law. Moreover, suppose 
each member of the contrast class is equally good or bad in respect to each moral theory,                                                         67 In this context, fuzzy sets or lists are not off the table. We might need degrees of membership to get the right results. 
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i.e., for any y of the contrast class, both theories claim that y has the same moral property 
relative to the topic. I am well aware that this supposition is completely false for the real 
world versions of these theories. However the issue here is logical, not whether I am 
being faithful to these theories; if you want a more believable case, some Kantian theories 
may be very close to having the same extensions as other Rights-based accounts. Suppose 
now that the May I? question is being asked by a stalwart defender of rights and as such 
finds any appeal to treating the good of individuals in terms of some composite super-
person deeply unsatisfactory. In this case, even though choosing the topic belongs in the 
extension of both moral categories and each element of the contrast class has the same 
value regardless of the moral theory used, only one of these two categories may be part of 
a satisfactory answer for this stalwart Kantian. But this means that the categories of 
contextual features cannot be extensional after all since on supposition all the terms are 
co-extensive (i.e., ∀𝑥 𝑓𝑥 = 𝑔𝑥 → 𝑓 = 𝑔), that is, for any x of the contrast class). In 
other words, our imaginary Kantian wants to know how you came about in deciding that 
the topic is an acceptable choice over the alternatives. 
 Modeling this piece of language/behavior under this condition (i.e., of the failure 
of substitution of co-extensive terms to preserve satisfaction) indicates that an intensional 
approach is more appropriate. As in other cases, such as it is possible that, it is known 
that, it is believed that, an intensional approach seems best served by constraining how 
terms in an extensional semantics are related to each other. For instance, in possible 
world semantics, this is accomplished by using the accessibility relation. By configuring 
this accessibility relation in different ways, we can develop different extensional 
semantics for various intensional operators.  
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In the May I? case we are looking for an answer that says something along the 
lines of “with this information together with such and such moral theory you can reach, 
get to, access, favor, or accept the topic but not the other contrast class members.” To be 
more precise, the structure of a minimally satisfactory answer looks more like: “no other 
member of the contrast class is more reachable, accessible, favorable etc. from the 
combination of said information and moral theory than is the topic.” This more precise 
version jettisons any assumption that there is a limit to the comparative intervals of 
favorability, etc. It also abandons any assumption that there is among the options one 
unique option that is most favorable, reachable, etc.68  
In contrastive explanation, contextual factors are modeled by using a relevance 
relation that an appropriate answer must satisfy between the question’s topic and its 
contrast class. Borrowing terminology from the literature on contrastive explanation I 
will say that a May I? question is a triple Q = 𝑇,𝑅,𝐶 , such that any appropriate answer 
to Q must offer relevant information and theoretical considerations R, as to why the topic, 
T, may or may not be chosen instead of other members of the contrast class C.  
To further develop this account, it will help to look more closely at how choice 
questions are answered. I will start with a brief and informal typology of answers. 
Consider the choice question “May I lie to make 2 million dollars instead of telling the 
truth that my product is more risky than previously thought?” 
1. Yes. 
2. You can lie instead of informing the public of the risks because the market 
will set the price for any increase in risk.                                                         68 Of course, this amendment is in many respects analogous to David Lewis’s [1973] revision of the Stalnaker conditional. 
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3. You can lie instead of informing the public of the risks because consumers 
have no right to information they don’t pay for. 
4. No. 
5. You can’t lie instead of informing the public of the risks because such risks 
have more marginal costs for the most vulnerable in a society 
6. You can’t lie instead of informing the public of the risks because it is unfair 
since the worst-off in society would be better off if they knew the additional 
information.69 
The negative and positive answers are clearly parallel, so I’ll just discuss one: let us look 
at the negative answers. Number 6 is a direct moral answer as it explicitly uses a piece of 
moral/political theory to answer the question and offers no auxiliary information. Number 
five is a direct contextual answer since it assumes the moral theory of 6 and makes 
explicit the grounds assumed in 6, i.e., that the worst-off would be better off knowing the 
risks. If we combined 5 and 6, we would have a complete moral answer. Not complete in 
terms of accounting for all and any moral considerations, but complete in explicitly 
offering relevant information and data from the salient moral theories and from the 
context. Number 4 is code for the other negative answers. The same sort of relationships 
holds for the positive answers.  
Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from this typology is that some 
answers, i.e., the direct contextual sort, can presuppose a particular moral theory or facts 
from a context. This indicates that a choice answer can be rejected (or changed) on 
multiple counts. And as argued above, by changing what answers would be satisfactory, 
                                                        69 Adapted from Van Fraassen [1980] 
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we thereby change the question asked. We can change the options under consideration by 
changing the contrast class. When we change a question by changing what we hold true 
in a context, we change the relevance relation characteristic of the question. In changing 
the relevance relation we challenge the presuppositions of the choice question; by 
changing those direct context answers which are satisfactory we might challenge which 
moral theory should be used to help decide the issue. Or we can challenge facts about the 
context. From the example above, we may challenge number 2 because risks external to 
the parties directly involved in a transaction generally fail to be accounted for in the price 
mechanism of the market. If the product has such externalities (the indirect costs 
mentioned above) then the market will not set the price for all the risks involved in 
selling, distributing, and using the product. In the sense indicated, the answer 
misunderstands what the question demanded or assumed in what would count as a good 
answer, in this case: the facts. 
Choices can then be specified to be as finely-grained (or not) as required by the 
phenomenon in question. This framework provides considerable flexibility in the level of 
specificity of questions because both the contrast class and the relevance relation are 
variable. Like contrastive explanation, changing the contrast class or relevance relation 
changes the relevant aspects of the topic under investigation. And this allows different 
sorts of contrast classes or relevance relations to represent requiring or presupposing 
different sorts of moral or political theories in satisfactory answers.  
No matter whether we want to specify an action intensionally, intentionally, 
extensionally, externally, collectively, cooperatively, individually or even divinely we 
can set up a contrast class or relevance relation to correspond to however we choose to 
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specify the target action/topic. So far it should look like anything goes in terms of what 
could count as a relevance relation since any direct answer to a choice question will bear 
at least one sort of relevance relation between the topic and the contrast class. 
Appearances are deceiving since constraints on the relevance relation are not specified a 
priori but regimented by the selection of classes of worlds where the propositions that 
represent answers are true. This selection of classes is what we call a neighborhood of 
worlds, but more on this in the following chapter. 
 
3.4.2 Choice-Principles and Moral Sentiments 
So far, I have offered what may be seen as a fairly syntactical account of moral 
principles. After all, in the theory I am offering, permissibility and other moral norms are 
understood in terms of choice-principles. And before I turn to showing how we can use 
choice-principle structures to represent trumping (and other order puzzles), It is 
appropriate to make a short foray into what I propose is a powerful philosophical 
interpretation of choice-principle structures.  
Choice-principles, I propose, should be formulated from elements drawn from 
what I call justified choice-attitudes. By using the term ‘justified choice-attitudes’ I mean 
to indicate that some of our attitudes to how our choices affect others may be justified, 
while other attitudes unjustified. Again, the concrete level I argue we should abstract our 
more formal notions from is the context of moral criticism. The relevant type of criticism 
is less focused on what rules you followed or not as the case may be, but at an even more 
concrete level. The type of criticism I have in mind cuts right to the heart of how your 
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choices appear to reflect due, or its lack of, concern for others’ well-being, rights, 
interests etc.  
On this account, PRIT meta-ethics is a cognitivist approach, and constructivist 
about the role of moral sensibilities in theory. With this interpretation, PRIT may then be 
characterized as explaining moral judgments in terms of which moral sentiments are 
justified under ideal procedures. An unjust situation is one in which someone in an ideal 
process should find unjust. Alternatively, ideal procedures allow us to simulate what an 
ideal sensibility would find just or unjust. But as constructivists, we have to give reasons 
for why such a procedure can faithfully model ideal sensibilities. This notion assumes 
that sensibilities are subject to criticism, training, or degradation and that we can make 
explicit certain moral properties (and their structure) to explain why someone’s 
sensibilities are better than another’s. 
However, even if one were to reject this interpretation for choice-principles 
nothing regarding the core (i.e., logical) framework of PRIT rests on this specific account. 
Nonetheless, this specific interpretation of the foundation shows up again later in an 
interpretation of the relationship between choice semantics and the truth-conditions for 
obligation in Chapter Four; this should be unsurprising given the terminology outlined 
above. 
This being said, let me sum up so far, since I am about to put these structures to 
work. We start with a sentence expressing a choice of an action over a specified set of 
alternative actions. We then modify this sentence with a deontic box or diamond. All 
things being equal, this is the best hope for developing an artificial language whose 
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sentences can represent moral obligations and permissions. In other words, it is choices 
that are permitted, prescribed, or proscribed as the case may be. 
 
3.5 Contrastive Principles and Trumping 
I now return to how I account for the phenomenon of trumps-reasoning. We may 
need to represent prohibiting, for example, choosing one sort of action over choosing two 
actions of a different sort (saving one evil person’s life or saving two innocent kittens). 
Principles, in essence, may need to be capable of being fine-grained.  
To this end, I start with interpreting the atoms of the system in terms of choices of 
a tuple70 of actions over a specified set of tuples of alternative actions. Then I modify 
some of these sentences with a deontic box or diamond, as the case may be. By 
interpreting our logical atoms as choices we have a much better way of expressing moral 
obligations and permissions. For example, let C be a choice in the sense just described. 
The salient tuples are constructed from a set of action-types A. For example, let A=(a, b, c, 
d). Then let A be the set of all tuples constructed on A. We define a choice as 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑨×𝑨 
such that the first argument for C is a single tuple and the second argument may contain 
any number of tuples. We can then use each 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 to represent a sequence of action-
tokens that could be chosen at the cost of not choosing other sequences of action-tokens 
Consider the horrible situation of saving beloved pets from a burning house. Let a 
be the action-type of saving a dog, b the type of saving a cat, c the type of saving a 
hamster, and d the type of saving a bird. A couple of examples of possible choice 
                                                        70 While there are many ways of characterizing tuples, the method I find easiest: a tuple is a sequence of nested ordered pairs. It is essential for the use I have in mind that tuples can have multiple instances of the same element. 
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relations would be: 1. 𝑐!= 𝑏, 𝑏,𝑎 𝑑, 𝑐,𝑑, 𝑐 , 𝑑,𝑑  which represents the choice of first 
saving two cats then a dog. The alternatives in this case are: saving a bird then going to 
the hamster cage and grabbing a hamster then returning to the bird cage to grab another 
bird and then returning to the hamster wheel for the last hamster; or just saving the two 
lovebirds in the same cage. 2.𝑐!= 𝑐, 𝑐, 𝑐, 𝑐,𝑎 𝑏,𝑑 , 𝑎  which perhaps represents the 
choice of grabbing the entire cage of hamsters then whistling for the dog instead of 
chasing the cat and bird around the burning house or just saving the dog. What tuples of 
action-tokens are available to choose among depends on many facts about the case. These 
facts often lie outside of moral theory, of course—how fast you run, how obedient your 
dog, how hard it is to carry the birdcage etc. 
With these tools, we can represent a sort of trumping-reasoning by modifying C’s 
relata. Suppose y is a choice of 𝑎,𝑎,𝑎  over 𝑏 . For ease of presentation, I am for now 
going to use the idea that moral necessity is a matter of truth at all morally accessible 
worlds. Of course, this changes in the next chapter for the reasons explained above, but 
nothing in what follows depends essentially on one notion or the other of moral necessity. 
Let y be true at all morally accessible worlds, i.e., in all such worlds one chooses to save 
three dogs over saving a single cat. This is consistent with a choice, like x: 𝑏, 𝑏  is to be 
chosen over 𝑎,𝑎,𝑎  also being true at all such worlds. We can have both x and y true at 
all morally accessible worlds with no inconsistency or incoherence resulting: it is 
obligatory to choose doing an a-action three times instead of doing a b-action once, but 
saving two cats is always chosen over three dogs. 
Let us return to the question “May I tell a lie instead of telling the truth and 
having a person die as a direct result?” Suppose that our starting principle-answer, P, is 
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“It is permissible to lie if it saves lives.” However, upon further investigation we learn 
there are good reasons to think that the young man whose life would be saved by the lie 
told will in turn torture hundreds of innocent kittens. Suppose that we then affirm the 
principle, Q, “It is impermissible to lie to save the life of serial kitten torturers.” This 
example is chosen because looked at apart from the contrast classes the claims look 
inconsistent; one entailing the permissibility of saving the person the other says it is 
impermissible to save. But this inconsistency is only apparent. The choice-question has 
clearly been changed, and each principle answers a different question. So both can still be 
true at all morally accessible worlds with no conflict. To be clear, while the principle Q 
trumps P in this case, nonetheless Q and P happily coexist in our intended semantics; 
which principle trumps which principle is in large part up to the question asked. 
To represent trumping in terms of a change in the relevance relation, the technical 
apparatus that will be developed in the next chapter is needed. Informally, like the 
previous account such trumping can be understood as changing what counts as a 
satisfactory answer to a May I? question.  
 
3.6 Trumping and CTD Obligations 
In many respects, this picture of trumping shares a structure with CTD obligations. 
Ideally, you should be able to get your way, i.e., do what your code prescribes. But in the 
sub-ideal conditions of disagreement between moral codes, it is often best to find some 
compromise. CTD structures are all about sub-ideal conditions. In the case of CTDs like 
the Gentle Murder Paradox [Forrester 1981], ideally you should not perform some evil, 
such as murder. But let’s say, as the story goes, that you do go about planning on some 
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murder. Clearly, this is a morally sub-ideal condition. Nonetheless, it is best, if you do 
kill, to do so gently. The issue that CTD obligations bring to deontic logic at large is how 
to make sense of the closure of obligations under known entailment. It seems to make 
sense that if A implies B and you are obligated to choose A that you are thereby obligated 
to also choose B. But hold on here; if you ought to kill someone gently, killing someone 
gently implies that you killed him; thus if you ought to kill someone gently, you ought to 
kill him (simpliciter). And since conditionals are thought to be transitive, we can derive: 
If you murder, you ought to murder. This puzzle can be thought to suggest we need to 
index obligations to their respective conditions of moral ideality. But we need to do so 
without thereby equivocating upon “ought” or its cognates. Technically, in the proof-
theory in Chapter Four we accomplish this by not letting in a structural rule called ‘modal 
modus ponens’ and in the semantics by using neighborhood functions to determine 
obligation.71 This rule lets us combine two necessities (in our case, obligations) into one. 
The philosophical issue however is how to make sense of not adding in this rule. I turn to 
this issue now. 
The similarity with trumping under conditions of disagreement with CTD 
obligations suggests that if we have an order theory that represents reasoning about CTD 
obligations, we will thereby have an order theory that can be used to reason about 
trumping. Thus, the hope is that the order theory justifies not adding in modal modus 
ponens.  
                                                        71 However, you won’t find explicit reference to modal modus ponens in the proof theory, as for ease of presentation there I approach this particular issue instead solely through the lens of the neighborhood semantics. 
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However the similarity between CTD reasoning and trumping-relations can be 
misleading at first. This similarity may seem to suggest that we should override a more 
ideal principle with one less ideal. In this case, it looks like a better option is being 
trumped by a worse option and that is a problem. While the formalization of these 
concepts will provide the needed tools, some preamble may help explain what is going on. 
We do not move down the ideality scale, so to speak, to represent the trumping relation. 
Rather the disagreement or other sub-ideal conditions trigger the need to find out what 
should guide us given these sub-ideal conditions. Once we find ourselves at a lower level 
of ideality, we are looking to move up. In other words, it is the principles in terms of 
being involved in the disagreement or conflict that are being trumped. Thus, in an 
important sense we have to keep clear at what level the relevant principles can be found. 
And if this is the case, a rule allowing us to always combine obligations into one, such as 
modal modus ponens, couldn’t be safely added. The formal order theory that follows will 
clarify this notion. Not only will we be able to get clear on how we can reason about and 
with CTD structures and trumping, but with the underlying order theory we will be all 
that much closer to defining a deontic consequence relation, given the pluralist 
framework of PRIT. 
 
3.7 Trumping, Cooperation and Coordination Devices 
 Recall that there were two motivations for analyzing how obligations can be 
trumped. The previous sections dealt largely with the logical and general philosophical 
issues. The second issue was that I plan on using trumping relations to respond to worries 
that disagreement in a pluralist context renders the action-guiding power of such moral 
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theories void, or at least problematically muted. And now that I have contrastive 
principles on board I can turn to this proposal that some but not all disagreement between 
RITs can be solved by appeal to shared coordination devices. In so doing I need to show 
that acceptable RITs need to include principles that specify which coordination devices 
may be used and under what circumstances. Moreover, this step will render Sen’s 
redundancy objection largely implausible. Thus a pluralist turn does in fact provide a 
helpful defense for an RIT approach.  
After this result, I show how a class of these devices is to be mobilized when 
disagreement between two distinct but equally correct RITs occurs. Under such 
circumstances, the relevant RITs must share a principle that amounts to: when there is 
disagreement, and all other things are equal, using such and such coordination device 
trumps the original prescription within each RIT. 
 As it is now understood, an ideally just society specifies the terms of fair 
cooperation among its citizens. However, any instance of cooperation requires 
coordination and this coordination itself can be just or unjust, fair or unfair, perhaps 
based on a lottery that may be unjustified or justified. Thus each RIT, to be adequate, 
must contain at least one account of what counts as a fair, just, moral etc coordination 
device with its characterizing equilibrium selection mechanism, i.e., some procedure to 
decide who contributes what to making everyone the best off they could be. More 
precisely, by ‘equilibrium’ I mean distributions such that no one can improve her lot 
given the choices made by everyone else involved. To be clear, we could have two 
equilibria but that the biggest winners in one distribution are the least improved in the 
other and vice versa. The terms of fair cooperation would have to specify how to fairly 
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coordinate on one distribution instead of the other.72 If adequate, such RITs may then 
appropriately model the terms of fair cooperation. For if such equilibrium selection 
mechanisms are just, fair and so on independent of RITs then something similar to Sen’s 
redundancy objection will return. That is, an RIT must posit how we are to coordinate on 
collectively choosing one equilibrium option over another. 
Appropriate RITs can then justify concrete policy decisions in virtue of the 
inclusion of equilibrium selection mechanisms within each characteristic Ideal. In other 
words, concrete policy choices can be treated as instances of coordination and RITs must 
have something to say about fair or just coordination. I now turn to use coordination 
devices within the political realm itself in order to resolve, in part, action-guiding 
concerns. 
There are many types of cooperation (social, family, economic, military etc). The 
need for coordination devices is not restricted to social and economic life but is needed in 
the political sphere as well. I propose that an adequate version of PRIT requires each RIT 
to include principles that permit cooperation with those who hold to conflicting RITs. 
                                                        72 This is one way of explaining how early Rawls went wrong in A Theory of Justice. He claimed any distribution that maximally improved the lot of the worse off was fair, all other things being equal. However, this theory of fairness was lacking an equilibrium selection mechanism, since who could end up as the worst off could (and likely would) change in different ‘worst‐off are best off’ equilibria. After all, there is no worst‐off until we structure a society in a particular manner. For example, suppose we have two groups of people, the Brainy and the Brawny. Suppose there are two equilibria, each worst‐off group is no better off than the worst‐off in the other option. But in one option the worst‐off are the Brainy and in the other option the worst‐off are the Brawny. The question from any worst‐off group arises, if we were to arbitrarily select one equilibria: why should we have coordinated on this option when we would have been the better off group in the other equilibria. In other words, why is it fair that we cooperated to make you the better off group when you could have cooperated to make us the better off group? As you can see, fair coordination matters just as much as fair cooperation. 
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More specifically, adequate RITs in RIT pluralistic worlds such as ours will include 
principles governing what to do when other acceptable RITs disagree with our favored 
RIT. Adequate RITs, on this account, must recognize the acceptability of other RITs in 
the political sphere, and in so doing must then include terms of cooperation with such 
disagreeable partners.73 
Suppose we have a case where such disagreement arises and each RIT involved 
has a principle that asks us to use such and such a coordination device to resolve the 
disagreement (a coordination principle). Now if each RIT involved had the same 
coordination principle, the disagreement could be resolved. In this case, all relevant RITs 
would need to have, for whatever reason they see fit, at least one such coordination 
principle in common. To be frank, it’s possible that an RIT may not override a conflicting 
prescription with a coordination principle. One way this could happen is that a stalemate 
may be seen as more approximately just than the chance an opposing RIT would get its 
way. Perhaps more disastrously, conflicting RITs may not share a coordination principle 
in common. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
I first looked at why truth-apt propositions make for terrible atoms in a deontic 
logic that can represent trumping-style reasoning. Even when we try a conditional logic, 
we miss out on the fact that a trumping relation introduces a new obligation: how we                                                         73 In Chapter Four, I prove that a version of this claim follows from a weakest possible logic appropriate for deontic reasoning. You may think of this claim as a refinement of Rawls’s notion of reasonable pluralism in a weakly well‐ordered state, but nothing essential hangs on this parallel. Nonetheless, if this parallel is correct, it shows that we can get something like Rawls’ claim but without his theoretical assumptions. 
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ought to order the fulfilling of obligations. This led me to try to represent trumping as an 
obligation ordering actions. Here we saw that the nature of action combination poses 
some difficult issues for representing obligation.  
Instead of trying to specify how the nature of action combination and obligation 
can work together, I suggested we have a simpler and more illuminating option: choice-
principles. I argued that choices and choice-principles far more directly capture what 
matters when we are looking to a moral theory to guide action. Next we saw how the 
structure of choice-principles models trumping as changing the question at hand. To 
finish off this line of argument, I briefly and informally explained how contrastive 
principles could solve order puzzles more generally by showing the similarity between 
CTD (contrary-to-duty) structures and trumping relations. 
With these preliminaries set up, I turned to using my theory of trumping relations 
to explain how even when moral theories disagree, we still might have action guidance. 
Here I introduce and defend the distinction between fair coordination and fair cooperation. 
Fair cooperation is a matter of identifying what sort of equilibrium we may choose; fair 
coordination is a matter of identifying how we should choose a particular equilibrium 
state so identified: the equilibrium selection mechanism must itself be fair. With the idea 
of fair coordination we have a powerful philosophical interpretation of how and why 
moral theories, if they disagree, may nonetheless jointly decide upon a method to 
compromise (or what I call “political cooperation”). But of course, it is neither a matter of 
logic nor meta-ethics whether two disagreeing theories will always have a coordination 
mechanism in common. This means that we may still allow for intractable and principled 
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disagreement in a liberal society, as befitting a foundational theory trying to keep actual 
practice as a touchstone. 
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Chapter Four     All the Different Best Options 
 
 
4.0 The Order Theory for PRIT 
 
To sum up so far: given a RIT framework, formulating a democratic and liberal 
notion of justice seems to require a pluralistic approach. Together with the notion of 
contrastive principles to account for the trumping phenomenon and other order puzzles, I 
seem to be at a good starting point for developing a formal meta-ethics for PRIT. It is 
also fairly clear at this point that by taking a pluralist approach with theorizing justice 
(including the notion of contrastive principles) there will be some rather drastic changes 
in how we should structure our concept of obligation. And as I have argued, using the 
formal tools of deontic logic looks like a promising, albeit perhaps surprising, way 
forward in such an investigation.  
 
4.1 Preliminary Issues 
 
Thus far I have argued that choices should replace atomic propositions as the 
parameters of a suitable deontic logic. I begin my formalization of obligation in earnest 
by developing some ideas that naturally arise if we take an algebraic approach to our 
models. In usual formulations of algebraic semantics for various logical systems, we 
allow for the possibility there are many more truth-values than merely ‘true’ and ‘false,’ 
and assume that any such truth-values are (partially) ordered. This approach lets us think 
of logical consequence in a particularly perspicuous manner. That is, when the relation of 
semantic consequence, i.e., 𝑃 ⊨ 𝑄, holds between two propositions, this will correspond 
to it being the case that in every interpretation P is less true than or equally true to Q. In a 
deontic logic such an algebraic ordering can be glossed as a moral ordering since if P 
   129 
being good (for example) is less true than Q being good, this relation is (on this account) 
equivalent to saying that the latter is morally better than or morally as good as the former. 
And as in the case with ‘truth’ (i.e., if P is true but less true than Q it follows that Q is 
true is well), when P is a good thing to do but less good than Q, it follows that Q is a 
good thing to do as well. 
There are three issues that naturally come up at this juncture. The first question is 
fairly formal in nature.  
(O&O)  Given a moral ordering of choices, how should we identify which choices 
are obligatory?  
Sure, an ordering tells us which choices are better than others but what is the connection 
between a choice being obligatory and such an ordering? This question seems to suggest 
that the moral status of an action, i.e., whether it is obligatory, is solely determined by it 
being better than or equal to other available choices. But this can’t be quite correct; in 
fact, questioning this presupposition helps illuminate the second issue I have in mind.  
Such a presupposition, i.e., that the moral status of actions can be solely 
determined by its relative ‘goodness’, treads upon a characteristic ambiguity in the 
informal concept of ‘the moral nature of actions.’ The issue here is how we can respect 
the distinction between choosing the better of two options, morally speaking, and a 
categorization of actions into good or bad, right and wrong, fair and unfair, or acceptable 
and unacceptable.74 In what follows, I will be using the pair ‘acceptable, unacceptable’ as 
a generalization of all such categorization schemas. But as we will see, how one 
interprets the semantic values of the logic is a matter of choice, all else being equal.                                                         74 There may be other moral schemas, for example authentic or inauthentic, holy and debased c.f. [Williams 2012] pgs. 73‐80. 
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While this might be controversial in some circles, I take the distinction between a 
ranking of choices and a categorization of actions to be part of the very bedrock of moral 
reasoning. Perhaps this is all too brief, but I think confusion regarding this distinction 
could be cleared up with the following considerations. Moral decision-making can often 
be quite simple; much of the time we can simply check to see how a certain action is 
correctly categorized. For example, in many cases, all we may need to know is that an 
action counts as deception and, as such, is (for example) wrong. However, in more 
complex situations, we may start with such a categorization of actions but cannot stop 
there—instead we must update how we think about the relevant actions given other 
options. To accurately represent this sort of reasoning, we need to answer a second 
question.  
(C&MP) How should a choice of one action over other options be related to the 
moral nature of the various actions?  
 There is still one more question that comes to the fore, especially with our focus 
on liberal theory. The issue here is closely related to O&O, the idea being how can we tell 
when some choice might be obligatory for one sort of person but not for another. In 
Chapter Three, I argued that the notion of a contrast class is insufficient to determine 
when an answer to an action-guiding question is satisfactory. We needed to also know 
what sort of answer the interlocutor would find relevant. The cases that I have in mind 
question what is fair to demand of such and such sort of person to do for the greater or 
common good, for example. The case of peace officers having much higher demands 
reasonably expected of them than, say, the general populace is especially germane. While 
some meta-ethics reject the idea of supererogation, we need a more general notion of 
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norms that we can make use of in liberal contexts; after all, liberalism is supposed to 
generally leave people alone, all else being equal. Given this approach to ordering 
options: 
(SC) How can we identify when it is unfair to oblige someone to choose the 
best option? 
 
4.2 Choices and Options 
In what follows, I argue that answers to these questions indicate that the notion of 
obligation should be formulated in terms of a complex relationship between what option 
is best, the moral nature of actions and the limits to what we can reasonably expect of 
others. In PRIT, this formulation is accomplished in part by combining an ordering of 
contrast classes with an ordering of actions with an ordering of what we can morally 
demand of different person-types or social roles. As such, this system uses a complex 
evaluation in its models. The evaluation I introduce orders three distinct primitive notions 
corresponding to the above answers: the moral acceptability of options, the relative moral 
superiority of decision-types and the moral limits to what we may demand of person-
types. Ultimately, the hope is that with appropriate answers to these questions and a logic 
that enables us to reason with and about these moral orderings, we will be able to define a 
cogent deontic consequence relation. Given that the larger project is focused on using 
formal tools to investigate the nature of political principles and related concepts under 
conditions of pluralism, this will be a major hurdle to overcome.  
I recognize that many philosophers will be familiar instead with evaluations that 
order one and only one primitive notion, i.e., truth (or some cognitive correlate), but 
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throughout this project I have defended, and will continue to do so, the idea that deontic 
reasoning is too complex to be represented using these more familiar accounts. 
 
4.3 Best Choices and Unacceptable Options 
To answer O&O, it is natural, if we set aside the question of what it means to ask 
too much of someone, to think of an obligatory choice in terms of which choice is best 
(morally speaking) given the circumstances. In other words, since obligations guide 
action, each person should be guided by doing what is best given the circumstances 
seems like a fitting notion with which to begin. My methodology will not only analyze 
the concept of the best but will also break down what we mean by “the circumstances” of 
a moral situation. There will be two parts to my formal treatment of relevant moral 
conditions or circumstances, namely specifying the options available and the type of 
person (or social role etc.) of the person making the choice. Thus, in order to analyze a 
notion of obligation apt for pluralist settings such as liberalism, I will develop an analysis 
of each component independent of each other and then combine the resulting structures to 
achieve my overall goal. 
Before I deal with the notion of moral circumstances, it will be useful to 
distinguish three features of a moral ordering of choices that are relevant to developing a 
formal conception of obligation. We can extract criteria from these features that 
illuminate the surprisingly complex relationship between best choices and acceptable 
options. 
The first feature I have in mind is that it looks possible to have many options in 
one particular contrast class be acceptable (i.e., to select) but from among these 
   133 
acceptable options there may also be a best option. In other words, an action being 
acceptable to choose does not imply being the best choice unless we add other 
assumptions (in other words, the acceptability of an option does not guide action without 
further considerations). Again, we want our system to respect the distinction between a 
moral categorization of actions, in this case between acceptable to choose and not, and a 
comparative process for assigning moral status to choices.75 
The second feature is that there may be ties for best in some moral orderings, and 
this is especially germane in the case of liberalism. Philosophically, this possibility 
indicates a subtle revision to what we can mean by obligations guide action: choosing 
what is best guides action when there are no ties for best. When we look for action-
guidance, morally speaking, we want to learn what we are obliged to do and if, as 
suggested, we should be guided by doing what is best (given the relevant caveats) doing 
what is best (so construed) is what we are obliged to do and vice versa. However when 
there are such ties for best, a further choice, one that cannot be based on the moral 
reasoning that led to the tie for best, must be made. In other words, ties for best require a 
higher order notion of action-guiding than merely doing what is best or what we are 
obliged to do. After all, being told that there are two options we are obliged to do tells us 
nothing about which one to actually choose. Philosophically, this suggest that such ties 
                                                        75 In fact, as we will see, since in this system weak permission is defined in terms of 
obligation we can make a distinction between an action being acceptable to select and the choice of that action over alternatives being permissible. On this account, the notions of obligation and permission are formalized to account for the moral status of choices, while the notion of acceptability is used to partly account for the other (i.e., extensional) aspect of the moral nature of actions. While Scanlon has informed quite a bit of my approach, here we part ways. If my account is right, Scanlon’s is problematic because he conflates a proposed action failing to be objectionable with its permissibility [Scanlon 1998]. 
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for best could be used to represent moral dilemmas or disagreement regarding 
foundational policy in a liberal state; in fact, this is the approach I will take. On the 
formal side of things, these considerations suggest representing an obligation as a 
maximal element in a moral ordering rather than just as a maximum element, at least as a 
starting point for developing the concept of a morally best choice.  
The third feature is that, for all that has been said so far, we could have an 
ordering that yields an obligation to choose an unacceptable option. This possibility 
seems, intuitively, quite problematic in a formalism for liberal foundations. The problem 
I have in mind is due to an ambiguity in how we use, correctly I assume, the moral 
imperative expressed by “you ought to…” locutions. Consider a moral ordering of 
choices, none of which is acceptable, but where at least one choice is better than the rest. 
If best choices are obligatory, we have an obligation to do something unacceptable. 
Perhaps even more worrisome: imagine if all available choices are not acceptable and an 
ordering posits that no choice is any better than any other option (or that a large subset 
ties for best of this bad lot). In this case, we seem to have a whole bunch of (trivially) best 
options, none of which is acceptable.  
First, I want to head off a potential misunderstanding. I am not claiming that I 
don’t need to represent that ‘one should make the best out of a bad situation’ in my 
system.76 The issue here, as I see it, is whether such a choice, i.e., the best of a bad lot, 
should count as an obligation or rather something more along the lines of the least you 
should do. In what follows, I will develop and defend the latter idea; I call it the 
obligation/approbation distinction. Taking this distinction seriously will allow me to 
                                                        76 See definitions 4.16 and 4.21 
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distinguish the best choices we can use to represent principles of justice from the best 
choices we should sort in some other way, or so I will argue. I begin by clearing away 
some tempting lines of thought that may obscure this distinction. 
 
4.4 Obligations and the Attribution of Responsibility 
At a linguistic level, normally we have no problem with saying “since you should, 
morally speaking, do the lesser of two evils (all else being equal), you ought to do the 
lesser of two evils (all else being equal).” Now it may seem reasonable that if you ought 
to do the lesser of two evils, you have an obligation to do the lesser of two evils. But the 
hazy sort of obligation reflected in this linguistic phenomenon is not the right guide for 
our intuitions insofar as we are trying to formalize a notion of obligation that can provide 
the right framework for identifying principles of justice. Instead, that notion of obligation 
is closely tied up with the responsibilities we take ourselves to have.77  
First, let me lay out a couple of preliminary definitions of the ideas at work here. 
The moral should of “you should do the lesser of two evils” I will call approbatory (i.e., 
you should do some evil that is sanctioned in this particular case). Secondly, recall that a 
choice that is beyond the call of duty, i.e., which asks too much of an individual to be 
required, is called supererogatory. In the context of an obligation we assume you are held 
responsible for the good or evil done (or foregone as the case may be), all else being 
equal. But in a supererogatory context, you are not held responsible for the good forgone 
but only the good you do, all else being equal. This basis for the 
                                                        77 Not to be confused with the similarly named abstraction norm from Chapter One. 
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supererogatory/obligatory distinction in turn illuminates a similar difference between the 
obligatory and the merely approbatory.  
In the case of doing the lesser of two evils, we tend to balk, and rightly so, at 
ascribing responsibility to the unfortunate person for doing evil when she or he chooses 
to do the lesser of two evils. For example, consider a parent caught in a typhoon with two 
small children. If the parent holds on to both children, all three will die. However, one 
child has a small chance of surviving if let go, while the other is still an infant and will 
surely die if let go. Let us assume that the parent who lets go of the older child, in order 
to have the best chance for all living, has done the best from available options, all else 
being equal. However, it is also clear that letting go of either child is a bad thing, as is 
holding on to both and damning all. But we generally, and correctly I assume, ascribe 
responsibility to the parent in this case, not for the bad they do, i.e., letting go of the older 
child, rather for the bad they avoid.78 The lesson is that in an approbatory context, you 
are held responsible for the evil mitigated, but not the evil perpetrated. This fact grounds 
the obligatory/approbatory distinction in a way that clearly parallels the relation between 
supererogatory and obligatory responsibilities; thus the cogency of the two distinctions 
should rise or fall together.79 And while in ethics and ordinary morality, some may 
                                                        78 As a caveat, such a parent is in a morally intolerable situation. Holding someone responsible for everyone dying because she or he didn’t have the emotional wherewithal to actually let go of the older child seems cruel, or at least unduly harsh; doing so seems to blame a victim of horrible circumstances. However, ordinary responses to tragedy are not always the best guide to how we should formulate principles of responsibility, ethics etc. 79 It might be objected that this analogy between approbatory and supererogatory is undermined by the asymmetry purportedly found between responsibilities for harm and good found in the Knobe effect (Knobe, J. 2003 “Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language” Analysis, 63, 190‐193). While an appropriate response deserves its own project, let me briefly sum up why I think the Knobe effect is 
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dispute the distinction between supererogatory and obligatory (some utilitarians or 
puritans perhaps?), in the context of political liberalism we need such a distinction—
citizens can’t be forced to give up, say religious beliefs, for a policy-makers’ notion of 
the greater good. 
With this analysis in mind, representing an obligation (qua best option) with the 
choosing of an unacceptable action undermines these distinctions. Moreover, it seems 
fitting then that the moral nature of actions, i.e., what sort of moral category actions 
belong to, should play a straightforward role in how obligations guide action. This 
suggests a simple change. We should instead understand obligation in terms of best 
acceptable option.  
For current purposes, I will assume that an obligation is a best acceptable option, 
unless otherwise noted. Moreover, we will see that the same sort of formal structure that 
allows us to distinguish between what is supererogatory and what is obligatory can also 
be used to distinguish what is obligatory from what is merely approbatory (see definition 
4.21). This suggests that the formalism accurately captures the distinctions between these 
different sort of best choices. In some sense, being able to formulate these differences in 
this manner should count as evidence that the obligatory/approbatory distinction is 
principled in general, and not just in the special case of the foundations of liberalism. 
More to the present point, though, is that we have clear criteria for answering 
O&O (How should we should identify which choices in a moral ordering are obligatory.)                                                                                                                                                                      illusory. The Knobe effect conflates the distinction between the deliberative and critical use of a moral principle (as elucidated by Scanlon 2008 see his pg 23 for definitions): conflating the meaning of a choice for an agent, i.e., the critical sense, with the permissibility of a choice, i.e., the deliberative sense, will lead to the same sort of mistakes Scanlon uncovers in the doctrine of the double effect. Thus if the doctrine of the double effect is illusory, so is the Knobe effect. 
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We therefore need our formulation of obligation to capture this relationship between best 
choices and the moral status of actions, i.e., C&MP. 
 
4.5 Two Moral Orderings 
With this preamble, it should not be surprising that our formal machinery takes as 
its starting point two distinct sorts of moral ordering—an ordering of actions and another 
of contrast classes or choice set-ups. We begin with some machinery for distinguishing 
choices of actions into acceptable and not acceptable.  
Definition 4.6 (Course of Action) Let A be a set of action types. We will say that a finite 
sequence 𝑎!,… ,𝑎! , where each 𝑎! ∈ 𝐴 is a course of action (or an option) from A. 
(Note that we assume 𝑛 ≥ 1, but n is finite, and we do not  assume that 𝑎! ≠ 𝑎!.) 
 
Let B be the set of all courses of action from A, and B be the set of all finite subsets of B. 
 
A choice C is an ordered pair consisting of a course of action a and a set of courses of 
action that includes it. That is, 𝐶 = 𝑏,𝜑 ∈ 𝐵×𝑩 such that 𝑏 ∈ 𝜑. 
 
We can then designate the set of all choices over A by C. (We will use a, b, c, d etc. to 
designate courses of action, 𝜑,𝜓 etc. to designate sets of courses of action.) 
 
 
Definition 4.7 (Contrast Class) If 𝐶 = 𝑏,𝜑 , 𝜑 is contrast class for C. That is, the 
tuples of action-tokens for the given choice is the contrast class for that choice.  
 
Ultimately, for any choice C we want a structure representing whether that chosen 
element of the contrast class should be chosen (that is, whatever value the choice is 
assigned, it is as good as or better than any other option given). To define the valuation, 
we first need the points or nodes in our model. 
 
Definition 4.8 (Situations) A situation is a set of choices. Let Sit be the [non-empty] set 
of all situations. 
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The intuitive notion here is that situations are the analogues for worlds in relational 
semantics for modal logic. We next introduce our first valuation, which will tell us which 
choices are acceptable and not acceptable (which we represent with a good old fashioned 
{1, 0}.) 
 
Definition 4.9 (Valuation) A valuation I over choices in each situation is a function 𝐼:𝑪 → 2!"#. This is equivalent to assigning a subset of Sit to each choice c by stipulating 
that for any 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑖𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ 𝐼 𝑐 , if 𝐼 𝑐  (s) = 1. We think of this as the set of situations in 
which c is acceptable. When s is in I(c), we also write 𝑠 ⊨! 𝑐 or 𝑐 !! = 1. 
 
(We sometimes suppress mention of I or s where context makes it obvious which I or s is 
in question.)  
 
Also note that a valuation assigns 1 or 0 to all choices for any situation; as it stands, there 
is no distinction yet between a choice being not acceptable because we have information 
that it is wrong, for example, versus not having enough reason to say that it is acceptable. 
In other words, there is no distinction yet between incompleteness and falsity; this comes 
later on when I introduce negation as a monadic operator, instead of as a semantic value. 
 
Definition 4.10 We define a pre-ordering80 ≤! on the options included in each contrast 
class 𝜑 ∈ B, given an interpretation I, by setting for ∀𝑥,𝑦 ∈ 𝜑,𝐶𝑥𝜑 ≤! 𝐶𝑦𝜑 iff in any 
situation where I deems 𝐶𝑥𝜑 acceptable, it also deems 𝐶𝑦𝜑 acceptable. 
 
The idea here is as follows. Suppose 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐,𝑑 ∈  𝜑 in some choice situation s; both a and 
b may be acceptable options according to an interpretation I, that is 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐶𝑏𝜑 and 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐶𝑎𝜑. But if 𝐶𝑏𝜑 ≤! 𝐶𝑎𝜑 while 𝐶𝑎𝜑 ≰! 𝐶𝑏𝜑 then (according to I) option a is 
morally better than is b even though both options are acceptable. We can now define 
frames and models for our choices in situations. 
                                                        80 A pre‐order is a reflexive, transitive (but possibly non‐total) binary relation. 
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Definition 4.11 (Frames and Models) A frame is an 𝐹 = 𝑆𝑖𝑡,≤! ; A model is an 𝑀 = 𝑆𝑖𝑡,≤! , 𝐼 .  
 
As previously argued, acceptability of an option is not enough to represent an obligation; 
we need to identify which options are maximal. We employ an obvious generalization of 
the previous notation to consider the effects of the interpretation and ordering on subsets 
of Sit and on particular choices. Given a structure 𝜑,≤! , 𝐼 , we denote the set of 
maximal elements of 𝜑 according to ≤! with 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜑! . If we let ‘𝑶𝑥𝜑’ represent that it 
is obligatory to choose x from 𝜑 we have the following first pass on defining obligation: 
  𝑠 ⊨ 𝑶𝑥𝜑 ↔ 𝑠 ⊨ 𝐶𝑥𝜑 & 𝑥 ∈  𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜑!  
 But as can be gleaned from the discussion of obligatory, approbatory and 
supererogatory distinctions, we still need a suitable answer to C&MP.  And sorting out 
how the moral nature of the chosen action matters to the choice of it over other options 
requires us to identify the moral nature of each element of any contrast class. In some 
sense, this issue amounts to the question of what comes first, a betterness ordering similar 
to that above or the identification of the moral nature of actions.  
Formally, identifying which option is best among acceptable options does not 
require identifying the moral nature of options from other contrast classes. And as argued 
earlier, the point of using a contrastive structure to regiment prescriptions (and cognates) 
is to represent how a choice’s moral status is relative to a specifiable group of alternatives. 
It seems that with what we have so far, the moral nature of actions is merely derivative of 
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a betterness ordering; but this must be too fast, given the distinction between obligatory 
and supererogatory and so on. 
 
4.12 Better Choices 
The order I defined above orders the options from one contrast class at a time. It 
doesn’t order choices drawn from different contrast classes, e.g., whether 𝐶𝑥𝜑 ≤ 𝐶𝑦𝛿. 
This distinction indicates that formally there is another moral ordering we need to take 
into account. 
 My methodology uses a moral ranking of different types of decision-setups, i.e., 
contrast classes. The idea here is that we find ourselves frequently expressing a 
preference for some sorts of decisions over others. For a non-moral example, choosing 
which beer to drink from a selection of American beers is a clearly inferior situation to 
one in which the selection includes beers from around the world. Similarly, on the moral 
side of things, some types of choices are less morally ideal than others: Sophie’s choice is 
a clear example of a type of decision that is less desirable that almost any other type of 
choice. Politically, a decision whether to bomb a hospital or a refugee camp (say in order 
to stop a dirty bomb from being deployed) is again a type of choice no reasonable and 
morally decent person would relish facing. In these cases, the options on the table as a 
whole, i.e. the contrast class, are morally better or worse than a different class of options.  
 
Definition 4.13 (Ideality-chains on contrast classes): Let I be an evaluation as above. An 
ideality-chain for I is a tuple ℬ! = 𝑩,≼  such that: 
• B is a finite set of contrast classes as before 
• We modify I to evaluate which contrast classes are morally better than or equal to 
others, i.e., 𝐼:𝑩 → 2!"#. Here 1,0  represents, in the case of ‘1’ an ideal decision 
setup and in the case of ‘0’ a morally regrettable state of affairs, at least insofar as 
the options available when making a decision. 
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• ≼ is a reflexive, transitive, partial binary relation on B, given by I. 
• For all 𝜑, 𝛿 ∈ 𝑩, 𝛿 ≼ 𝜑 iff ∀𝑠  ∈ 𝑆𝑖𝑡, if 𝛿 !! = 1 then 𝜑 !! = 1 
where . ! again denotes the salient truth-set function.81 We can then denote the set of 
maximal elements of an Ideality-chain according to I as 𝑀𝑎𝑥 ℬ! . 
 
We can now construct a composite ordering of choices together with this non-
total pre-ordering of contrast classes. To create this new ordering we take the 
coordinatewise ordering on 𝑪×ℬ!, a composite relation between the ordering of choices 
in C and our non-total, reflexive, and transitive ordering of contrast classes.  
 
Definition 4.14 (Goodness-graph or G-graphs): A goodness-graph for I is a tuple 𝐺! = 𝐺,≤!  where ≤!is a partial pre-order on G such that: 
• 𝐺  ∶=   𝑔 𝑔 ∈ 𝐶×ℬ!  
• 𝑐!, 𝑏! ≤! 𝑐!, 𝑏! ↔ 𝑐! ≤! 𝑐! 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏! ≼  𝑏! 
 
So for each contrast class from ℬ!, together with each choice within that contrast class, is 
now ordered by ≤! . We again denote the set of maximal elements for 𝐺! by 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐺! . A 
goodness ordering according to I seems a good approximation of a normative code; such 
a code specifies what is the best option82 from each class of options, while each class of 
options is itself ordered. While perhaps not yet conclusive, with a G-graph we at least 
have a good handle on how to answer C&MP. 
  
4.15 Obligations and Principles of Justice 
At this point we have a fairly rough sketch of what our formulation of an 
obligation will look like. In other words, we can sort different best choices into different 
groups. But we still have no rule for identifying which sort of best choices should 
represent obligations.                                                         81 More precisely: the acceptable‐set function. 82 But is still only an approximation; see definition 4.16 
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For foundations of liberalism, we are interested in obligations so that we can 
reason about principles of justice, i.e. some class of obligations we will find interesting as 
principles of justice. Not only do we need to know what are the best options given a class 
of alternatives, but we need to know which sort of best options deserve to be seen as 
obligations and thereafter isolate some of these as our principles of justice. To get there 
we need to turn to issues of normative codes bumping up against an ugly reality.  
We will need three operations on 𝐺! in order to make sense of some common 
cases of moral-political reasoning, and thus to shed light on the nature of best options. 
The first helps capture the notion that we sometimes have to choose the lesser of two 
evils, or to make the best out of a bad situation (but not quite yet approbatory, see 4.21). 
The second is closely related and helps represent the notion that building castles in the 
sky is all well and good for theoretical purposes, but we should reject foolishly chasing 
idealistic options. The third allows us to represent how a code is transformed in the face 
of disagreement with other codes. 
 
Definition 4.16 (Relative G-graphs) For any g-graph 𝐺!, we want to represent what is 
best relative to a particular contrast class, say 𝛿. We designate the greatest lower bound 
(with respect to ≤!) of two contrast classes in 𝐺! using ∧, i.e. the meet. We define a 
relative g-graph 𝑮! = 𝐺! ,≤!  such that: 
• 𝐺! ∶= 𝜑! ∧ 𝛿 𝜑! ∈ 𝐺  
• ≤!∶= 𝜑! ∧ 𝛿,𝜑! ∧ 𝛿 𝜑! ,𝜑! ∈≤! 83 
 
That is, the elements of the relative contrast class are just the meets of all the original 
elements with 𝛿. An element of the new relative graph is less than or equal to another 
exactly when their non-relativized originals are so ordered. In other words, this technique 
lets us see “what happens, all else staying the same, if we assume that 𝛿 is the best                                                         83 This definition generalizes on a definition for a restricted P‐sequence from [Benthem, Grossi, Liu] accessed Aug 7, 2013. 
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situation” by identifying 𝛿 with a top element, since it will be the top element of any 
contrast class ordered by ≤!  and ipso facto also with ≤!. We then define a maximal 
element for a relative g-graph in similar fashion from before. Thus, if we must choose 
what is best from among unpalatable options, for whatever reason, we can represent this 
with the relative g-graph for the contrast class that includes the unpalatable options. But 
as of yet, there is no need to identify such best options, i.e., from among unpalatable 
options, as obligations. 
Not all sub-ideal reasoning involves choosing under bad conditions. In some cases, 
that which is more ideal than what one ought to do is instead impractical or infeasible. 
For example, a certain fox had a code that guided him to reach for some grapes; however, 
the grapes were out of reach and the fox replaced his old code with a new one. The new 
code reclassified the grapes as not so good after all—in fact, those grapes were probably 
sour. This sort of normative code change is more than just a change in which contrast 
class we take to be relevant. We need a more permanent type of change in a g-graph. In 
other words, we need an operation to chop off the unfeasible choices rather than just the 
“moving spotlight” operation of the relative g-graphs. But this cannot be a simple matter 
of lopping the tops off orderings since the changes that motivate removing upper options 
from an evaluation often ramify below as well: some options at a lower level of ideality 
will also disappear.  
In the fox example, if we remove eating grapes as the thing most worth doing, the 
lower level option of wandering through vineyards will also likely be removed. Thus we 
cannot just take a relative maximal element as a new top element and keep the remaining 
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order the same to represent the sour-grapes phenomenon.84 A more comprehensive 
revision to I is required. And as may be gleaned from the fable, generally which options 
are sour is a material rather than formal property of options. In what follows, it is more 
perspicuous to use the strict part of our ideality ordering, i.e., ≺ instead of ≼, in order to 
make clear how sour-grapes reasoning works. 
 
Definition 4.17 (Realistic Options and Sour-grapes): Let S designate a set of ‘sour 
options’. Given a 𝐺! (a goodness-graph), we designate any 𝛿 ∈ 𝑩 a realistic contrast 
class iff for any 𝛿!! ∈ 𝑩, if 𝛿!! ≻! 𝛿 then 𝛿!! contains sour options, i.e., 𝛿!! ∩ 𝑆 ≠ ∅. Thus 𝛿 represents a ‘second best’ contrast class, i.e., a highest such class (according to I) that 
does not include the “sour grapes” option(s). We will define 𝐺!"! , the sour-grapes graph 
for 𝛿 as follows. 𝐼°is a sour grapes reinterpretation of I iff  𝐼°is such that for any 𝛿! ∈𝑩 that is preferable to 𝛿 according to I, i.e., 𝛿! ≻! 𝛿, 𝛿! !° is non-comparable to 𝛿 !°. 𝐺!"!  is 𝐺! defined relative to 𝐺!°rather than 𝐺!.  
 
Note that it follows that 𝛿 !° ∈ 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝓑!°  since ¬∃𝜑 ∈ 𝓑 such that 𝜑 ≻!° 𝛿; anything 
previously thought better has been declared “sour grapes”.  
Since we order 𝓑 in virtue of the membership of options and their ordering, a new 
ordering of 𝓑 will presuppose a revision of how some particular options are ordered.  
Proposition 4.17.1 A sour-grapes interpretation, i.e., revision of 𝓑!, implies that some 
choices that may have been comparable according to I are now incomparable according 
to that sour-grapes interpretation. 
                                                         84 Please ignore any negative connotations associated with the use of ‘sour grapes’. While there are perhaps more frequent uses of this term in a negative sense, i.e., as a sort of irrational distortion of preferences (maladaptive instead of merely adaptive), psychologically it is generally helpful to ‘pretend’ that what you once wanted wasn’t really all that good anyways. For example, while Martha may be a fairly competent martial artist and had many Sanseis encourage her to compete at world championship tournaments, she discovered she is prone to injuries. Thus it seemed to make sense to stop training for such a goal, and put her time and effort into her academic work. And this seems eminently rational…and it is helpful if she convinces herself that being a world champion would just mean she had to, say defend her title until she lost it. And for Martha, the inevitable losing of her title would be worse for her than winning it would be good.  
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Proof: Follows trivially from 4.14.  
 
Thus, since membership is sufficient for discriminating contrast classes and we 
order contrast classes in virtue of the moral nature of the options, a change in the ordering 
of contrast classes presupposes a change in the ordering of individual options. The 
question is: how far can this revision go down the ordering? Intuitively, the idea is that if 
the reason why the option of walking in a vineyard would discriminate a better contrast 
class than one without that option is due to eating grapes being the most worthy thing to 
do (i.e., walking in the vineyard increases the prospects of finding grapes newly fallen to 
the ground, say, and so might rank ahead of more laborious options such as raiding the 
hen house). Once eating grapes is removed as the best possible outcome, it seems 
wandering in the vineyard could no longer be seen as better than other options, all else 
being equal. Since the detailed application of this idea requires appeal to the content of 
individual codes, i.e., that the value of some options is in terms of means for some other 
purpose, the notion above (4.17) can only pick out some formal constraints for a sour 
grapes interpretation. But as we will shortly see, this nonetheless allows us to 
demonstrate some fairly interesting results about the foundations of liberalism. 
 The sour-grapes definition illustrates that a moral evaluation is a complex system 
that depends both on an ordering of and specifying relevant choices set-ups as well as 
specific interpretations stating which choices are acceptable and which are not. Thus, 
which options are best is not a matter of logic (i.e., in this presentation, does not hold 
across all interpretations); and this is a virtue for a deontic logic modeling a plurality of 
moral codes. This leads us to our next topic, the difference between a moral code in 
general and a code that may be suitable in the foundations of liberalism. 
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4.18 Plurality of Codes and Liberalism 
A plurality of codes results in at least some disagreement. As noted, a liberal 
society takes such a plurality as a starting point. In fact, calling it a ‘society’ involves the 
hope that the codes can (at least usually) get along despite the disagreement. With this in 
mind, we will need a way to represent what changes in a code when, sometimes at least, 
it can get along with others. Again, we will see some of the subtleties involved in using a 
best option to represent an obligation, especially in liberal foundations.   
 
Definition 4.19 (liberal g-graph): Let L (for ‘liberal’) be the chain getting your way >compromise > recalcitrant disagreement . A liberal g-graph for 𝐺! is a 
coordinatewise ordering on 𝐺!×𝐿, i.e., 𝑔, 𝑙 ≥ 𝑔!, 𝑙!  iff 𝑔 ≥ 𝑔! and 𝑙 ≥ 𝑙!. 
 
As a motivating example, consider the simple (and overly simplistic) g-graph that says a 
society with no guns is better than a society with some guns. The relative g-graph for this 
code and L will rank the pair 𝑛𝑜 𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠,𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑛𝑒’𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑦  best of all. Next best 
and not comparable to one another are 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑤𝑎𝑦, 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠  and 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒,𝑛𝑜 𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠 . Next best but comparable with both is 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑒, 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑔𝑢𝑛𝑠  and so on…. In total we have a six-node directed graph 
corresponding to a coordinatewise ordering on this g-graph and the liberal L. A fact that 
will be important later on is that in virtue of this composite ordering with L there will 
always be at least one ‘get your own way-pair’ node better than any ‘compromise-pair’ 
node in a liberal g-graph. 
Readers suspicious of formalism for its own sake might well wonder whether all 
this machinery is worth the trouble. Clearly, I think it is. Let us briefly turn to an example 
of its uses as a possible tool to reveal something about the foundations of liberalism, in 
particular how we can use the notion of a best option in this context. I will introduce two 
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more definitions. These definitions I take to encode important concepts central to 
discussions of liberalism. If these definitions are apt then 4.19.3 proves an intriguing 
claim about the moral nature of liberalism. 
 
Definition 4.19.1 (liberal modus vivendi): A modus vivendi agreement is any 
compromise-pair on a liberal g-graph that is less good than at least one getting your way-
pair.  
 
Intuitively, a modus vivendi is an agreement for the time being. A modus vivendi implies 
that at the earliest opportunity to get your way your code guides you to get your own way. 
 
Definition 4.19.2 (liberal principled agreement): A principled agreement is any 
compromise-pair of a liberal g-graph that is also a maximal element. 
 
Proposition 4.19.3 A sour grapes interpretation that removes ‘getting your way’ as most 
desirable is both sufficient and necessary for a principled liberal agreement.  
 
Proof: Given a coordinatewise ordering in composing a liberal g-graph, it follows that 
any liberal g-graph will have at least one ‘get your own way’-pair as maximal. Thus 
assuming no sour grapes operation is available, it follows any compromise-pair in a 
liberal g-graph will satisfy definition 4.19.1, i.e. it will be a modus vivendi. 
On the other hand, if we compose a sour liberal g-graph we can make a 
compromise-pair of a liberal g-graph a maximal element and thus can satisfy definition 
4.19.2. Here’s how: assume we have the underlying liberal g-graph and its associated 
interpretation I. Let 𝛿 ∈ 𝐿 represent political compromise. We create a new graph 𝐺!"! by 
replacing I with 𝐼°such that we take the truth-set of any element of L ≻! 𝛿 instead as 
incomparable to 𝛿 !°(with respect to set-theoretic inclusion). It follows that 𝛿 !° ∈𝑀𝑎𝑥 ℬ!°  𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 ¬∃𝜑 ∈ ℬ 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝜑 ≻!° 𝛿. Thus, there is some 𝛿!°-pair that satisfies 
definition 4.19.2.                                                                                                                        
            
 
The point of 4.19.3 is that what is best simpliciter is not obligatory; rather, in this case the 
best compromise or consensus is obligatory. And so it should be in a pluralist, liberal 
society. This sour grapes-style of change to a moral code is of fundamental importance to 
the foundations of liberalism and the legitimacy of a liberal state, at least if we are 
assuming a pluralist liberal society—more on this below. In section 4.42 I will show how 
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we can, with a minimal logic (i.e., one that has no rules besides the basic connectives and 
that by adding new rules could only prove more not less) prove a Rawls-ish and Scanlon-
esque criterion for allowing multiple, equally correct but conflicting moral codes 
(regarding policy). This criterion claims that being guided by an appropriate code implies 
that one must find grounds that those who hold disagreeing but nonetheless appropriate 
codes couldn’t object to that choice. There I argue that the sour-grapes style of change to 
moral codes plays a fundamental role in interpreting this criterion. 
 
4.20 More on the Different Types of Best Options 
There is still more machinery required in order to make all the key distinctions we 
need. First, we will want to be able to distinguish what is required from what is more 
than what is required. Plausibly, one can think of circumstances in which, for instance, 
an action would be required of a police officer (or parent) but not a bystander. Thus we 
shall take as given a set P of ‘types of person’ or perhaps better ‘social roles’ and define 
obligation and related notions relative to such roles. Given the Cartesian product of the 
set of person types and maximal elements for some contrast class we can define a new 
predicate that can represent the distinction between obligatory and supererogatory, and, 
as promised, between obligatory and approbatory.  
 
Definition 4.21 (Super-choices): We modify I to evaluate which maximal choices are too 
much to ask for each type of person, i.e., 𝐼:𝑃×𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑮! → 2!"#. Here, 1,0  represents, 
in the case of ‘0’, that the maximal choice is too much to ask with regards to that type of 
person, while ‘1’ we interpret as coming under this limit. Thus, in our earlier discussion 
‘acceptable’ was just shorthand that meant ‘meets a minimum to be okay.’ But once we 
no longer abstract away consideration of social roles, it becomes more natural to speak in 
terms of ‘at least meets the limit.’ 
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Given a set of person-types, P and the set of maximal choices from a relative g-graph, i.e., 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑮! , we define a predicate Θ on 𝑃×𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑮! , such that for 𝑐 ∈ Θ, if 𝑐 !! = 1 and Θ !! = 1 we say that c is obligatory according to I for the relevant 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃. And if 𝑐 ∈ Θ 
and 𝑐 !! = 1 but Θ !! = 0 then according to I, c is supererogatory for p; otherwise if 𝑐 !! = 0 but Θ !! = 1 for 𝑐 ∈ Θ, then c is the best of unacceptable choices (the least you 
could do: approbatory according to I). 
 
Intuitively the super-choice structure tells us which maximal choices are unacceptable 
relative to prescribing said choice for a particular person-type. And as can be seen, it also 
represents which choices, normally objectionable, become sanctioned when no other 
choice is better. Alternatively, we can interpret Θ as telling us whether the choice to 
prescribe a particular maximal choice for some person is acceptable or not.85 On this 
account, obligations amount to which maximally acceptable choices may be (i.e., 
unobjectionably) prescribed for a certain type of person according to I. 
There is another, more political, distinction that we will want to represent. In 
4.19.2 I defined the notion of a principled agreement. But Martha may find herself 
making a principled agreement, i.e., one that she is committed to regardless of better (in 
terms of, for example, self-interest) options coming by, even though there is no moral 
principle guiding her to do so. She may be a psychopath who understands the long-term 
but self-interested benefits of such principled compromises and cooperation (no political 
affiliation should be read off this description). On the other hand, Mary’s moral code 
regarding political behavior guides her to always find compromises that she commits to, 
all things being equal. And lastly, John’s moral (so-called) code tells him to make 
political compromises in the face of recalcitrant disagreement, but to try to get his own 
way at the earliest opportunity. Thus we could be principled in compromising in the first                                                         85 Or both, as possible in the formalism of RD‐choice; if this is a desirable possibility, set any maximal choice that is non‐objectionable relative to a person‐type as obligatory instead. 
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place, but that the compromise fails to be itself principled, i.e., it’s merely a modus 
vivendi. The philosophical pay-off for these distinctions is that, of course, as moral agents 
in the political sphere our ambition is to reach principled compromises for which the 
parties to the agreement were principled in doing so. And the idea here, once again, is 
that a formal representation may serve a fruitful role in analysis. 
In order to represent the distinction between a principled compromise and being 
principled in compromising in the first place, we can use the notion of a strong 
permission. The notion of a weak permission is just that there is no obligation to refrain 
from the permitted choice. A strong permission can be understood as permitting an 
exception to a norm, i.e., while there is an obligation to refrain from that choice, the force 
of this obligation is set aside for a different obligation (for whatever reason). A strong 
permission tells you that under particular conditions, one need not be guided by the 
relevant norm. Being able to represent the distinction between a weak and a strong sense 
of permission may, in general, be a useful feature in a deontic system. It just so happens 
that I will represent the notion of being principled in compromising in the first place as an 
instance of a strong permission. 
It may be helpful to understand this weak/strong permission distinction by 
appealing to a particularly literal notion of what it means for some claim to be morally 
action-guiding. On this account, only prescriptions can be morally action-guiding; they 
prescribe what one should do and, as in the case of injunctions and directives, are 
intended to change peoples’ behavior. The idea here is that one can guide action only if it 
is possible to change someone’s behavior by said guidance. A weak permission has no 
such (perlocutionary) force, all else being equal: if someone apparently changes her 
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behavior due to a weak permission, this change presupposes independent motivation, 
morally speaking, for the behavior. In other words, the agent had reasons to do X and 
thought that she shouldn’t choose to do X but then discovered that, after all, she was 
permitted to do X. On this account of action-guiding, it is the agent’s prior motivation for 
Xing that accounts for her choice, not the following of a moral code. The strong 
permission is thus morally action-guiding in a way that the weak fails to be. The strong 
permission is intended to change someone’s behavior by changing what norm they should 
follow. While perhaps not all may find it necessary to tie in action-guiding so closely 
with the living up to norms, the distinction between weak and strong permission is not 
without further philosophical pay-off. As we will see, representing the notion of trumping 
as a change in contrast class leads naturally to formalizing this notion in terms of a strong 
permission—a change in which norms apply is a change in which maximals we appeal to, 
and which maximals we appeal to depends on the relevant contrast class. 
In PRIT, I will represent a strong permission as guiding action by specifying a 
change in contrast class. In particular, a strong permission tells you when you can ignore 
best options and then choose best from the remaining acceptable options, i.e., the second 
best from the original class. Thus, as in other cases of sub-ideal reasoning, by changing 
the contrast class, we are then guided by doing what is best from that class of options. To 
help clarify the connection between strong permission and action-guidance, we can use 
some of the surplus structure (that is, surplus in respect to what is obligatory) found in a 
relative g-graph.  
 
Definition 4.22 (Strong permission): We interpret every 𝐶𝑥𝜑 ! = 1, 𝑠. 𝑡.𝐶𝑥𝜑 ∉𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑮!  as an element of a strong permission class. To distinguish obligatory maximal 
choices from supererogatory maximal choices, we interpret every 𝐶𝑥𝜑 ! = 1 such that 
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𝐶𝑥𝜑 ∉ Θ as an element of a strong permission class. We then use the relative g-graph 
operation to identify what is best from this strong permission class. A strong permission 
is a norm calling for us to choose a maximal from this strong permission class. 
 
A strong permission may be used to represent a norm calling for compromise when 
sticking to your guns will result in recalcitrant disagreement, but nonetheless allowing for 
the compromise to be a modus vivendi. This is again a case of demonstrating the limits to 
the formal properties of such agreements and where material considerations must enter. 
As we wanted, a strong permission is action-guiding in the sense explained above: it tells 
you to choose a maximal from a contrast class and as such, is intended to possibly change 
an agent’s behavior, all else being equal. 
In fact, on this account one needs a strong permission that says whether it is 
permissible to trade in your code for a sour version; that is, if you ought to compromise, a 
strong permission could tell you it’s okay to give up on your best options. Thus we can 
make a distinction between agreements that are principled (i.e., 4.19.2) and being 
principled in compromising in the first place (i.e., 4.22).  
The more familiar notion of permission, i.e., what we call a weak permission 
defined in terms of obligation, will be represented by not being obligated to not choose. 
The formal representation for this sense of permission must wait until the formal 
language and its operators are introduced. 
 
4.23 Representing Liberal Choices and Codes 
We can, with the tools developed so far, make a first pass on representing some 
basic notions in the foundations of liberalism. To illustrate, we can represent a minimal 
notion of liberty in terms of that which is too much to demand of a privileged person-
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type: the citizen. Intuitively, we want to distinguish between maximal choices a liberal 
state can demand a citizen to do for, say, the ruling party’s idea of the greater good and 
maximal choices that are, generally, unfair to demand of ordinary citizens. 
Philosophically, the idea here is that liberal states aim to leave people alone to live their 
lives as they see best, all else being equal. The reason why I call this a minimal sense of 
liberty is that the conditions regarding who counts as a citizen are essential to recognizing 
a state as appropriately liberal, i.e., states with second class citizens (e.g., those who don’t 
have the same standing in the law as first class citizens) generally don’t deserve honest 
title to liberal. While there is more to be said about the concept of liberty, for now I can 
develop this minimal notion as a sub-sort of super-choice. 
 
Definition 4.24 (simple liberty): We use 𝑀 ∈ 𝑃 to denote the type “citizen.” We use the 
extended evaluation from 4.21 (Super-choice) and define a predicate Ξ on 𝑀×𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑮!  
such that for any 𝑐 ∈ Ξ if 𝑐 !! = 1 and Ξ !! = 1 we define c as obligatory for all citizens 
according to I. If 𝑐 ∈ Ξ and 𝑐 !! = 1 but Ξ !! = 0, according to I, c is illiberal. 
 
Obviously, there is conceptual space in the simple liberty structure for a correlate to 
approbatory as in super choices; I will leave this notion informal, with the unimaginative 
name of ‘liberal approbatory.’ One of the goals for PRIT is to sort out what it means to 
cooperate while leaving others alone to disagree with us; the formal condition above, i.e., 
for illiberal policy, won’t get us very far without assuming this material property of 
liberal societies. The natural thing to do here is to combine the techniques from 
representing compromising in the face of disagreement with the above structure for 
representing leaving people alone. 
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First I define an ordering of simple liberty choices, constructing a g-graph where 
all options are considered in terms of what is fair to ask of citizens: instead of using ≤!(4.14) we will define an ordering with respect to Ξ. We then compose this ordering 
with L as we did with liberal g-graphs (4.19). Finally, to complete the code, we turn it 
into a sour ordering. 
 
Definition 4.24.1 (Ξ g-graphs): A Ξ g-graph is a 𝚵≼ such that for each 𝑐, 𝛿 ∈ Ξ, 𝑐!, 𝛿! ≼! 𝑐!, 𝛿!  iff according to I from 4.24 for any s, if 𝑐!, 𝛿!  meets our liberal 
minimum at s then so does 𝑐!, 𝛿! . 
 
Definition 4.24.2 (liberal 𝚵≼): A fair-liberal graph is the coordinatewise ordering of 𝚵≼×𝐿. 
 
Next, I treat the call for political compromise in a political sphere chock full of 
disagreeing codes as an instance of a sour grapes style of change to fair-liberal graphs. 
 
Definition 4.24.3 (sour liberal 𝚵≼): Let S designate a set of ‘get your own way’ options 
(our sour grapes, so to speak). Given a fair-liberal graph 𝚵≼, we designate any 𝛿 ∈ 𝑩 a 
realistic contrast class iff for any 𝛿!! ∈ 𝑩, if 𝛿!! ≻! 𝛿 then 𝛿!! contains ‘get your own way’ 
options, i.e., 𝛿!! ∩ 𝑆 ≠ ∅. We will define 𝚵!"! , the sour-grapes fair-liberal graph for 𝛿 as 
follows. 𝐼°is a sour grapes reinterpretation of I iff  𝐼°is such that for any 𝛿! ∈ 𝑩 that is 
preferable to 𝛿 according to I, i.e., 𝛿! ≻! 𝛿, 𝛿! !° is non-comparable to 𝛿 !°.  
 
Thus, we interpret 𝛿 to represent the class of choices that result in political compromise.  
 
With 4.24-4.24.3 we can represent a liberal code that guides the choice of policy 
in terms of prescribing the best upon which we can agree, subject to protecting the liberty 
of individual citizens. In order to represent being principled in compromising, we can 
straightforwardly compose a strong permission in the same way as before. 
With this logical machinery, we can represent sour-fair liberal codes that could 
disagree with each other regarding what we mean by the ‘best’, others upon the meaning 
of ‘liberty’ and still others will disagree on how we should reach a compromise. Thus we 
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must distinguish between what a code says is a best acceptable choice, i.e., obligatory 
according to that code, and what is a best option acceptable to all relevant codes. To 
handle all these codes and the resulting disagreement, we need a formal language and its 
proof theory to reason about all these different orderings.  
 
4.25 The Proof Theory—Preliminaries 
 
Often it would be sufficient to have a semantics in hand, especially when the 
primary goal is to apply logical insights to issues in other areas of philosophy. However, 
in our case, it is also important that we develop a useful proof theory. The idea here is 
that with PRIT foundations, we care not only about what we can prove (which we might 
be able to get at merely by considering the class of valid formulas), but also about how 
we might prove our claims. And just providing a procedure for deciding whether a 
formula is valid won’t be good enough in our case; we need tools to analyze proofs. 
Analyzing proofs themselves will allow us to identify ‘parameters’ used in a sequent, i.e., 
a mathematical object expressing a conditional judgment, and investigate what sort of 
changes we could make to these parameters if want to see different conclusions. This sort 
of approach allows us to focus on problem solving; we can see what went into proving a 
conclusion we need to avoid (like liberalism being incoherent if there are multiple correct 
accounts of what is just) and sort how to make suitable changes (like making a distinction 
between inconsistencies that are disastrous from those that can be reasoned with fruitfully 
in a pluralist setting like liberalism).  
The other reason to have this sort of proof-theory for PRIT is that sometimes we 
might want to keep track of, i.e., recover information glossed over at a more general level 
of abstraction, which moral theory was used to warrant some course of action. And to be 
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slightly more pragmatic, I have also tried to get to interesting proofs, i.e., with meta-
ethical import, as directly as possible. You will find in this section a proof claiming that, 
in a pluralist setting, moral codes must refer to and require compatibility with the content 
of competing codes. Not only does this proof bear a resemblance to Rawls’ claims about 
the implications of what he calls ‘the fact of Reasonable Pluralism’, I prove this version 
of the claim using none of his theoretical assumptions or framework. In fact, this claim is 
proved merely in virtue of a weakest logic capable of defining the relevant logical words. 
This proof can be found at 4.42.    
In keeping with two of the recurrent themes, I propose we want a proof-theory for 
our deontic action-guiding concepts in terms of a formal language that sets out how some 
sorts of choices logically follow from other choices. But this phrasing is slightly 
misleading. Granted, on a direct and simple reading, it is the choice of actions for which 
we seek moral guidance; the issue here however is that we need more than just a typing 
of choices in order to represent reasoning about, for example, conjunctions of choices. 
That is, a conjunction of choices is not itself automatically a choice. For example, the 
conjunction of a choice to lower spending on foreign aid (instead of, say, keeping it 
steady or raising it) and the choice to lower taxes for those who tend to vote for your 
party (instead of, say, abolishing regressive tax breaks, i.e., tax breaks that required a 
high income in the first place) is not itself a choice: choices are structures with contrast 
classes and there is no contrast class with this conjunction, as it stands. Moreover, it’s not 
clear how a logic could automatically populate a contrast class for such a conjunctions, 
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i.e., extensional conjunctions, in a coherent manner.86 Still less are disjunctions of choices 
themselves choices, let alone arbitrary conditionals. Since we want to know how certain 
types of things follow from other types, the concept of choice is not apt, on its own, for a 
type-theoretic approach. At the very least, we should look for a sort of typing that is 
simpler to work with. 
The lesson here is similar to a point raised in Chapter One. There is such a thing 
as too much detail for some purposes [Sambin & Valentini 1998]. Recall how in order to 
do some maths, some details important at a fundamental level must be ignored or 
abstracted away, i.e., too much information can be “a burden when dealing with the 
synthetic methods of mathematics (pg. 2).” And again, what makes such abstraction 
constructive is that such details can be recovered when warranted. In like fashion, the 
fine-grained structure of choices is important to solve problems at a fundamental level. 
For example, when the order or priority of actions matters, I have urged the use of 
something like the fine-grained structure of choices to represent the relevant reasoning. 
However, when such issues are not in play, and we are concerned (for example) with 
conditional obligations or the combination of choices, the added structure of choices is 
cumbersome (to say the least). In such cases, I propose we can treat the topic action of a 
choice as if it were a ‘formula’ on its own right. Alternatively, one can think of this 
                                                        86 The closest I have been able to fix this issue is that each possible pair of options, one from each component choice, populates the contrast class for a conjunction of two choices. The selected option is thus also a pair. But this sort of conjunction is not very extensional in nature (we must reference other options not selected) and thus not apt for an extensional notion of conjunction, i.e., it is incoherent if a choice is an extensional conjunction. Later I will introduce an intensional notion of conjunction called ‘fusion’ and this seems more like what could be going on with this sort of conjoining of two choices. 
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seemingly exclusive emphasis on the topic as actually elliptical for our discussion of the 
corresponding choices.  
I propose then that we should interpret our formulas as plans. One of the 
characteristic features of moral and political reasoning, i.e., in terms of justifying policy, 
is the role of commitments. It is our commitments to make certain choices under certain 
conditions— where we foresee selfish or self-interested confounding factors— which is, 
in some sense, paradigmatically the subject matter of moral reasoning and related action-
guiding concepts87 (i.e., instead of say, prudential reasoning where cognitive updating of 
new information is paramount). Such commitments can be described in terms of [moral] 
plans. I propose we do so; consider some of the following examples of such typing.  
 
4.26 The Types—Plans 
The question in front of us is how to formalize logical complexes of choices and 
at this point, how to interpret what such complexes even are, since as noted they don’t 
seem to be choices in any straightforward sense. My suggestion has been to treat them, 
instead, as plans. Let us begin, then, with suitable interpretations of atomic formulas. A 
choice is, in a natural if not a rather simplistic sense, a plan. My plan for the next few 
minutes may be that I will choose a green tea instead of another cup of coffee. And if we 
focus on the topic of choices, this is a plan to drink green tea. The advantage of talk of 
plans rather than choices is that such talk more readily generalizes when we bring plans 
together via logical operations.                                                         87 There is here, I think, a very interesting philosophical moment. On this picture, moral reasoning implies the refusal to countenance updating the contrast class of a choice under ordinary conditions. Now what counts as ordinary conditions is what is so philosophically intriguing. But such issues are beyond the scope of this project. 
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Suppose we have a plan to choose A and the same plan is also a plan to choose B, 
it is thereby a plan to choose A and B. A plan to buy a car that is also a plan to give away 
all my money involves, if it is a smart plan, ordering my choices in such a way that both 
will be achieved. It must be a plan to buy a car and give away my money.88 The case for 
disjunctions is similar: while in standard propositional languages A implies A or B, the 
disjunction of a choice to A or a choice to B is not, necessarily, itself a choice. But a plan 
to choose A is also a plan to choose A or B, extensionally speaking.89 Similarly, a plan is 
type A or B just in case it is either a plan of type A or a plan of type B. 
Negation is an interesting connective, for both plans and choices. Certainly the 
negation of a choice is not naturally regarded as a choice—not choosing armed rebellion 
and choosing not to rebel are two quite different things, the former occurring much more 
frequently than the latter. Similar remarks apply to plans. The distinction between choices 
and plans regarding negation comes, instead, because we must allow for negation of 
complex formulas and not just atoms, and complex formulas, as such, can be plans but 
not choices. 
                                                        88 And as argued in the last chapter, questions of ordering actions is a question of how to choose which action to do in which order. So we distinguish between smart plans that can achieve both goals and ill conceived plans in terms of choices that order the options differently. 89 However, it is also possible that we want a more nuanced (i.e., multiplicative or intensional) notion of disjunction. For example, suppose that today we don’t know for certain which options will be in play tomorrow. Let’s assume that there are two groups of options, 𝜑 and 𝜎 we are concerned with; the plan is that if 𝜑 is in play choose A from it and if 𝜎 is relevant, choose B from that group. Thus we have a plan to choose A or a plan to choose B. That is, to represent a disjunction of plans may require keeping track of which plan matters to which choice. While this may be a useful feature to have in a deontic logic, i.e., if we want to go a non‐distributive route, I will not pursue it any further, as it would meet no pressing need to do so in the immediate project. 
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  Since not planning is not itself a plan, all things being equal, we will interpret the 
negation of a plan A to be a plan not to A, i.e., as a plan to do something incompatible 
with doing A. One naturally thinks of “not A” as the disjunction of all the plans that are 
incompatible with doing A, so for instance planning not to engage in armed rebellion is 
the disjunction of planning to lead a quiet life or planning for a career in government and 
so on.  
It will be useful to our overall project to have a negation built on the notion of 
incompatibility. We want to allow for reasoning about cases that can’t be actualized, 
notably ideal cases and about plans that can’t be jointly acted upon. A straightforward 
and germane case is when two different groups in a political community have different 
plans for a certain chunk of tax revenue and where if one group gets their way the other 
will lose out. Understanding deontic negation in terms of incompatibility rather than in 
the more simple terms of “not” allows us to readily distinguish that case from the 
situation in which one group has plans for the tax revenue and another hasn’t ever 
thought about it and really doesn’t care what happens. 
Before I set out conditions for implication, we need to be able to distinguish cases 
where the same plan guides us to choose both A and B, and where we combine a plan to 
choose A with a different plan to choose B. In relevant logics, this second sort of 
conjunction, i.e., intensional conjunction, is called fusion. We say a plan is of type A fuse 
B if it is a plan to combine a plan to choose A with a plan to choose B. This is in contrast 
with the extensional conjunction case; as explained above, there we say a plan is type A 
and B if it is a plan to choose A and B.  
   162 
In the proof-theory for relevant and associated substructural logics, implication is 
generally defined in terms of fusion. Let me give a brief example of how this relationship 
works. Suppose we have a plan, a type A fuse B plan, and our theory tells us that it is 
therefore also a type C plan. This means that if we have an A plan, it follows it is also a 
plan to choose a type C whenever B is chosen, i.e., that ‘choosing B’ implies ‘choosing C’ 
follows from choosing A. However, the connection between antecedent and consequent in 
relevant implication is subtler and more sophisticated than may perhaps be thought from 
this brief characterization. And this connection is due to the constraints or properties we 
assign to fusion.  
 
4.27 Proof Constituents: Sequents, Structures and Punctuation 
In an effort to describe the system in an efficient and readable way, I will leave 
aside certain details I assume most philosophical readers will be familiar with. The 
system may be unfamiliar in that it includes ‘rules’ of two different sorts. First, each 
logical operator is equipped with introduction and elimination rules of a sort I assume is 
familiar. The feature that may be less familiar is the inclusion of structural rules. 
Structural rules are, intuitively, ways to pay closer attention to the premises (or evidence) 
by regarding them as a sort of structured entity, whereas in the more common systems, 
the premises are treated as an unstructured collection. For example, in proof systems 
designed for classical or intuitionistic logic, we generally find that the premises are 
represented as belonging to a set, whereas in the proof theory we will be looking at how 
the order of premises could matter or that a premise couldn’t be used more times then it 
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appears, for example. So we will need to add structure to sets, so to speak,90 to represent 
how we could use premises in these different ways. In order to make this idea clear, let 
me introduce the notions of a structure and punctuation. (In what follows I am assuming 
the notion of a language in terms of a set Lang composed of its atomic formulas and 
connectives that satisfies unique decomposition. [Restall 2000], see his pgs. 14-16.) I will 
use letters like “A”, “B” and “C” for formulas and reserve letters such as “X”, “Y” and “Z” 
for structures, except of course where formulas are being used as structures.91  
Definition 4.28 (Punctuation marks) 
An object together with its arity n (the number of input arguments) is a punctuation mark 
p when its arguments are structures. 
 
Definition 4.29 (Structures) 
Given a set of punctuation marks Punct, disjoint from Lang, the multiset Struct(Lang, 
Punct) will be a collection of structures when it satisfies the following unique 
decomposition condition.  
 
Lemma 4.29.1(Unique decomposition for structures) 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑋 ∈ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔,𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋 = 𝑝𝑋!…𝑋! = 𝑞𝑌!…𝑌!, 𝑡ℎ𝑢𝑠 𝑝 = 𝑞,𝑛= 𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑛,𝑋! = 𝑌! 
 
Like Lang, if Struct satisfies unique decomposition, we can use induction to prove claims 
about structures. We can think of structures and their punctuation as a way of 
representing how we combine, compose and manipulate premises in a conditional proof. 
In order to show unique decomposition, we need to make explicit some further 
constraints on Struct. 
 
                                                         90 The conceptual priority here is assumed merely for expository purposes. We might instead think of sets where the structure of, say, multisets, has been stripped away. 91 What follows is adapted from Restall [2000], though the proofs regarding the unique decomposition of structures and induction over structures are my own.   
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Lemma 4.29.2 (Struct conditions) 
Let Struct be the smallest subset of (𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔 ∪ 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡) such that 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔 ⊆ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 and if 𝑛 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 ∀ 𝑋!…𝑋! ∈ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡,𝑝𝑋!…𝑋! ∈ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 
 
Lemma 4.29.2 states that since any formula is a structure, all other structures are 
constructed by combining these structures, i.e., the formula, using punctuation, similar to 
the case of atomic formula and connectives in Lang. 
 
Proof for Lemma 4.29.1: Now follows straightforwardly from the unique decomposition 
of formula in Lang.  
 
Theorem 4.29.3 (Induction over structures) 
Take any collection of structures Struct(Lang, Punct). Suppose the property Ψ holds of 
every formula of Lang (our base case for structures) and suppose that for each 
punctuation mark 𝑝 ∈ 𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡 with arity n, whenever Ψ holds of each 𝑋!…𝑋!, then Ψ 
holds for p𝑋!…𝑋! as well. It follows that Ψ holds for each structure in Struct(Lang, 
Punct). 
 
Proof:  We assume the collection Q of all formula satisfying Ψ. Q must also satisfy the 
conditions in Lemma 1.3 since 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔 ⊆ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡. But that means that Struct(Lang, 
Punct)⊆ 𝑄, since Struct is the smallest such collection. Therefore, every structure in 
Struct(Lang, Punct) satisfies Ψ as well.       
 
We will also use the fact that, just as formulas have subformulas, structures have 
substructures. 
Definition 4.29.4 (Substructures) 
We define the substructures of a structure as denoting the elements of the smallest set of 
structures satisfying two conditions: 
• Any structure X is a substructure of itself 
• If X is 𝑝 𝑋!,… ,𝑋!(!)  then every substructure of any of the structures 𝑋! is also a 
substructure of X. 
I will write ‘Y(X)’ to indicate a structure, Y, with X as its substructure. 
 
 
Definition 4.30 (Antecedents, Consequents and Consecutions) 
Given Struct(Lang; Punct), we define ⊢ to be the consecution relation on 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡×𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔 
such that 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴, where the antecedent is an 𝑋 ∈ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡 and the consequent is an 𝐴 ∈ 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔. 
 
   165 
Before we can define when we have a proof of a consecution, we need the notions of 
inference, rules, and proofs. 
 
Definition 4.31 (Inferences and Rules) 
The pair Inf = ⊢ ,⊢  is an inference such that ⊢  is the set of consecutions that are 
premises and the latter of the pair, i.e., the single consecution, is the conclusion. We 
define the set of any such pairs Rule = ⊢ ,⊢    to be the rule corresponding to the 
inferences. 
 
There is a particular sort of rule that is central to type-theoretic proof theory. Intuitively, 
structural rules let you rearrange or adjust structures while not ‘losing’ any of the 
formulas that followed from the antecedent structure. Before we can formally introduce 
the notion of structural rules, I need to explain what I mean by closed under substitution 
for formulas. As you can see from above, structures (uniquely) decompose into formulas; 
now, if a rule requires that you can replace any formula in a structure with an arbitrary 
structure, that rule is closed under substitution for formulas. Also, when a structure, say Z, 
is generated via a structural rule from X, we will denote this relation by 𝑋 ⇐ 𝑋!, where in 
this example 𝑋! stands for Z (given that the consequent with X as antecedent and the 
consequent with 𝑋! is the same). 
 
Definition 4.32 (Structural rules) 
A rule ⊢ ,⊢    closed under substitution for formulas is a structural rule when the 
structure of the conclusion is an 𝑋′ and the structure of the antecedent is an X such that 𝑋 ⇐ 𝑋!. 
 
Definition 4.33 (Rule families) 
We define a collection 𝑋 ⊢ ,⊢   ∈ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡(𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔;𝑃𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡)  to be the Rules for a 
Lang.  
 
Typically we will want one rule for introducing and one rule for eliminating each 
connective in that language. Also, for each punctuation mark and given any structure 
composed with that punctuation, there is a formula with a connective equivalent to that 
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structure in virtue of 4.29.2 (i.e., in virtue of the unique decomposition of structures.) 
Finally, any structural rule governing each punctuation mark is a member of Rules. 
 
4.34 Proof theory with no structural rules 
Adding structural rules lets us prove more, not less. So, before I delve into the 
intricacies of the particular proof theory and formal semantics, let me first prove an 
interesting claim that must be true of any more complicated system. This claim is 
interesting because, while it is a valid deduction in a weakest such proof system (i.e., 
given suitable elements for representing the relevant deontic notions), it makes what may 
first strike one as an ampliative claim when interpreted back into ordinary language: it 
makes an inference from what our logical words mean to what we will find in moral 
codes acceptable in any liberal society. Obviously, this deduction is not ampliative. 
Instead, it seems best to interpret it as revealing a requirement of any moral code under 
conditions of pluralism: that any such code must guarantee that acting upon its 
prescriptions is compatible with the obligations of rival codes. This criterion bears a 
strong resemblance to a claim Rawls infers from what he calls “the fact of Reasonable 
pluralism.” What this proof shows is that this conclusion holds without using any of his 
theoretical apparatus or assumptions. 
 
Let me now introduce the rules for our connectives. As noted above, these are the 
mostly familiar introduction and elimination sort for each connective, though as I have 
defined rules, we could have a rule with no premises. And this is how I will introduce the 
identity axiom: as a rule with no premises. 
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Definition 4.35 (Rule for Identity) 
The rule for identity is the collection of all inferences with no premises to a conclusion of 
the form 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐴 
 
The connectives we will now be looking at will be: implication, fusion, conjunction, 
disjunction, negation and obligation. There is a small technical caveat here. I promised to 
start with a deontic logic with no structural rules, and if I were to be accurate in how I 
present such a logic, I would have to define two different implications, the familiar left-
to-right arrow and a right-to-left arrow. It is only in the presence of a structural rule 
letting us ignore the order in which premises may be combined where these two sorts of 
arrow need no longer be distinguished. We find this sort of structural rule in the familiar 
classical and intuitionistic logics, as well as the standard take on relevant logic, hence it is 
not surprising that the left-to-right arrow is relatively well-known compared to its 
backwards sibling. For ease of presentation and also due to the lack of any present need, 
we will ignore the right-to-left conditional in what follows. And this same line of 
reasoning applies to the fact that we would also need two different sorts of negation in 
any logic without structural rules. 
We begin with the rules for the conditional. They are the familiar rules of modus 
ponens and conditional proof, though written in sequent notation. Note that in the case of 
conditional elimination, in the conclusion itself we explicitly keep track of all the 
evidence required to arrive at the conclusion B by including both X and Y in the 
antecedent of the sequent.  
 
Definition 4.36 (Implication Introduction and Elimination Rules) 
 
 I 𝑋;𝐴 ⊢ 𝐵𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 → 𝐵 
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 E 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 → 𝐵       𝑌 ⊢ 𝐴𝑋;𝑌 ⊢ 𝐵  
 
I briefly mentioned above that the key difference between a relevant and a classical or 
intuitionistic conditional is that the arrow has precisely the relationship these rules 
stipulate for the semi-colon to different operators, viz. to fusion for the relevant arrow 
and to conjunction for the classical or intuitionistic arrow. I introduce a bit of technical 
vocabulary for this relationship. 
 
Definition 4.36.1 (Punctuation residuating Conditionals) 
We say a connective → is a conditional that residuates the punctuation mark ‘;’ iff it 
satisfies I and E. 
 
I now stipulate the rules for the fusion operator that ensures that it is related to semi-colon 
in the appropriate way. 
 
 
Definition 4.37 (Fusion Introduction and Elimination Rules) 
 ∘ 𝐼 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴      𝑌 ⊢ 𝐵𝑋;𝑌 ⊢ 𝐴 ∘ 𝐵  
 
 ∘ 𝐸 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 ∘ 𝐵      𝑌 𝐴;𝐵 ⊢ 𝐶𝑌 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐶  
 
I have suggested above that fusion is “another sort of ‘and’.” It’s not obvious what this 
new sense amounts to, glossed in ordinary language terms. For the present, it might be 
intuitive enough to see fusion as ‘together with’ and in some cases, ‘compatible with’, 
‘composed with’ or ‘combined with’. These interpretations of fusion will be appealed to 
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in 4.42. Let me now introduce the more familiar formal notion of ‘and,’ namely 
conjunction. 
 
Definition 4.38 (Conjunction Introduction and Elimination rules) 
 ∧ 𝐼 
  𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴      𝑋 ⊢ 𝐵𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵  
 ∧ 𝐸! 
  𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴  ∧ 𝐸! 
 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵𝑋 ⊢ 𝐵  
 
The rules for disjunction for disjunction are familiar; thought the form that disjunction 
elimination takes may require some unpacking. It may help to think of the two leftmost 
premises in relation as establishing that each of A and B, together with whatever, if any, 
subsidiary information is provided by the rest of Y, are enough to allow us to establish C. 
 
Definition 4.39 (Disjunction Introduction and Elimination Rules) 
 ∨ 𝐼! 
  𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 
 
 ∨ 𝐼! 
 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐵𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 
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∨ 𝐸 
  𝑌 𝐴 ⊢ 𝐶    𝑌 𝐵 ⊢ 𝐶     𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵𝑌 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐶  
 
Next I will define a generic necessity operator based on Greg Restall’s  [2000] 
proof-theoretical approach to necessity in his introduction to substructural logics.92 I will 
presently show how we can modify this definition to introduce the notion of multiple 
sources of moral necessities, i.e., a plurality of moral codes. After I prove the Rawls-like 
claim I mentioned above, I will show how we can safely and constructively abstract away 
the details of the particular source of a moral obligation. This is important since we want 
to be able to make sense of the idea that whatever a moral code prescribes is in fact 
prescribed—even if a different code prescribes something contrary to it.  
 
For generic necessity, I need a new punctuation mark, the unary △. 
 
 
Definition 4.40 (Generic Necessity Introduction and Elimination rules) 
 □𝐼 
  △ 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴𝑋 ⊢ □𝐴  
 □𝐸 
  𝑋 ⊢ □𝐴△ 𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴 
 
 
With the rules for necessity stipulated this way, box formula and triangle structures are 
related in a way that parallels the relationship between semi-colon and fusion. As in the 
case with ‘;’ there are different structural rules we may include to govern the behavior of                                                         92 C.f. [Restall 2000] pgs. 47‐52 
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△. There are no introduction or elimination rules for ‘;’, nor for △. In both cases the 
behavior of a punctuation mark is governed by structural rules and its role in rules for 
connectives. Restall [2000] suggests that we think of △ as a sort of unconditional version 
of  ‘;’ (pg. 47-9.) The idea there is to think of necessities as being implied by ‘logic’, and △ encodes this information, i.e., when it takes a structure as an argument, it entails that 
whatever follows from that structure is provable by logic alone. 
 
However, a single generic necessity connective is not well suited for a pluralist 
deontic logic if we need to avoid problematic inferences, i.e., where inconsistent 
obligations show up. First off, we don’t want to be able to infer from A being obligatory 
and B being obligatory that the conjunction ‘A and B’ is obligatory. Otherwise, the 
conjunction of inconsistent actions would be obligatory from the fact of having 
inconsistent obligations found in pluralist settings. And being obligated to do the 
impossible is not a welcome result for liberal, i.e., pluralist, foundations. The proof is 
straightforward, but instructive for sorting out what we will need to define a connective 
that’s a better fit. 
Proposition 4.40.1 (Generic Necessity is not well suited for inconsistent obligations) 
With a generic necessity connective, a conjunction of necessities entails that the 
conjunction of the relevant formulas is necessary as well. If we suppose that pluralism 
permits the conjunction of inconsistent obligations, this would entail that inconsistent 
actions would be obligatory.  
 
Proof: 
 □𝐴 ∧ □𝐵 ⊢ □𝐴 ∧ □𝐵□𝐴 ∧ □𝐵 ⊢ □𝐵          □𝐴 ∧ □𝐵 ⊢ □𝐴△ □𝐴 ∧ □𝐵 ⊢ 𝐵             △ □𝐴 ∧ □𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴△ □𝐴 ∧ □𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵□𝐴 ∧ □𝐵 ⊢ □ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵
 
 
And if we suppose that A is incompatible with B we have an unfortunate result.  
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One might have suspected that a singe generic necessity is not suitable for 
pluralism if one takes Restall’s gloss on the generic necessity at face value. Moral 
necessities aren’t true (or acceptable) come what may or because of ‘logic.’ I have been 
supposing that moral obligations are prescribed by moral codes and that pluralism has as 
its source that whatever a legitimate moral code prescribes is prescribed (together with 
the claim that there are at least two such moral codes). This suggests that one way to 
solve the above problem is to instead keep track of the different moral codes that give rise 
to particular obligations. Instead of a single punctuation mark and necessity, we will need 
specific punctuation marks corresponding to each of the relevant moral codes. For ease of 
record keeping, I will use the natural numbers starting with 1 as the punctuation that 
corresponds to a necessity connective with that number as a subscript. Here are the rules 
for these connectives. 
 
Definition 4.41 (Multiple Necessities Introduction and Elimination rules) 
 □!𝐼 
 ℕ𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴𝑋 ⊢ □!𝐴 
 □!𝐸 
 𝑋 ⊢ □!𝐴ℕ𝑋 ⊢ 𝐴  
 
 
 
With this connective I block the earlier proof that a conjunction of obligations from two 
different sources (i.e., moral codes) proves that the conjunction of the topic actions is 
itself obligatory. 
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 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ □!𝐴                 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ □!𝐵1 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴                   2 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ 𝐵  
 
 
And since the antecedent structures are different, we can’t conjoin the respective 
consequents, i.e., A with B, before we introduce any of the necessities. 
 
This modification to necessity not only blocks the derivation of impossible 
obligations, it allows me to prove the Rawls-like claim mentioned earlier. But before I do, 
let me put the symbols into words. Consider the sequent we will prove below: □!𝐴 ∧□!𝐵 ⊢ □! □!𝐵 → 𝐴 ∘ □!𝐵 . The consequent may be interpreted as claiming that it is 
obligatory by the lights of moral code 1 that if B is obligatory because of moral code 2 
then choosing A is compatible with the obligation to choose B from moral code 2. Notice 
it doesn’t say that choosing A is compatible with choosing B, only that acting on one code 
is compatible with the obligations from another code. 
 
Proposition 4.42 (The moral codes in a plurality must reference the content of each other 
in terms of compatibility) 
 
Proof: □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ □!𝐴                 1 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ 𝐴              □!𝐵 ⊢ □!𝐵   1 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ;□!𝐵  ⊢ 𝐴 ∘ □!𝐵1 □!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ □!𝐵 → 𝐴 ∘ □!𝐵□!𝐴 ∧ □!𝐵 ⊢ □! □!𝐵 → 𝐴 ∘ □!𝐵
    
 
                            
 
Theorem 4.42 can be read as a criterion, not for what counts as a moral code 
simpliciter, rather for whether a certain group of moral codes are potentially an 
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acceptable plurality (like the liberal context). As you can see, there is nothing in the 
theorem that could tell us, if the compatibility doesn’t obtain, which moral code is at fault 
and should be rejected. For example, suppose we have a group of codes that satisfy the 
criterion from Theorem 4.42, but we then add a new moral code that makes this new 
group fail the test. There is no formal reason so far that allows us to select the new moral 
code as the one at fault; in fact, it’s possible that the newer moral code merely reveals a 
hitherto unknown fault with the older group. A good formalism doesn’t replace old-
fashioned hard philosophical work, after all.  
The sequent just proved is related in interesting ways to the familiar—but 
unprovable—claim that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. While details regarding how to interpret 
fusion in terms of a sort of compatibility must wait until some of the formal semantics is 
in place, this much seems to be entailed by what I have already proved: acting on one 
moral code means being in a situation where those who hold to conflicting obligations 
have no reason to object to your choice, or else it’s not clear what ‘compatible with’ 
could mean. While this superficially resembles Scanlon’s [1998: 153] notion of ‘there 
being no reasons to object’ as a necessary and sufficient condition for the acceptability of 
a principle, these two notions are actually quite different. In my case, the claim is much 
weaker; I have identified a general moral obligation to find at least one situation such that 
there are no suitable reasons to object to your action, i.e., opposing views don’t have to 
find our choices acceptable or obligatory, nor should we expect that to be possible in 
general.93 
                                                        93 This fact also feeds into why double negation elimination, i.e., ~~A  A, is rejected in what follows—more on this below. 
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There are also interesting connections with some claims I proved in the order-
theory, especially the liberal g-graphs of 4.24 and relevant propositions. There I showed 
that a principled liberal moral code must give up the choice to get their way, suitably 
construed, even if that option becomes readily available, i.e., without ‘need’ for 
compromise. I interpret these claims as all pointing to a sort of trumping obligation in any 
legitimate moral code (i.e., for a pluralist context): that you ought to find some sort of 
consensus or compromise as a condition on acting on any one moral code. If this 
connection bears out, the compatibility from 4.42 likely means just this very thing! Thus, 
if I am correct, the results from the order-theory can provide some guidance for when 
moral codes are incompatible in terms of 4.42, how to tell which moral code is at fault: 
the one that claims you ought to get your own way if you can. 
It may be useful to present some concrete examples that may be seen as 
illustrations of the sort of situation addressed by this simple theorem. During the first two 
years of U.S. President Barack Obama’s first term, the Democrats held the balance of 
power in each legislative body as well as, obviously, the executive. Yet, assuming that 
the Democrats are generally good liberals and that they made the (arguably false) 
assumption that their political rivals were working with a different but still liberally 
acceptable moral code, they should nonetheless have declined the opportunity to get their 
own way in favor of searching for a consensus or compromise with their political 
opponents—or, more precisely, to arrive at actions that left their opponents without 
grounds for objection, i.e., in some sense compatible with their opponents moral code. 
And it appears they did so (perhaps breaking the hearts of some illiberal leftists….). On 
the other hand, since Prime Minister Harper’s Conservatives won a majority government 
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in Canada, it seems that the only competing values that mattered are those of Canada’s 
Supreme Court. If it’s fair to suggest that the Conservatives are generally illiberal94 then 
it should not be surprising that as soon as they get their turn to get their own way, they do 
so, i.e., they seem not to care whether their policies could be compatible with moral codes 
from opposing views. The basic idea here is that liberals see politics as a way for 
disagreeing groups to work together, to cooperate politically, socially, and economically. 
On the other hand, illiberal folk generally see politics as a winner-takes-all proposition.  
Thus, insofar as a conjunction of obligations from different moral codes can be 
construed as representing a pluralist setting for meta-ethics or liberal foundations, this 
proof demonstrates a Rawls-like claim regarding the content of moral codes in a pluralist 
setting: a sort of compatibility or tolerance. And this proof does so merely in virtue of the 
most bare bones meaning of the logical words involved: obligation, conjunction, fusion 
and implication. 
We can also gloss this result in the following way: in a pluralist setting, moral 
codes must (in a logical sense) take into account the obligations found in other relevant 
moral codes. And this fact follows merely from the weakest notions of the logical words 
involved. Of course, it follows that adding stronger rules won’t affect this consequence: 
when we add more structural rules we can prove more, not less. 
We are now ready to move on to the general conditions for the semantic frames I 
shall argue are a good fit for a deontic logic under conditions of pluralism. After we have 
                                                        94 Of course this line of argument assumes that illiberalism goes along with a rejection of pluralism. While this seems to me to be generally true, I have not argued whether alternative general political stances could give rise to alternative pluralisms. 
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explored that issue, we can then align the structural rules and axioms with our frame 
semantics. 
 
4.43 The Frames for PRIT-friendly logics 
We turn now to laying out more systematically a formal semantics in which the 
conceptual tools just described can be embedded, i.e., a formal system suitable for 
representing liberal pluralism. Such a system will need to be paraconsistent, relevant and 
constructive: paraconsistent because of disagreement between codes is allowed for, 
relevant because adding premises to a code will change what is obligatory (as in a strong 
permission), and constructive because of the nature of the sort of liberalism we are 
looking at. The system on offer, RD- choice (for Deontic Relevant logic of choices95), is, 
I suggest, suitable for investigating obligation under such pluralist conditions.  
It is common in introductions to modal logic to suggest that the concept of 
obligation may be represented as a sort of moral necessity. According to this perspective, 
we model obligation as a logical word defined in terms of a class of modal frames. 
Specifically, an obligation in a world is defined as formulas true at all worlds morally 
accessible from it. In the order-theory presented above, obligation is independently 
analyzed as a sort of predicate; I will show below that it is a predicate that can be turned 
back into a logical word. Moreover, there are three further changes to the more familiar 
formalization of obligation I will investigate.  
                                                        95 Saying that this system is based on any particular relevant logic, such as R, would be misleading. The logic here, while small “r” relevant, is much weaker than is R; in particular, negation rules are more constructive than generally found in relevant logics. 
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While obligations and permissions in RD- choice will be represented in terms of 
truth and falsity conditions in the class of relevant models, this is best understood as the 
acceptability of plans, which, as described above, are officially the interpretations 
assigned to the formulas of the language.  
Secondly, we will need a relevant arrow to characterize implication in any deontic 
logic that avoids a class of validities that would be disastrous in moral discourse. The 
relevant arrow, together with a relevant and constructive negation I introduce, will also 
result in a paraconsistent system.  
Thirdly, we must adapt the semantics to allow for several distinct sources of 
obligation. We could do so by allowing for a multitude of accessibility relations, each 
relation representing a different moral code (for example). However, the same results 
(with added benefits moreover) can be accomplished with the more elegant technique of 
using neighborhood functions to represent necessities—in our case, moral necessities. A 
neighborhood function takes a world and returns a class of worlds; the propositions ‘true’ 
at these worlds are then the propositions necessary relative to the input world. This 
technique allows us to transform the predicate-analysis of obligation into the more 
formally useful logical word approach. 
The final issue is that while individual moral codes, the ideals of our regulatory 
ideal theories, will be complete and consistent, how they interact is still a matter of 
constructive process. In other words, even though we could use classical logic to reason 
within a particular RIT, when we must reason between them, the reasoning must be 
constructive, paraconsistent and relevant. And as may well be surmised, what can be 
proved using the rules corresponding to such weak rules is much less than one may have 
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expected or hoped for. On the other hand, as I have already shown, important and 
surprising truths of liberal foundations can still be proved, even with such weak logical 
machinery. Moreover, a disappointment can still be an important philosophical lesson. 
 
4.44 Not True and False, Not Acceptable and Objectionable 
Talk of choices or plans being true or false seems awkward and forced. I propose 
that we instead appeal to the more general notion of designated values. Designated values 
are those members of the set of semantic values, V, that matter to deciding validity: 
designated values must be preserved in valid inferences, the most well-known case being 
truth in classical logic. For present purposes, instead of truth I will take the semantic 
values for choices and plans to be acceptable or not acceptable, with acceptable being 
our designated value. In this case, valid inferences preserve the acceptability of plans 
instead of preserving the truth of propositions. Conveniently, while they are, 
philosophically, different notions from truth or falsity, there are precisely two of them. I 
will therefore use a version of a two-valued possible worlds semantics. In the two-valued 
semantics for deontic logic I have in mind, this means that options are interpreted as 
being either acceptable or not acceptable, but not both, in any particular world.  
As noted above, we will not be interpreting negation in terms of mere absence of 
‘truth.’ Negation cannot be represented by a plan merely not being acceptable in a 
paraconsistent system with just two values (since negation would act ‘classically’). So I 
will represent negation in intensional terms: using fusion to represent a compatibility 
relation. That is, given some world w, a plan is negated (i.e., objectionable) not when that 
plan is not acceptable at w but when it is not acceptable at any compatible worlds. With 
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this framework, we have a clear difference between options failing to be acceptable and 
being objectionable. 
However, the standard way in relevance literature to specify the class of 
compatible worlds for any world verifies the rule of double negation elimination (DNE), 
and DNE, notoriously, is the sine qua non of non-constructive reasoning. Whatever one’s 
intuitions about DNE in general or in moral discourse in particular, a suitably 
philosophical interpretation of the conditions required to make the compatibility relation 
verify the non-constructive rules generally valid for negation in relevant logic seem 
implausible in a pluralist deontic setting.  
 
4.45 DNE Is Problematic in a Pluralist Deontic Setting 
Consider two moral worlds, w and v. In a general sense, w is compatible with v 
when nothing that w rejects is accepted at v. But in order for compatibility to matter 
logically, i.e., as a way of representing negation, there must be a further relationship 
between w and v. In the previous chapter I introduced the notion of the hereditariness of 
truth, and there is a similar notion at play here. A convenient way to think about this 
property is in terms of ‘earlier’ and ‘later’ states of, for example, a research project, 
where later states generally have more established truths, but which anyway include all 
the truths established at any earlier state—the idea is that in a constructive process once a 
truth is decided (proved, established and so on), it can’t be overturned by later 
developments. To facilitate talk of later stages including truths established at earlier 
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stages, it will be fruitful to think of worlds, semantic points in a frame, situations and so 
on, as if they were sets of truths.96 
From a technical point of view, it is easy to build an inclusion relation into our 
models for operations like conjunction or disjunction. It is a bit trickier for negation; we 
need particular conditions to ensure that negation is preserved up the inclusion order as 
well. Since negation will be spelled out in terms of compatibility, we must ensure that 
compatibility is constrained in terms of inclusion: if a includes b then if a is compatible 
with c, b is compatible with c; if c includes b then if a is compatible with c, a is 
compatible with b. So we can say that a world/stage x objects to A just in case for each y 
compatible with x, y doesn’t accept A. We say xCy if x is compatible with y. 
 In order to verify DNE, it will suffice to guarantee that for any world w there is a 
world compatible with w, say y, such that for any world z compatible with y, every 
sentence true at z is also true at w.97 This condition is problematic however. Since we can 
assume (safely one might think) that since ~~A follows from A, the reason why we 
shouldn’t accept rejecting some plan at w, i.e., wCy and 𝑦 ⊭ ~𝐴, is in fact just a matter of 
~~A and A being provably equivalent, i.e., since 𝑤 ⊨ ~~𝐴 and wCy (and thus 𝑦 ⊭ ~𝐴) 
for any z, such that yCz, 𝑧 ⊨ 𝐴 and according to our DNE conditions, whatever is true at z                                                         96 Please don’t take this ersatz talk as analysis. It is intended merely to enable us to talk as if one world could include another world, for example, and thus make fruitful use of relevant mathematical objects and relations for representing what our logic can and cannot do. 97 To show this, suppose 𝑤 ⊨ ~~𝐴. We need every y, such that xCy, 𝑦 ⊭ ~𝐴. If we claim that for any z, such that yCz and thus 𝑧 ⊨ 𝐴, that w includes z, we have 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴 as desired. This part of the argument is adapted from Restall [2000] pg. 261. This condition is also necessary: Suppose that ~~𝐴 ⊢ 𝐴, thus for any world w, if 𝑤 ⊨ ~~𝐴 then 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴. We need that for some world v such that 𝑣 ⊑ 𝑤, 𝑣 ⊨ 𝐴 (even if all this means is that v=w.)  Since 𝑤 ⊨ ~~𝐴, we also need some y such that xCy and 𝑦 ⊭ ~𝐴. We then need some z such that yCz where 𝑧 ⊨ 𝐴. But in order to ensure that 𝑣 ⊨ 𝐴, all we have is that 𝑧 ⊨ 𝐴 and thus can only set v=z to do so. 
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is true at w. But I have already noted that, taking disagreement and compromise seriously, 
we need to distinguish between not having reasons to object to some policy and taking 
that policy as acceptable. That is, we may recognize that another moral code is an 
appropriate source of guidance in a liberal democracy, yet not take it as one’s own such 
source of guidance. Thus, one moral code may fail to see some policy as acceptable, but 
that thereby, in of itself, gives no grounds to object to that policy in every case. We need 
to reject this possibility, i.e., that ~~A being provable and A being provable must always 
travel together. 
 
4.46 Moral Necessities 
The third basic idea underlying this system is the account of obligation and 
permission at a world. The usual way to formalize obligation is with possible worlds talk, 
where we use a suitable accessibility relation and quantify over ideal or otherwise 
morally appropriate worlds. With this approach, when all worlds morally accessible from 
some world w evaluate some choice, action, plan or proposition (as the case may be) as a 
designated value, that choice etc. is obligatory at w. The problem is that this approach is 
natural only if the modal logic is a normal modal logic. But deontic logic in general 
seems like a poor fit for being a normal modal logic, let alone a pluralist deontic logic as 
in the current project. Thus, before I explain why the accessibility approach is too 
convoluted if non-normal, let me argue why we would want to go non-normal in the first 
place. 
Let me start with a general problem with any deontic logic being normal. Part of 
what makes a modal logic normal is that it verifies the inference of ⊢ □𝐴 from ⊢ 𝐴. 
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Using such a necessity operator to represent obligation would mean that any truth 
provable from logic alone would thereby be obligatory. Obviously, this allows us to infer 
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ in a suspiciously easy manner, but there are further, more pressing 
problems. First, perhaps we can’t work with a free logic, (we need A=A to hold generally, 
for example), thus our logic assumes that something exists. This implies that something 
ought to exist rather than nothing and perhaps we have a strange and far too easy moral 
realism. The other problems become clear once we consider a pluralist deontic context.  
The formulas □A & □𝐵 ⊢ □(𝐴 & 𝐵) and □(𝐴 →  𝐵) ⊢ □𝐴 → □𝐵 are equivalent 
for characterizing normal K modal logics but, as Jennings, and  Schotch [1981] point out, 
an aggregation principle such as the former formula obliterates an important deontic 
distinction: not being obligated to do the absurd is different from being permitted to do 
what one is obligated to do.98 Leading up to a more concrete example, the latter formula 
can be glossed in a pluralist deontic context as claiming that if one moral code prescribes 
that if you plan on doing A then you do B as well entails that if a moral code prescribes 
plan A then some moral code must also prescribe plan B. But this runs contrary to the 
whole point of considering a pluralist deontic system in the first place. Say a correct 
moral code prescribes that if you go to church, you give ten percent of your income to the 
church. But this code doesn’t prescribe going to church, it merely prescribes that if you 
go, tithe. Perhaps an atheist could even accept this code. But suppose another correct 
moral code does in fact prescribe going to church but not tithing (perhaps because money 
could be better spent feeding the hungry). This seems like poor reason for the first code to 
then go ahead and prescribe tithing to churches or, alternatively, to claim that the latter 
                                                        98 Proof can also be found in appendix 1. 
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code is incoherent because it doesn’t prescribe tithing or to expect that there must be 
some other code that does prescribe tithing. But this would be the case if these formulas 
are valid in a pluralist deontic logic.  
 At a technical level, non-normal ‘accessibility’ semantics is a mess to work with. 
To represent a plurality of moral codes, i.e., with each having its own notion of obligation, 
is to have each code have its own accessibility relation. An initial problem with such a 
straightforward formalization of this idea is that a relevant version of implication turns 
out to be both a blessing and a curse. The problem in this case is that the most well 
understood semantics for the arrow in relevant logics uses a sort of accessibility relation, 
similar to that found in the possible worlds semantics of modal logics in general. If we 
have a plurality of accessibility relations, it looks like we would end up with a very messy 
and perhaps unintelligible structure representing implication (i.e., we would have a 
plurality of implications and thus a tough time making sense of the corresponding notion 
of a conditional being appropriately logical).  
A simple fix for this problem is to have different sorts of accessibility relations—
moral and modal in this case—after all, it might seem strange to treat implication as 
somehow moral in nature in deontic logic. The problem now is how to fix how the 
different moral accessibility relations could interact in an intelligible fashion. A quick 
example of this issue is that if we want to represent permission as a sort of deontic 
diamond, i.e., possibility, operator and define it as usual in accessibility terms, we say 
that x⊨ ♢A iff there is some y morally accessible from x and y⊨ A. But now consider a 
dilemma where x⊨ □P and x⊨ □Q (non-trivially) such that P and Q are incompatible 
plans. If we define permissibility as above, dilemmas don’t seem to really matter any 
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more since we are permitted to do either, rather than face some hard work sorting which 
action we should do at the cost of failing to do the other. In other words, at least in some 
cases, resolving a dilemma means that we are, it turns out, forbidden from doing one 
action because we must do the other, and letting permission work like this sense of 
possibility, i.e., be implied by obligation, would undermine this.99  
There is a fix for this problem as well but it is not going to help us in our project. 
We could instead [directly] define ♢ in terms of □, such that ♢ = ~□ ~. But since we are 
using compatibility to represent negation conditions, our frames won’t let us do this in 
any elegant, simple, or perhaps even coherent fashion. Consider if x⊨ ~□~P then for each 
y such that xCy, 𝑦 ⊭□~P and this follows with accessibility conditions if and only if there 
is some z that is morally accessible from y and 𝑧 ⊭ ~𝑃. And this holds if and only if there 
is some v such that zCv and v⊨P. The point here is what does the fact that there is this 
one v such that v⊨P have to do at all with whether x⊨♢P? There is no doubt we would 
need to ensure that the worlds compatible with worlds accessible from worlds compatible 
with x are also accessible to or from x. And if that line of reasoning is bit hard to follow, 
let alone how it could be apt for representing permissibility, you can see why we might 
want to find some way to go non-normal without recourse to accessibility relations. 
The lesson here is that we need a non-normal modal logic to do a pluralist deontic 
context justice, but if we could find one that handles non-normality without defining our 
deontic modalities in terms of accessibility relations, we would be headed in the right 
                                                        99 As may be guessed, this line of reasoning means that generally obligation doesn’t imply permission in a pluralist deontic setting—see 4.66‐8 for when this inference is or isn’t valid in PRIT. 
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direction, or at least a better direction. It is in this light that I propose we instead use 
neighborhood semantics. 
Rather than a set of multiple accessibility relations, we can abstract out the 
mathematical notion underlying such a structure. The idea is that we could take a set of 
formulas to represent all the plans some correct liberal theory consider obligatory (say, as 
developed in the graph-theoretic approach from earlier) and because we are assuming a 
pluralist setting, we will have multiple such sets, one for each correct policy-guiding code. 
For each world we could then identify a set containing all these sets of formulas,100 each 
such subset thus representing what the different liberal theories consider obligatory for 
that world. Thus, I need a mathematical structure that will tell us, for each world, the set 
of sets of obligatory plans. We call the subsets of these structures the neighborhoods of 
our input world, and this is why we call the use of such mathematical objects to represent 
modalities ‘neighborhood semantics.’ 
To help further motivate the decision to use neighborhood models instead of the 
more recognizable relational models, I want to point out the many formulas that are not 
valid on the class of all neighborhood frames. These formulas may all be seen as 
problematic for deontic logic, and using a technique that invalidates them right off the bat 
is therefore a virtue of the theory. Without going into too much detail regarding why each 
of these formulas are problematic for deontic logic, I will point out a couple of fairly well 
known philosophical issues from the literature.  
                                                        100 As may be suspected, formalizing this idea in what follows does in fact verify Russell’s paradox. Which is really appropriate if you like relevant logics. 
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In appendix 1 I prove that the following formulas are not valid for the class of 
neighborhood frames. (I will use 𝑶𝜓 to represent obligated to choose 𝜓 and 𝑷𝜙 to 
represent weakly permitted to choose 𝜙.)  
a. 𝑶𝜓 & 𝑶𝜙  → 𝑶 𝜓&𝜙  
b. 𝑶 𝜙 → 𝜓 → 𝑶𝜙 → 𝑶𝜓  
c. O𝜙 → 𝜙 
d. 𝑶 𝜙&𝜓 → 𝑶𝜙&𝑶𝜓 
e. 𝜙 → 𝜓 → 𝑶𝜙 → 𝑶𝜓  
I have already argued that (a.) and (b.) don’t play nice with a pluralist deontic context. 
Formula (c.) represents the inference that if anything is obligatory, it is true; since we do 
not live in a paradise, there are many obligations that are not discharged. Of course, this 
is readily enough rendered invalid in standard deontic logics by not having accessibility 
relations that are reflexive.  
The schemas (d.) and (e.) are equivalent and are valid in all normal modal logics. 
That they should be viewed as problematic comes from the fact hat they seem to give rise 
to things like the Gentle Murder Paradox [Goble 1991]. Recall that the paradox arises if 
we grant the plausible assumption that, if you kill someone, you ought to kill him or her 
gently (or in self-defense.) Of course, it’s a logical truth that if you kill someone gently, 
you kill him or her. By an instance of (e.) and detachment, we have that if you ought to 
kill someone gently, you ought to kill him or her. But this, given simple propositional 
principles and the aforementioned assumption, gives us that ‘if you kill someone, you 
ought to kill him or her.’ If something has to go to resolve this problem, an inference like 
(e.) is likely less plausible than the principle that one ought to always reduce harm when 
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one can or generally, to only kill in self-defense. If this is correct, the best way to resolve 
this paradox is to jettison (e.) and this can be done easily by switching to neighborhood 
models. 
Instead of rigging together relational semantics to avoid these formulas, for each 
formula at least one structure induced by neighborhood semantics circumvents them—see 
the appendix for details. It’s quite remarkable that as we have philosophical reasons to 
reject these formulas in the deontic domain, that neighborhood semantics comes ready 
made to invalidate them on the formal level. Of course, this is just a consequence of 
neighborhood semantics being a generalization of accessibility semantics (to show this is 
beyond the scope of this project but we can see how this would work in the one direction, 
i.e., as evidenced by the fact that neighborhood semantics doesn’t validate the normality 
formulas). It looks, at least as a starting point, that neighborhood semantics is better 
suited for pluralist deontic logics than is relational semantics, despite the relative 
unfamiliarity of the neighborhood approach. Hopefully, the fact that neighborhood 
models generalize over relational models will help offset any uncomfortable novelty.  
We have two other advantages from going with neighborhood semantics, i.e., for 
representing a pluralist deontic context. First, I want to stress how well neighborhood 
structures fit with our earlier graph-theoretic discussion. With a relational approach, one 
might see the truth conditions for obligation as a sort of substantial analysis, i.e., 
obligation here is what is true (acceptable and so on) at any morally ideal (better and so 
on) world relative to us. But with the neighborhood approach, the neighborhoods for a 
world are just those sets of formula corresponding to the maximal elements from the 
relevant graphs, i.e., our moral codes. Of course, one might think that the accessibility 
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relations would merely encode the same information as found in our graphs without 
implying anything more philosophically substantial. But the point is that with the 
neighborhoods approach, reading off our models a competing, substantial analysis of 
obligation is not even a possibility: the models just are the right sort of mathematical 
structures to encode the information found in our graphs. In other words, the semantics 
are formal, not philosophical (or not so in a way that undermines the analysis of 
obligation found in the graph-theory). 
The second advantage is that negation will behave a little more simply when it 
modifies O and P. This is a feature of the definitions and neighborhood models. While we 
evaluate plans as acceptable or objectionable (or both or neither), obligations and 
permissions are either true or not true of the relevant neighborhoods.  
 
4.47 Frame Semantics 
 We start with definitions for the objects we will use to build our frames. Atomic 
Plans are what will be represented by the atomic formulas of our formal language. To a 
first approximation, these Atomic Plans will be interpreted by sets of points, i.e., a plan to 
do A will be the set of points where the atomic formula A is acceptable—this is 
essentially the familiar idea of an atomic proposition in the semantics for modal logics. 
However, to interpret non-atomic formulas, we need to generalize this notion somewhat. 
We therefore introduce another notion, that of point-sets. Importantly, point-sets have 
some nice mathematical properties related to graph theory [Cardinal, Hoffmann, Kusters 
2013; Brandenburg 2008]. This will facilitate our argument that this formal semantics 
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captures how we should reason about obligation (as found in the order-theory section) all 
that much more natural. 
Definition 4.48 (Points and point sets) 
(Under a particular interpretation) we identify each point with the set of formulas ‘true’ 
there, and write x ⊨ y if every formula ‘true’ at x is also ‘true’ at y. If P is a non-empty set 
of points, the pair 𝒫 = 𝑃,⊑  is a point set and  ⊑ is a  partial order on P.   
 
 
Definition 4.48.1 (The set of Plans) 
The set Plan 𝒫  of plans on a point set is the set of those subsets of P that are ⊑-closed 
upwards. 
 
 Technically speaking, the plans of 4.48.1 are order filters on Plan(𝒫). If {A} is a 
point set, then there will be a smallest plan generated by A, viz. the set of all point sets 
that include {A}. This will be the official interpretation of the atomic formula A, 
replacing the intuitive idea of an Atomic Plan described above. The generalization will be 
helpful when we look at neighborhood semantics—more on this below. It is worth noting 
that, while in the graph theory we used situations to represent sets of choices, here we use 
the more general notion of point sets, and in particular of plans, that can represent sets of 
formula. 
Formulas are connected with more than just the extensional connectives familiar 
from introductory logic courses, but also with intensional variants. We turn now to 
defining those relations on our point sets suitable for representing these intensional 
connectives. 
 
Definition 4.49 (Point Set Relations) 
A binary relation C on a point set is a d-compatibility relation if and only if for any 𝑤, 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝒫 if 𝑤 ⊑ 𝑥 and 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑧 whenever xCz then wCy. 
A ternary relation R on a point set is an d-implication relation if and only if for any 𝑢, 𝑣,𝑤, 𝑥,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ 𝒫 if 𝑢 ⊑ 𝑥, 𝑣 ⊑ 𝑦, 𝑤 ⊑ 𝑧, and Rxyz then Ruvw. 
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Before I can define a frame, I need one more notion. I didn’t define this notion for the 
proof theory since it made no appearance in anything then under discussion. However, we 
need a way to register theoremhood in the logic, i.e., to show what follows from logic 
alone. To do so in the semantics, we need the notion of an identity for fusion. In the 
proof-theory, identity for fusion is equivalent to a punctuation mark we can use to 
indicate theorems. It might be slightly amusing to note that we can define this element 
without first defining fusion—see 4.52.  
 
Definition 4.50 (Sets apt for identities for R) 
We define an identity for the relation R such that for any 𝑇 ∈ 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛 𝒫  it is left identity if 
and only if for each 𝑥,𝑦 ∈ 𝒫, 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 iff ∃𝑧 ∈ 𝑇, Rzxy and right when Rxzy. 
 
We can thus use elements of T to represent that ‘whatever is true at x is true at y’ is a 
theorem—more on this below. 
 
Definition 4.51 (D-Frames) 
A d-frame ℱ is a point set with the above relations and identity sets. 
 
Definition 4.52 (Evaluations on D-frames without modal connectives) 
Given a d-frame and formulas A, B, we say that a relation ⊨! is an evaluation if and only 
if for each non-modal connective from the proof theory, i.e., without negation, necessity 
or permission, we have the following conditions on the frame (I drop the subscript where 
context makes it obvious): 
• 𝑤 ⊨ 𝑝 iff  ∀ℱ, there is some 𝑋 ⊆ Plan ℱ  such that ∀x ∈ X, the evaluation 
assigns p to x and whatever is true at x is true at w 
• 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴 ∧ 𝐵 iff ∀ℱ  𝑤 ∈ ℱ,𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴 and 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐵  
• 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴 ∨ 𝐵 iff ∀ℱ 𝑤 ∈ ℱ,𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴 or 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐵 
• 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴 → 𝐵 iff ∀ℱ, ∀𝑤,𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ ℱ, where Rwyz, if 𝑦 ⊨ 𝐴 then 𝑧 ⊨ 𝐵. 
• 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴 ∘ 𝐵 iff ∀ℱ, ∀𝑤 ∈ ℱ there is some 𝑦, 𝑧 ∈ ℱ, where Ryzw, 𝑦 ⊨ 𝐴 and 𝑧 ⊨ 𝐵 
• 𝑤 ⊨⊥ for no 𝑥 ∈ ℱ for any ℱ , i.e., if 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴 and 𝑥 ⊭ 𝐴 for some arbitrary A, 𝑥 ⊨⊥ 
The value 𝐴  of a formula A according to ⊨ is the set 𝑤 ∈ ℱ:𝑤 ⊨ 𝐴  of all those points 
where A is true or acceptable.  
 
Definition 4.52.1 (D-Models) 
A d-model 𝔐 is a d-frame with an evaluation on that frame. 
 
   192 
 I am now in a position to sort out what structural rules I need for the proof-theory 
and thus the corresponding constraints on R and C relations for the d-frames. The main 
benefit of approaching logical inquiry in this fashion is that it allows us to carefully add 
in structural rules and conditions on frame relations, one at a time. This allows us to 
adjust our rules and semantics in relationship to one another, enabling us to ensure that 
our connectives behave as called for. And if we find the rules and semantic conditions of 
a philosophically satisfying sort, we might then accept inferences validated by them that 
we may have thought wrong-headed before. Alternatively, if we dislike the conclusion, 
we can get a clearer picture of the philosophical costs (in terms of rejected structural rules 
and awkward semantics) involved in avoiding it. This way logical inquiry can justify its 
outcomes in terms of finding a best fit between the meaning of connectives and the class 
of inferences we validate [Goodman 1971]. 
 
4.53 Rules and Conditions for Negation and the Ternary Relation. 
 First, I will need a way to ensure that the R relation in the models line up with the 
proof-theory structural rules governing ‘;’.101  
Definition 4.54 (R-Terms for structural rules) 𝑅 𝑠𝑡 𝑢𝑤 =  ∃𝑣 𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑣  ∧ 𝑅𝑣𝑢𝑤  𝑅𝑠 𝑡𝑢 𝑤 =  ∃𝑣 𝑅𝑡𝑢𝑣 ∧ 𝑅𝑠𝑣𝑤  
 These terms will let us encode conditions on d-frames that correspond to 
structural rules governing ‘;’ once we specify how our evaluation relates points to 
structures. 
                                                         101 Again, the formalism here largely follows the presentation in Restall [2000], though I correct for a small misprint for the Associativity rules. 
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Definition 4.54.1 (Evaluation relating Points and Structures) 𝑤 ⊨ 𝑋;𝑌 iff for some 𝑥,𝑦 ∈ ℱ, where Rxyw, 𝑥 ⊨ 𝑋 and 𝑦 ⊨ 𝑌 
This definition clearly matches the idea that formulas connected with fusion are 
equivalent to the corresponding structures with ‘;’ punctuation marks. Thus, the ‘v’ in 
definition 4.54 represents a sort of a proof of, or a designated formula for, the relevant 
fusion connected formula. 
 Just as a great virtue of Kripke semantics for normal modal logics is that key 
modal principles at the syntactical level correspond exactly to conditions on the modal 
accessibility relation, in substructural logics many structural rules correspond exactly to 
conditions of the ternary relation R. 
 
Proposition 4.55 (Structural rules and conditions on R) 
Any of the following structural rules correspond exactly to the specified conditions on R. 
 𝑋; 𝑌;𝑍 ⇐ 𝑋;𝑌 ;𝑍   Associativity   𝑅 𝑠𝑡 𝑢𝑤 → 𝑅𝑠 𝑡𝑢 𝑤 𝑋; 𝑌;𝑍 ⇐ 𝑌;𝑋 ;𝑍   Twisted Associativity  𝑅 𝑡𝑠 𝑢𝑤 → 𝑅𝑠 𝑡𝑢 𝑤 𝑋;𝑌 ;𝑍 ⇐ 𝑋; (𝑌;𝑍)   Converse Associativity 𝑅𝑠 𝑡𝑢 𝑤 → 𝑅 𝑠𝑡 𝑢𝑤 𝑋;𝑌 ;𝑍 ⇐ 𝑋;𝑍 ;𝑌      Commutativity  𝑅 𝑠𝑢 𝑡𝑤 → 𝑅 𝑠𝑡 𝑢𝑤 𝑋;𝑌 ⇐ 𝑌;𝑋    Weak Commutativity  𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑢 → 𝑅𝑡𝑠𝑢 𝑋;𝑌 ;𝑌 ⇐ 𝑋;𝑌  Contraction   𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑢 → 𝑅 𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑢 𝑋;𝑋 ⇐ 𝑋   Weak Contraction  Rsss 𝑋 ⇐ 𝑋;𝑌     Thinning/Weakening  Rstu → s ⊑ u 
 
Proof: See Restall [2000] pgs. 248-52 
 
 Throughout different chapters I have suggested that the order of premises doesn’t 
have to matter at this level of representation. Hence, the commutativity rules shall be 
assumed without further argument.  
Since we can think of brackets and punctuation marks as allowing us to classify or 
label bodies of information, theory, premises etc. in terms of composing one sort with 
another, establishing which structural rules we want can be a matter of arguing how type 
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composition should work in some domain. For example, whether composing X’s with Y’s 
and then composing this composite with a Z is not the same as composing an X with a 
composite of Y ‘s with Z’s may depend on whether composition gives unique outputs, 
such as we might find when composing, and thus typing, functions. On the other hand, 
when composition doesn’t give such unique results, i.e., when composition of the form 
(X;Y);Z results in the same bodies of information or theories (and so on) as composition 
of the form X;(Y;Z), the associativity rules are needed. I have argued that issues of the 
order in which we choose our actions and thus combine our plans is better dealt with at 
the level of choices, not at the more abstract level of plans. This means that plan 
composition is associative. 
When is type composition not idempotent? Idempotent composition means that 
whatever follows from X;X follows from X on its own. Some logics need to be ‘resource-
sensitive’, i.e., you might need two copies of the same bit of information, not just one, to 
trigger a state change, for example. Resource-sensitive logics are thus not idempotent. 
The various linear logics are resource-sensitive and show up when we reason about 
computability or state machines. Typing and combining plans is not resource-sensitive 
and thus should instead be idempotent: what follows from two copies of the same plan, 
follow from just one copy of the same plan. 
Classical and intuitionist logic are monotonic in the sense that if Q follows from P, 
Q will follow from P composed with any X whatsoever. It is this monotonic feature that 
verifies irrelevant inferences in such logics, and as argued earlier, we need to ensure such 
inferences aren’t permitted. Thus, composing plans shouldn’t be monotonic and therefore 
we jettison thinning or weakening. 
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With our conditions on the R relation set to correspond to these structural rules, 
we can move on to model conditions for negation and their corresponding proof rules. 
Definition 4.56 (Negation) 
• 𝑤 ⊨ ¬𝐴 iff for some y such that wCy, 𝑦 ⊭ 𝐴 
With this condition for negation, the C relation says nothing whether y is compatible with 
x. This brings up a possibility to define another sort of negation where the compatibility 
relation takes the arguments in the other direction, i.e., not A at x when yCx and y doesn’t 
accept A. Arguably, there is no need for these two sorts of negation. To avoid this, we can 
set the C relation as symmetrical. The next issue is how fusion, implication and negation 
are interrelated. First off, if we have need to, we should be able to represent negation in 
terms of ‘implying the absurd’ (or something similar). Second, I have previously helped 
myself to interpreting fusion as a sort of compatibility; I can now live up to my promises. 
And thirdly, we have already seen how fusion and implication are related from the 
formalism so far. But before we get to the conditions for frames, let me introduce the 
corresponding rule for negation in our proof-theory.  
 
Definition 4.56.1 (Rule for Semicolon Negation) ¬𝐼;¬𝐸: 
 𝑋;𝐴 ⊢ ¬𝐵         𝑌 ⊢ 𝐵𝑋;𝑌 ⊢ ¬𝐴  
 
Notice that this one rule both eliminates a negation from a formula in a premise and 
introduces a negated formula in the consequent. 
 
Definition 4.56.2 (Frame Conditions for Negation) 𝑥𝐶𝑦 → 𝑦𝐶𝑥      Unique Negation ∃𝑥 𝑅𝑦𝑧𝑥 ∧ 𝑥𝐶𝑤 ↔ ∃𝑣(𝑅𝑦𝑤𝑣 ∧ 𝑧𝐶𝑣) ¬𝐼;¬𝐸 
∀x∃y (xCy)     ∀𝑧 ∈ 𝑇,¬𝑧 ⊨⊥  
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The frame condition for ¬𝐼;¬𝐸 looks fairly daunting. It helps, I think, to consider the 
proof that these are precisely the conditions we need to make the negation rules valid.  
Proof: In the first direction, we are looking to ensure if 𝐶;𝐴 ⊢ ¬𝐵 then 𝐶;𝐵 ⊢ ¬𝐴. This 
means we need to know, supposing that 𝐶;𝐴 ⊢ ¬𝐵, that if 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐶;𝐵 then 𝑥 ⊨ ¬𝐴. Thus, 
we need to see that there is some w such that xCw and 𝑤 ⊭ 𝐴. Suppose that 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐶;𝐵. 
Next, since 𝑅𝑦𝑧𝑥, there is a y, z such that 𝑦 ⊨ 𝐶 and 𝑧 ⊨ 𝐵 by the definition of fusion. 
We also know that ∃𝑣(𝑅𝑦𝑤𝑣 ∧ 𝑧𝐶𝑣). Thus, 𝑣 ⊭ ¬𝐵 because zCv and 𝑧 ⊨ 𝐵 from earlier. 
But now, since 𝐶;𝐴 ⊢ ¬𝐵, this implies that 𝑣 ⊭ 𝐶;𝐴. And with having a y, w such that 
Rywv, we have 𝑦 ⊨ 𝐶 from earlier. This implies 𝑤 ⊭ 𝐴, as required. The other direction 
works in the same way.  
 
And since fusion and implication are defined as they are in 4.52, this condition 
ensures that the compatibility relation maintains the right sort of connection with the 
implication relation. The third negation condition is just what we expect if elements of T 
are supposed to register theorems.  
I can now move on to define validity for our system, but first I need to define the 
sort of points or worlds that matter for determining validities. 
Definition 4.57 (Worlds and Non-normal points) 
Non-normal points are any x ∈ ℱ such that for some A, x⊨ A and 𝑥 ⊨ ¬𝐴 (i.e., it is 
impossible for xCx) or that for some A, 𝑥 ⊭ 𝐴 ∨¬𝐴. Any other such x is a world, i.e., a 
normal point. For any element of the identities for R, i.e., T (4.50), say z, whatever is true 
at z is true at any normal point. 
 
The idea here is that it is possible that not all points are the same sort of thing in frame 
semantics. While we may start in the same place as the more familiar logics, i.e., looking 
at what relationships we find between worlds, we extend this idea to include the notion 
that worlds may also be related to non-world things, such as incomplete or unrealizable 
states of affairs. Intuitively, in a pluralist deontic setting we may have reason to use 
unrealizable plans or incomplete information in deductions. Having worlds relate to 
incomplete or unrealizable points in a frame allows us to represent how we should reason 
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under such conditions. And just like the more familiar modal logics, validity is a matter 
of what ‘truths’ hold at every world. We can use the identities for R to do this, as laid out 
in 4.50, because of two features. First, the truths of any identity for R are true at any 
world. Secondly, in virtue of how identities are defined, we don’t have to worry about 
there being truths at every world that identities can’t register as a theorem. 
 
Definition 4.58 (Validity) 
P is a valid formula in ℳ iff ∀ℱ ∀z∈T, z ⊨ P. 
 
As required, any time, i.e., in any frame, an element from our identities for R verifies 
some formula, that formula is valid. 
 
Proposition 4.59 (The logic RD-choice is relevant)  
Proof: I show the relevance of RD-choice by demonstrating that for any two formulas, A, 
C if 𝐴 → 𝐶 is a valid inference in RD-choice, A and C must share at least one atom. 
Consider the case where we have two worlds, w, u, and a non-normal point x such wCu 
and that 𝑅𝑤𝑥𝑤 and Ruxu.  We suppose that x is a situation where all choices are 
designated. There are two cases to be considered: (1) when all of A’s atoms are only 
designated at w and all of C’s atoms are only designated at u (2) when all of A’s atoms 
are only designated at u and all of C’s atoms are only designated at w. [This guarantees 
that A and C will never share an atom].  
Case (1) take 𝑅𝑤𝑥𝑤 and suppose that w⊨ 𝐴 → 𝐶. Thus since 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴, we need 𝑤 ⊨ 𝐶. But 
in this case C’s atoms are not designated at w and thus 𝑤 ⊭ 𝐴 → 𝐶 contrary to our 
assumption (and because of this invalidity there is no need to cover Ruxu for case (1)).   
Case (2) take Ruxu and suppose that 𝑢 ⊨ 𝐴 → 𝐶. Thus since 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴, we need 𝑢 ⊨ 𝐶 But 
in this case, C’s atoms are not designated at u and thus 𝑢 ⊭ 𝐴 → 𝐶 contrary to our 
assumption (and again, one invalidity is sufficient, so there is no need to cover 𝑅𝑤𝑥𝑤 for 
case (2)). 
 
 
Proposition 4.59.1 (The logic RD-choice is paraconsistent.) 
Proof: I show paraconsistency in virtue of negation failing to obey the rule of explosion. 
Explosion is when 𝑝 ∧  ¬𝑝 ⊨ 𝑞 for any arbitrary q. The negation condition on our frame 
needed to get explosion is that xCx for each x in our frame. Here’s how: suppose the 
explosion condition holds, and that 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴 ∧¬𝐴. Since xCx, 𝑥 ⊭ ¬𝐴 because 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴 and 
thus 𝐴 ∧¬𝐴 ⊢⊥. Therefore if 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴 ∧¬𝐴, 𝑥 ⊨⊥ and thus 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐵 for any arbitrary B. In 
the other direction, suppose 𝑝 ∧  ¬𝑝 ⊨⊥ is valid but that xCx doesn’t hold. Suppose that  𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴 ∧¬𝐴 and thus everything is true and false at x. But since it also follows that 
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𝑥 ⊭ ¬𝐵 and 𝑥 ⊭ 𝐵 for any arbitrary B, x is compatible with itself, contrary to our 
assumption. The condition necessary for explosion is not included in the semantics. 
 
Proposition 4.59.2   (The logic RD-choice is constructive.) 
Proof: We have already seen that our frames don’t have the conditions necessary for 
DNE. The remaining condition is that excluded middle doesn’t hold. The excluded 
middle is that for any point 𝑥 ∈ ℱ, 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴 ∨¬𝐴 for any arbitrary A. The frame condition: 
for each 𝑥,𝑦 ∈ ℱ,∀𝑥∃𝑦(𝑥𝐶𝑦 ∧ 𝑥𝐶𝑦 → 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥 ); for sufficiency, suppose that the frame 
condition holds. If 𝑥 ⊭ 𝐴 and 𝑥 ⊭ ¬𝐴 there is some y s.t. xCy and 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥. Thus 𝑦 ⊭ 𝐴 
and 𝑦 ⊭ ¬𝐴. But then 𝑥 ⊨ ¬𝐴 by negation conditions and x isn’t a point in ℱ  after all, 
i.e.,  𝑥 ⊨⊥. 
 
For necessity, suppose that for any point x, 𝑥 ⊨ 𝐴 ∨¬𝐴 for any arbitrary A but that for 
some 𝑥,𝑦 ∈ ℱ, 𝑥𝐶𝑦 and that 𝑦 ⊑ 𝑥 fails, i.e., there is some formula true at y but not x, say, 
P. Since xCy, we have 𝑥 ⊭ ¬𝑃. But then x⊨ P follows according to our supposition and 
thus x⊨⊥. Our frame conditions (for negation) don’t include this condition necessary for 
excluded middle and thus the law of excluded middle is impossible to verify in our 
frames. 
 
4.60 Deontic Semantics for R-choice: 𝑹𝑫-choice 
I now introduce a version of neighborhood semantics. Let me start with introducing the 
notion of sets paired with a distinguished collection of subsets. 
Definition 4.61 Given W is a non-empty set, 𝑊!  is the collection of all subsets of W. 
The pair 𝑊,𝐹  where 𝐹 ∈ 𝑊!!  i.e., 𝐹 ⊆ 𝑊! , F is a set of subsets of W. 
I now need a way to assign these subsets to points, each subset being those 
formulas obligatory for the point they are assigned to.  
Definition 4.62 A neighborhood function is an N such that 𝑁:𝑊 → 𝑊!!  
N is a function taking each point to a set of sets of points, each of those sets is a 
neighborhood of the input point. 
Definition 4.62.1 A neighborhood frame, F, is a pair F= 𝑊,𝑁  where W is a non-empty 
set and N is a neighborhood function.  
 
Definition 4.62.2 A neighborhood model is a tuple ℳ = 𝑭, 𝐼 , where F is a 
neighborhood frame and I is the same interpretation from before (4.52.) Taking our frame 
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to be characterized as above, I is extended to an assignment of semantic values for all 
formulas as before with the additional condition: 
1. 𝑥 ⊨! 𝑶𝐴 iff 𝐴 ! ∈ 𝑁(𝑥) 
 
Intuitively, an evaluation now also specifies that if a set of formulas is assigned to a point, 
that formula is obligatory at that point. But not all points are equal; some are worlds, 
some are incomplete or unrealizable states of affairs. In order to ensure we can 
distinguish between inconsistent obligations within the same moral codes (which is 
disastrous) and inconsistent obligations abstracted out of equally correct but conflicting 
moral codes, we need to restrict permissibility conditions to worlds only. We will see 
why in the following section. 
 
Definition 4.62.3  (Permissibility at Worlds) 
Given a ℳ, I is also extended to assign semantic values as before, with the additional 
condition for all s ∈ Worlds 
2. 𝑠 ⊨! PA iff  W− 𝐴 ! ∉ 𝑁(𝑠)  
 
If according to an evaluation, a formula isn’t forbidden (i.e., the set complement isn’t a 
neighborhood) at a world, it is permitted. 
In order to use the neighborhood function to pick out obligations, i.e. a specific 
sort of necessity, we will need some semantic postulates and other, more general, 
algebraic properties governing N. 
 
4.63 Algebraic Properties of N  
In order to represent the information found in our moral codes (i.e., g-graphs) the 
neighborhoods N sends a point to will need certain constraints. First, N is appropriate for 
I only if no normal point, i.e., world, w includes ⊥ as a neighborhood. Next, we need a 
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superset relation such that any set, Q, that includes a neighborhood for x, Q is also a 
neighborhood for x. This entails that for every s ∈ W, W ∈ N(s). Intuitively, the superset 
relation ensures that our neighborhoods capture the order found in our moral codes. 
We also need to have some notion of O ‘not A’ and P ‘not A’ as not merely 
representing that it is obligatory (or permissible as the case may be) to object to A, but 
rather that it is obligatory (or permissible as the case may be) to not choose A. Again, we 
will use x to denote any point and w to denote worlds. 
 
Definition 4.64 (Negation as Not Choosing)  
3. 𝑥 ⊨! 𝑶~𝐴 iff I(¬𝐴) ∈ 𝑁(𝑥) 
4. 𝑤 ⊨! P~A iff  W−𝐼(¬𝐴) ∉ 𝑁(𝑤)  
5. 𝑥 ⊨! ~𝑶𝐴 iff  𝐼 𝐴 ∉ 𝑁 𝑡 , where sCt 
6. 𝑤 ⊨! ~𝑷𝐴 iff W−𝐼(𝐴) ∈ 𝑁(𝑡), where sCt 
 
Intuitively, I is telling us that when the formulas obligatory from 4.62.2 on ‘closer 
inspection’ include negation operators, we can interpret such obligations now as being 
obligatory to not choose, rather than as before, obligatory to object. Thus, we can use 𝑶~𝐴 to represent it is obligatory to not choose A. In condition (5.) we use the 
compatibility relation to define a negated obligation at x not when that obligation is not a 
neighborhood of x, but rather when that obligation is not a neighborhood of some point 
compatible with x. This ensures that this negation, as it is evaluated in terms of 
compatibility, still triggers the non-normality conditions underlying 4.57 such that if x ⊨ 
OA and x⊨ ~OA, x is non-normal, i.e., that x could not be compatible with itself: an 
inconsistent state of affairs. 
The two different notions of negation here allow us to distinguish between 
obligations to object to some plan versus an obligation to not choose some plan. After all, 
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we might have a point at which a plan is both acceptable and objectionable, so it’s 
possible that we could have an obligation to object to that plan, but still be obligated to 
choose it. For instance, we might be faced with a horrible dilemma, and part of our moral 
code is that we ought to object to having to do something that forces us to give up doing 
something we should otherwise do. Nevertheless, we ought to actually choose that 
objectionable plan (or not as the case may be). Again, the permissibility conditions are 
restricted to normal points or worlds, evaluating whether an objectionable plan is 
forbidden (4.) and in the other case (6.) whether a neighborhood of a compatible point 
forbids the plan. 
Besides the general call for making such distinctions, there is a significant 
philosophical point that this formalism allows us to represent (in fact, I take this point to 
justify the subtitle for this project, “On why Liberalism must be inconsistent to be 
correct”). Normal worlds are allowed to consider, as it were, what’s going on in 
incomplete and inconsistent places, not only with respect to how the R relation works, but 
also in terms of what points can show up in a neighborhood for a world. A normal world 
w could verify a particular sort of dilemma: w⊨ OA and w⊨ O~A. The conditions for this 
dilemma, i.e., that both I(A) and I(¬𝐴) ∈ 𝑁(𝑤), doesn’t imply that w is not compatible 
with itself. And informally, obligation has been analyzed in terms of a best choice, given 
constraints on social roles, so it shouldn’t be surprising that choosing some plan and not 
choosing some plan could both be best choices for some world. Thus, a normal world 
could have inconsistent obligations, of a sort, without itself being inconsistent. Of course, 
acting on both choices isn’t going to work, but there is nothing incoherent about the 
inconsistent action guidance. And of course, we have already seen how in PRIT we 
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jettison the idea that if we are obligated to do two plans that we are obligated to do the 
conjunction of those plans. 
But this is where we start cooking with gas. As we will see in 4.68, our actual 
liberal context doesn’t meet this condition for being a world, i.e., self-compatible relative 
to deontic consequence. If this is correct, it means that in order for liberalism to have a 
foundation, the political liberal context must itself be inconsistent. On this analysis, 
liberalism is an unrealizable plan (or rather is composed of plans that together are 
unrealizable) and this is the bar our attempts at justification must reach in its foundations. 
I turn now to further parsing the difference between worlds and points, relative to 
obligatory and permissible plans. 
 
4.65 Properties of the Neighborhoods 
I need to also consider whether 𝑅!-choice should have an axiom OA PA. In 
relational semantics, this formula corresponds to the seriality property: for any point, x, 
there is a point, y, such that y is accessible from x. For my system, the required semantic 
postulate is even simpler. 
 
Definition 4.66 (Seriality) A serial constraint on a neighborhood function for normal 
worlds is: 𝑠 ⊨! 𝑶𝐴 then ⊥∉ 𝑁(𝑠) for all normal points. 
 
We already have this condition from 4.63. No world, i.e., normal point, verifies an 
obligation to do the absurd. 4.66 merely makes this connection to seriality explicit. 
 
Proposition 4.67 Neighborhoods are serial iff OA PA is a valid formula 
 
Proof: Suppose neighborhoods for worlds are serial but OA PA is not valid. Thus ⊥∉ 𝑁(𝑤), 𝐼!(A) ∈ 𝑁(𝑤) but also W−𝐼!(𝐴) ∈ 𝑁(𝑤). But then ⊥∈ 𝑁 𝑤 .  Now suppose 
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OA PA is valid but neighborhoods aren’t serial. So we assume that 𝑤 ⊨ 𝑶𝐴 and that ⊥∈ 𝑁 𝑤 . But now 𝑤 ⊭ 𝑷𝐴 since 𝐴 ∈ 𝑁(𝑤) for every A. 
 
Seriality doesn’t apply to neighborhoods for non-normal points because we need 
to allow for another sort of dilemma to be true at such points. The type of dilemma that 
we need to use non-normal points to represent is when we are both obligated to choose 
some plan and not obligated to choose the same plan. In this sort of case, the point x can’t 
be compatible with itself and is thus a non-normal point. But the seriality rule, if general 
would require permissibility to be recursive at x and this result would allow an 
irrelevancy being verified, i.e., if x’s were R related to worlds, we could verify: if you are 
not obligated to do A, it is permitted to do A. Thus, the seriality rule only governs normal 
choice situations. But of course, validity is only a matter of what formulas are ‘true’ at 
normal worlds, so there is no loss here. 
The above comment is part of a more general fact regarding non-normal situations. 
If some point is non-normal then we don’t use the recursive procedure for determining 
some of its semantic values. Rather the model assigns non-normal points into the 
powerset of some formulas, not just atoms, as is befitting points where the rules of logic 
don’t apply. In other semantics for relevant logics, it is generally only formulas with 
implication that doesn’t use recursive procedures at non-normal worlds. This is often seen 
as intuitively plausible because of the close connection between implication and the 
corresponding consequence relation. However, in RD-choice, this notion of the ‘rules of 
logic’ i.e., the consequence relation, is extended to permission connectives; in this case, it 
is because we must take dilemmas seriously and thus, in some sense, open-ended. 
As it stands, there is only one axiom for obligation connectives in RD-choice.  
   204 
Separation 𝑶 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄 → 𝑶𝑃 ∧ 𝑶𝑄 
Separation follows trivially from neighborhoods being closed under the superset relation. 
 I now turn to putting some of this formalism to use and explicating how and why 
pluralist deontic settings such as our ‘world’ we need to make a distinction between not 
being obligated to not choose some plan and being permitted to choose some plan. In fact, 
according to RD-choice very little deontic reasoning in settings like ours will tells us at 
all what is permissible, rather only what we aren’t obligated to do, all else being equal. 
Informally, in a pluralist deontic setting like liberalism, not only do we allow for two 
equally correct moral codes prescribe conflicting plans, but also that one code may 
prescribe a plan the other doesn’t. If the former sort of disagreement were the only to 
occur, we could represent a liberal setting in terms of normal worlds. But we also seem to 
be stuck with acceptable codes both prescribing and failing to prescribe the same plan; 
thus we must be, deontically speaking, in a point that isn’t self-compatible. 
 
Proposition 4.68 The actual world is a non-normal point given the existence of moral 
dilemmas such that we are both obligated and not obligated to choose some plan. 
 
Proof:  Since we are assuming that liberalism presupposes a plurality of moral and 
political codes, some of which will say we are obligated to choose A and others say we 
are not obligated to choose A, the conditions for our setting to be non-normal are met. 
 
The non-normality of the actual world can also be used to support the idea that an 
enumeration of moral properties in an actual situation cannot always be used to 
recursively determine what one ought to or may do.  
 
Proposition 4.69 If we restrict attention to models that include only normal worlds 
obligation is interdefinable with weak permission. 
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Proof: We need to show that 𝑶𝐴 ↔ ~𝑷~𝐴 is valid across all neighborhood frames that 
include only normal points. First, let’s suppose that OA is not true at s but that 𝑠 ⊨ ~𝑷~𝐴, 
i.e. a counterexample. Thus 𝑊 − ¬𝐴 ∈ 𝑁(𝑡), where sCt and so 𝐴 ∈ 𝑁(𝑡) since t is 
also normal. But since 𝑠 ⊭ 𝑶𝐴, it follows that 𝑡 ⊨ ~𝑶𝐴. Thus 𝐴 ∉ 𝑁 𝑡 , a 
contradiction. In the other direction, suppose that 𝑠 ⊭ ~𝑷~𝐴 and thus 𝑊 − ¬𝐴 ∉ 𝑁 𝑡 , 
where sCt. Assume that 𝑠 ⊨ 𝑶𝐴, i.e., a counterexample. Since s is normal, 𝑠 ⊭ ~𝑶𝐴 also. 
But then 𝑡 ⊨ 𝑶𝐴 and 𝐴 ∈ 𝑁(𝑡), a contradiction. 
 
Proposition 4.69 illuminates the relationship between must and only, making clear 
that it parallels the relationship between best and ought. Letting ~𝑷~𝐴 represent the idea 
that it is impermissible to not choose A, this provides a good characterization of what we 
must choose, namely A. But since 𝑶𝐴 ↔ ~𝑷~𝐴 is valid only when limited to normal 
worlds, this interdefinability only happens when there is only one consistent moral code 
in play. Thus, if we must choose A, it is because it is the only obligation possible. 
Therefore, must is related to ought as only is related to best in PRIT, thanks to RD-choice. 
It just requires that the political world we are most familiar with turn out to be a morally 
inconsistent one.  
 
4.70 Summary 
 In this chapter, I analyzed obligation in terms of a special sort of predicate. Using 
an order-theoretic approach, I showed how we could represent obligation as a best 
acceptable choice from among alternatives. As a crucial tool for carrying out this analysis, 
we represented normative codes, moral and political, as graphs, and I looked at various 
ways to manipulate the graphs to represent different sorts of reasoning. I looked at how 
we could sort what is best to choose from when faced with only a bunch of bad options. I 
also found a method for representing what to do if our best option becomes unavailable. 
These last few techniques proved useful in demonstrating some powerful constraints on 
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what sort of moral or political codes can count as legitimate or principled in a liberal 
society.  
 However, treating obligation as a best choice of acceptable options in its full 
graphic detail is problematic; that is, if we want to use a formal language to reason about 
and with these mathematical objects. There are good reasons to abstract away much of 
the choice structure when we want to use logical connectives. Thus, I turned to the idea 
of plans. After a brief introduction of a weakest proof-theory i.e., with no structural rules, 
that could represent multiple sources of obligation, I derived a proof that could be 
characterized as a criterion for what counts as a legitimate moral code under conditions of 
pluralism. That is, moral codes in a pluralist context must contain an obligation calling 
for us to find a way so that other moral codes couldn’t object to our choices. 
 I then worked out the various properties fusion and implication should have by 
introducing a frame semantics. The logic was then proved to be paraconsistent, relevant, 
and constructive.  
 Finally, I introduced the technique for taking the predicate analysis of obligation, 
i.e., from the graph-theory, and representing obligation as a logical word: neighborhood 
semantics. With the neighborhood function, the logic gathers all the best of acceptable 
choices relative to an input world or point, and returns with obligations corresponding to 
each such best choice. With this technique, we have a way of treating obligation as best 
of acceptable choices as a logical word without being itself in some sense an analysis of 
obligation (as, arguably, there is with the standard sort of relational possible world 
semantics). After explaining some of the ways we need the neighborhood function to 
behave, I looked at the seriality condition for neighborhoods. The seriality condition 
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would ensure that we could always infer that it is permissible to do what we are obligated 
to do. With this condition, together with a distinction between different sorts of dilemmas, 
I proved in a formal setting what had been argued earlier in informal terms: that since 
there are both types of moral dilemmas, ours is in fact a non-normal ‘world.’ This gave 
precise bounds to what it would take to justify liberalism: that liberalism itself is an 
unrealizable plan, not that it just takes the unrealizable composition of plans seriously. 
This result also led to my final proof: that there could be only one source of obligations, 
i.e., no disagreement or conflict could be possible, if we must do something. Thus, the 
PRIT system can represent the claim that must is related to ought as only is related to best. 
This result means that pluralism doesn’t require rejecting a systematic approach. It does 
however require that if liberalism is cogent, it must be an inconsistent system. 
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Chapter Five: Final Remarks and Directions for Future Research 
5.0 Summary  
This project has aimed at providing an analysis of obligation and its cognates that 
can make sense in a pluralist context. I motivated this research by arguing that a pluralist 
approach to liberal foundations makes sense on two fronts. First, I argued that by 
allowing for multiple correct, but conflicting, answers to foundational questions, some of 
the problems facing a systematic foundation for liberalism could be solved. Second, I 
argued that any constructive approach to the foundations of liberalism is also, prima facie, 
a pluralist approach. But without a clear sense of what obligation can mean when there 
are conflicting principles or obligations, we can’t know what sort of problems we may be 
unleashing upon unsuspecting political theorists.  
In order to explain the nature of obligation when we assume pluralism, I argued 
that we should use some of the ready-made tools used by logicians. Specifically, relevant 
logicians have been investigating consequence relations that could distinguish between 
explosive inconsistencies and inconsistencies that can nonetheless be fruitfully used in 
deductive reasoning. A connected reason for taking a formal approach is that we have a 
tradition in deontic logic for treating obligation as a logical word. It seemed like a good 
fit for exploring the relevant conceptual possibilities, given that we could find a logic that 
satisfies our criteria.  
We next looked at the nature of ethical or political pluralism in more detail. After 
all, the clearer the picture of pluralism, the clearer the criteria my analysis might satisfy. 
In this section I explained and developed what it meant for a multiplicity of theories to be 
a philosophically relevant pluralism: the pluralism must be non-trivial and have 
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interesting disagreement between its theories. To do so, I introduced the concept of 
theories being rivals. Rivals may equivocate upon certain properties at some levels of 
theoretical description, but the conclusions they draw on our target level must use an 
unequivocal sense of the same predicate. Thus rivals may disagree about how to answer 
the same well-posed question. 
Formalizing obligation quickly becomes complicated when we aim to represent a 
wide range of essential and acceptable inferences found in actual best practices. In this 
project, I focused on the issue of the order in which we live up to prescriptions. As shown, 
it is difficult to model how one obligation could trump or override another, especially 
when standard formalization suggests we treat obligations as propositions or actions true 
at all morally accessible worlds. But investigating the formal conditions behind trumping 
isn’t merely an exercise in trying to solve puzzles in deontic logic. I argued that 
principled cooperation and coordination between disagreeing political viewpoints calls 
for such moral codes to contain an obligation ‘to get along’ that trumps their other 
prescriptions, that is, when needed. 
Informally, I argued that we should analyze obligations in terms of contrastive 
principles. I developed this conception of obligations by adapting from the notion of 
contrastive explanation, as proposed by Van Fraassen. By taking moral principles as 
answers to a May I? question, where the topic and contrast class are specified, as in the 
explanation case, we can account for the fact that decisions are about choices. By using 
the account of contrastive principles, we could represent trumping in terms of changing 
the nature of our action-guiding question. Moreover, the nature of contrastive principles 
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suggested a powerful analysis of obligation: that we should choose the best acceptable 
option from among the relevant alternatives. 
Finally, the previously informal or syntactical concepts of choices and obligations, 
specifically the resulting ideality ordering and related moral orderings are treated 
formally with graph-theory. A bare-bones proof-theory was introduced to reason about 
and with the concepts defined by this order theory. I then used this formally minimalist 
language to deduce a criterion for any moral code under conditions of pluralism: that any 
such code must guarantee that acting upon its prescriptions is compatible with the 
obligations of rival codes. I argued that this criterion has significant philosophical value 
when it comes to identifying what sort of moral or political codes could count as 
deserving a hearing, i.e., in a liberal democracy. 
The formal semantics for the language RD-choice was then introduced and shown 
to be paraconsistent, relevant and constructive. Next I introduced a semantics that allows 
us to ignore the theoretical source of a prescription, as needed for a pluralist version of 
obligation: neighborhood semantics. And as promised, I proved that ‘ought’ doesn’t 
imply ‘can’ let alone ‘may’ when moral pluralism is assumed. Perhaps more surprising, I 
proved that our world, assuming liberalism and thus pluralism, is not a normal world in 
the logical sense, i.e., in terms of deontic logic. This means that what we can say follows 
from a choice being obligatory is very limited indeed.  
Obviously, we can’t assume that there is always an answer for any moral question, 
let alone one unique answer. But the results of this project allow me to say a bit more 
than that. We can’t assume that a rule for cooperating or coordinating being fair today 
implies that it will be fair tomorrow. They could be trumped after all. We have to treat 
   211 
what is fair or just, even in terms of fundamental policy, as always being subject to 
revision, or even in some areas in a case-by-case process. Thus, PRIT promises a 
powerful way to justify making constitutional law amendable or to even include 
notwithstanding clauses.  
But along with such clear pluralist limitations to the reach of deontic reasoning, I 
proved some significant claims regarding the nature of moral or political codes. We saw 
that principled liberals won’t take an opportunity to get their own way and that we should 
find ways so that those who disagree with us can’t object to our choices. We also saw that 
fair coordination matters just as much as fair cooperation. That is, when it comes to 
theories of how we should live together (while still disagreeing about how to live together 
and about what is good in life), we need to make sure how we settle on a path forward is 
fair, not just where we are headed. 
 
5.1 Future Directions 
5.1.1 Realism/Anti-realism Debates 
In the course of investigating obligation under conditions of pluralism, I have 
abstracted out some general principles or questions of wider theoretical interest. In 
Chapter One I showed that constructive foundations in general are also prima facie 
pluralisms. This seems to suggest the following conjecture: that debates regarding the use 
of logical principles to frame realist/anti-realist questions are far more fraught, to say the 
least, than may have first been thought. For example, supposing a standard way to go 
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semantic anti-realist in some domain is via constructivism, one is thereby a dialetheist if 
we take this well-trodden path for truth predicates, at least prima facie. 
5.1.2 Pluralism and Modalities 
I introduced here a new technique (or rather synthesized two prior ones) such that 
that we can analyze some logical words, i.e., modalities, in terms of a class of predicates 
and the relevant properties of a suitable function. This suggests that what we call 
‘neighborhood’ semantics may have more philosophical value than just the nice 
mathematical features of being a more general account of possible world semantics.102 
Previously, neighborhood semantics accounts relied on the mathematical properties of the 
neighborhood function to provide a merely formal analysis of the relevant necessity. If I 
am correct regarding moral necessity, i.e., obligation, we may have a new philosophical 
method for identifying and distinguishing between different sorts of necessities: the 
relevant classes of worlds are predicatively defined in terms of an independent 
characteristic. This leads to a second question, supposing that many central concepts in 
philosophy can be analyzed independently of a formal notion of necessity: Why is it that 
when we can treat certain words as a modality, such as knowledge, obligation, proof etc. 
that we can then have a pluralism regarding the corresponding subject matter if we use 
neighborhood semantics to represent them as necessities?  
To put the philosophical point more directly: in the examples here (knowledge, 
obligation etc.) the relevant terms admit of analysis independent of the semantics of                                                         102 That is, with the right properties we can have a function that for any class of Kripke frames and models we get a class of neighborhood models that validates all and only those formulas verified by the Kripke models (but not vice versa).  
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Kripke frames and its cognates, such as possible worlds. When we can combine such an 
independent analysis with truth-conditions for a type of necessity, a philosophically 
significant pluralism regarding the concept is possible. And that’s surprising. 
5.1.3 Philosophy of Language 
The paraconsistency (and other logical features) needed to make sense of 
pluralism have repercussions regarding what the corresponding concepts can even mean. 
In Chapter Two, I showed that we have a clear principle dividing relativism from 
pluralism. If X according to theory 𝑌! is 𝐴! we have relativism. If X according to theory 𝑌! is A we have pluralism. Pluralism abstracts away or ignores the source, i.e. the 
relevant theory, of the predication. The idea here is that with pluralism, it doesn’t matter 
to what the terms mean which theory was used. This suggests that some notions of 
inferential semantics or proof-theoretic accounts of meaning, i.e., doctrines that meaning 
is derived or read off the inferences we can make with the terms, are (at least) incomplete 
with regards to pluralism.  
At one level of analysis we keep track of which theory says what as befitting 
paraconsistent inferences. With this level of analysis, valid inferences directly depend on 
parameters corresponding to the relevant theories. But at more abstract levels (i.e., those 
suitable for pluralist contexts) valid inferences are independent of which theory was 
originally used. The question here is: how can we know which class of inferences matter 
for the meaning of the relevant terms? Or if both levels matter, how can we make sense 
of what the relevant terms mean? 
   214 
5.1.4 Deontic Logic 
 Much of the motivation for contrastive principles in Chapter Three came from 
dissatisfaction with how order puzzles are treated in deontic logic literature. It seems that 
even other independently invented accounts that purport to use contrastive 
representations of obligation don’t solve these puzzles as clearly as I think is possible. 
My approach treats the modality as binding over the entire choice structure and I think 
that this feature will make a large difference. Specifically, I propose that the graph-theory 
in Chapter Four can be used to represent reasoning that avoids the order puzzles common 
to deontic modalities and do so in a principled manner. 
5.1.5 A New Family of Liberalisms 
 I propose that by using the liberal abstraction norm of responsibility from Chapter 
One, I could develop a new family of liberalisms. The idea is that we could use the 
responsibilities of an ordinary fiduciary as a starting point for articulating the concept of a 
social fiduciary. If I am correct, the responsibilities of a social fiduciary could account for 
treating equivalent concerns equally— with liberty being of paramount concern.  
There are three components to how I plan on formulating the social fiduciary 
perspective. First is in terms of choosing under conditions of ignorance. Here I plan to 
use the well-trodden metaphor of the veil of ignorance, but I propose a better rule of 
choice under ignorance than may have been used: the lottery assumption rule. It states 
that it is never rational to assume that you are in a minority group when choosing under 
conditions of ignorance. The resulting character of such choices under ignorance forces 
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us to make explicit and justify a social ontology for our social fiduciaries, i.e., on the pain 
of very racist, classist, hetero-normative policies being allowed in. It then seems that the 
responsibilities of a relevant social fiduciary should include minimizing paternalist 
intervention. I propose that this responsibility, i.e., to minimize paternalist intervention, is 
what social fiduciary foundations can use to analyze, explain, or represent the value of 
political liberty.  
If correct about how this will work out, this approach to liberal foundations would 
make explicit the role of social ontology when we articulate what makes fundamental 
policy just and liberal. Moreover, from some preliminary investigations, and despite the 
seeming tilt towards preferring those who start with more to invest; building a social 
fiduciary perspective based on a responsibility norm actually could end up very 
egalitarian and perhaps more so than wellbeing based approaches. 
 
5.1.6 Legitimacy of a Liberal State 
Given some uncontroversial assumptions, Sen’s redundancy complaint from 
Chapter One seems to underestimate the connection between what I propose is a thin 
notion of legitimacy, reasonable expectations, and the process of justifying basic 
institutions. General principles of justice (to adapt a phrase from Nelson Goodman 
[1983]) commit us to deciding unrealized cases of right. This suggests that questions of 
legitimacy specifically focus on what injustices the state will remedy. It seems plausible 
that the notion of legitimacy, in its thinnest form, involves our reasonable expectations 
regarding the sorts of things the state will find unjust in the foreseeable future. However, 
to make sense of how the deliverances of a plurality of moral codes could work together 
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in deciding what injustices a state should remedy, we will need PRIT or at least 
something fairly similar.  
There are three interconnected questions that seem pertinent. The first is the most 
general: What is the nature of legitimacy?  The second: Why does knowing what a state 
stands for matter? The third: What is the relationship between legitimacy and justifying 
the basic structure of society? The answer, in different ways, is what I call the 
convergence relation between the goals and methods of a state and the moral codes of its 
citizens.  
I propose that we could define the convergence relation in terms of whether the 
means and ends characterizing a state (and because there is often no clear distinction 
between ends and means, hereafter, the states ‘meands’) can be defended from relevant 
criticism given the moral codes of its citizens and likewise for the moral codes of citizens 
regarding the principles that characterize the meands of their state. The intuitive notion 
here is that we should take a state to be legitimate if its meands coheres with the moral 
codes of citizens. Identifying the meands of a state presupposes being able to identify the 
sorts of injustices (and the respective remedies) citizens can reasonably expect the state to 
so remedy. If the choice to remedy (and how) a sort of injustice can be defended from 
criticism drawn from the moral codes of citizens, it seems that the state is legitimate for 
those citizens. 
I suspect that this convergence relation, as an account of a suitably thin notion of 
legitimacy, in fact reinforces a distinction between justifying the basic structure or nature 
of a liberal state and justifying concrete cases of policy choices. If so, responding to this 
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aspect of Sen’s objection, we could find more ways to develop the resources of PRIT to 
solve larger meta-ethical considerations. 
 
5.1.7 Comparing PRIT with CA 
 As suggested, with some of PRIT’s system sorted out, we could begin to compare 
how well it stacks up against CA systems in general. I argued in Chapter Two that CA 
systems generally use a privileged perspective to rank options. If this generally amounts a 
uniquely correct perspective, foundational pluralism can’t be assumed. On the other hand, 
there is no uniquely correct perspective by which choices in PRIT are ranked. What 
remains to be seen is whether a CA system could have a plurality of perspectives ranking 
options. 
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Appendix 
 
The basic idea behind neighborhood semantics is that a formula, P, is necessary at a 
world, s, if the truth set of P is one of the sets for the neighborhood function on s. Let me 
start with perhaps the most intuitive example of how these semantics work. Since the 
truth set of a conjunction, e.g. (P & Q) = ( 𝑃 ∩ 𝑄 ) can be smaller than the truth set of 
either conjunct, a necessary conjunct at s does not imply either conjunct is also necessary. 
 
Proposition 6.0: 𝑶 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄 → 𝑶𝑃 ∧ 𝑶𝑄 is not valid in the class of neighborhood frames 
 
Proof: Suppose Sit = {w, x, y} and that N(w) = { {w, x}, {y}}. Let 𝑃 ! = 𝑦, 𝑥  and 𝑄 ! =   𝑦,𝑤 . Thus 𝑃 ∩ 𝑄 = {𝑦} and so 𝑤 ⊨ 𝑶 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄 . But 𝑦, 𝑥 ∉ 𝑁(𝑤) thus 𝑤 ⊭ 𝑶𝑃. 
 
Proposition 6.1: (𝑶𝑃 ∧ 𝑶𝑄)  →  𝑶 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄  is not valid in the class of neighborhood 
frames 
 
Proof: Suppose Sit = {w, x, y} and that N(w) = { {w, y}, {y, x}}. Let 𝑃 ! = 𝑦, 𝑥  and 𝑄 ! =   𝑦,𝑤 . Again, 𝑃 ∩ 𝑄 = {𝑦}. So while 𝑤 ⊨ 𝑶𝑃 ∧ 𝑶𝑄 since 𝑃 ! ∈ 𝑁(𝑤) 
and 𝑄 ! ∈ 𝑁(𝑤),    ∉ 𝑁(𝑤) and thus 𝑤 ⊭  𝑶 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄 . 
 
Proposition 6.2: 𝑶 𝑃 → 𝑄 → 𝑶𝑃 → 𝑶𝑄  is not valid in the class of neighborhood 
frames 
 
Proof: Suppose Sit = {w, x, y, z} and that N(w) = { {w, y, z}, {w, x}}. Let 𝑃 ! = 𝑤, 𝑥  
and 𝑄 ! =   𝑤,𝑦 . Thus ¬𝑃 ∪ 𝑄 = {𝑤,𝑦, 𝑧} and so 𝑤 ⊨  𝑶 𝑃 → 𝑄 . But while 𝑃 ! ∈ 𝑁 𝑤 , 𝑄 ! ∉ 𝑁(𝑤). Therefore 𝑤 ⊭ 𝑶𝑃 → 𝑶𝑄. 
 
Proposition 6.3: 𝑶𝑃 → 𝑃 is not valid in the class of neighborhood frames 
 
Proof: Suppose Sit = {w, x} and that N(w) = {{x}}. Let 𝑃 ! = 𝑥 . Thus 𝑤 ⊨  𝑶𝑃 but 𝑤 ⊭ 𝑃. 
 
Proposition 6.4: 𝑃 → 𝑄 → 𝑶𝑃 → 𝑶𝑄  is not valid in the class of neighborhood 
frames 
 
Proof: Assume that 𝑤 ∈ ¬𝑃 ∪ 𝑄 , so we need to show that ¬𝑃 ∪ 𝑄 ∉ 𝑁(𝑤). Let 
Sit = {w, x} and that N(w) = {{x}}. So we need to set 𝑃 ! =    and 𝑄 ! =   𝑤 , and 
thus 𝑄 ! ∉ 𝑁(𝑤). Therefore 𝑤 ⊭ 𝑶𝑃 → 𝑶𝑄. 
 
Next I show that if sets are defined extensionally, equivalent formula make for equivalent 
necessities. 
 
Proposition 6.5: 𝑃 ↔ 𝑄 → 𝑶𝑃 ↔ 𝑶𝑄  is valid in the class of neighborhood frames 
with sets defined extensionally. 
 
   219 
Proof: Since we assume that 𝑃 ↔ 𝑄 iff 𝑃 = 𝑄 , if 𝑃 ! ∈ 𝑁(𝑤) for any w, then so is 𝑄 ! ∈ 𝑁(𝑤). 
 
 
I also claimed that if we can aggregate obligations into a obligatory conjunction we can 
conflate the distinction between inferring permission from obligation and there being no 
obligations to do the impossible. This claim is classical, i.e., requires explosion and 
excluded middle, so it’s damage is limited, so to speak, in this project. However, one 
might have noticed that the seriality condition on neighborhood functions suggests a 
similar issue. Regardless, here is the proof. 
 
Proposition 6.6 There being no obligations to do the impossible classically implies 
seriality and seriality classically implies there being no obligations to do the impossible. 
 
Proof: Suppose 𝑶𝑃 ∧ 𝑶𝑄 → 𝑶 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄  and that seriality fails. Thus, 𝑥 ⊨ 𝑶𝐴 and 𝑥 ⊨ ¬𝑶𝐴 by excluded middle. So, 𝑥 ⊨ 𝑶 𝐴 ∧¬𝐴  by our schema and since 𝐴 ∧¬𝐴 ⊨⊥ 
by explosion, 𝑥 ⊨ 𝑶 ⊥. To avoid this result, we need the seriality condition (and proving 
the other direction is trivial.) 
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